centrifugal forces of the immense and unmanageable empire. Under their influence the caliph became a PersianGreat King,' more and more withdrawn from public view in a halo of reverence; and the 'Abbasid court became a byword among the hardy Arabs for luxury and self-indulgence. Most people, when they think of a caliph, form an 'Arabian Nights' image of 'the golden prime of the good' Harun-er-Rashid; but it was really an afternoon, drawing towards a lurid sunset. There was plenty of music and the song of the girl like an Oriental willow,' much wine and festivity, but little statesmanship. To Harun's son, El-Ma'mun, Arabic literature indeed owed much, especially in the study of some branches of Greek philosophy, but he was a ruler of exceptional mental breadth. It was a liberal policy, however mistaken, that led him to take the revolutionary step of conciliating the Shi'a, who abounded in Persia, by nominating their Imam as his successor in the caliphate and proclaiming the fact on his coinage. The indignation of the good people of Baghdad, who immediately set up a rival caliph of unblemished orthodoxy, caused a hasty reversal of this curious policy; but that it should have been entertained for a moment shows how far the caliph had departed from the creed of his forefathers, and how powerful was the pressure of Persian ideas.

After El-Ma'mun the caliphate of Baghdad rapidly degenerated. Turkish mercenaries were called in to protect the caliph from his own subjects; the very capital was temporarily vacated from fear of the mob; caliphs were set up and deposed at pleasure by their Turkish bodyguard; many were assassinated, starved, or poisoned; and at one time there were three dethroned blinded caliphs in captivity at Baghdad. The orthodox Successor of the Prophet had to submit to the control of the schismatic Buweyhid princes, and once, even in Baghdad, the Abode of Peace,' prayers were said for the heretical Fatimid caliph of Egypt. The religious sultans of the race of Seljuk released the caliphs from their duress, but could not restore their prestige, though now and again a caliph of some virility would widen the bounds of his small dominions round Baghdad and resume the immemorial war with the

Eastern Emperor. In spite of flashes of ability and a more sustained level of literary culture, such a caliphate was not of the stuff to last; and, when a misguided 'Abbasid summoned the aid of Chingiz Khan and his Mongols to chastise a Moslem prince, the end was not far off. It came with the sack of Baghdad by Hulagu Khan in 1258.

It is true that a flicker of the flame was rekindled when Beybars, the Mamluk Sultan, set up a refugee of the deposed family in Egypt; and seventeen of these later 'Abbasids posed there as caliphs until the Ottoman conquest in 1517, when Selim I compelled his captive, El-Mutawekkil, to assign to him his sacred office, and afterwards handed it on to successive Turkish sultans. But, as we have said before,* these fainéant caliphs of Cairo had little prestige even there, and were useful merely in preserving the established formality, otiose as it was, of legitimising the appointment of a prince by the caliph's diploma. In the days when the Baghdad caliphate was at its weakest, the princes who set up dynasties in Persia and India liked to hold a formal patent from their spiritual chief, just as Napoleon wished to be crowned by the Pope, or as people who set no value on the sacrament of matrimony would not consider themselves properly married unless in church. But, wherever such a superstition prevailed among rulers, we may be sure that it reflected a popular sentiment which could not safely be ignored.

Yet even the spiritual repute of the caliphate had early lost much of its force by the waning of the temporal power of the 'Abbasids. Spain was lost to them from the beginning; and, though the Omayyad prince who escaped from the massacre of his kindred and was welcomed by the Arabs at Cordova as their Emir did not assume the sacred title, and the Spanish Moslems managed quite happily with no caliph for a hundred and seventy years, the greatest of his descendants, 'Abd-er-Rahman, at length took the style of caliph in 929. Long before this, Morocco had established a legitimate caliphate; from the 8th century the 'Abbasid influence there was gone. In the 9th, the rest of North

Quarterly Review,' No. 443, April 1915, p. 530.

Africa and Egypt became independent, and in the 10th the Fatimid caliphs made it officially Shi'a. The prestige of the caliphs of Baghdad sank to zero. With the fleets of the great caliph of Cordova sweeping the Mediterranean, the armies of the Fatimids flowing on through Egypt to Syria, the Carmathians spreading anarchy in Arabia and even thieving the sacred Black Stone from the Kaaba of Mecca, and a schismatic prince holding Baghdad itself, what had become of 'the independence of the caliphate from foreign control'? where was 'the guardianship of the Holy Cities'?

The orthodox caliphate had, in fact, become a phantom, a subject for theologians and canon lawyers to debate, but no longer a matter of supreme moment. The spiritual head of Islam, if he were also the head of the most powerful Moslem State and army, was doubtless a formidable power; but a caliph who had no army, who was recognised by only a portion of the divided Moslem world and was unable to enforce his spiritual authority anywhere, was but half a caliph even in the regions which acknowledged him, and no caliph at all elsewhere.

We have briefly examined the manner in which the caliphate devolved, as seen in the light of history. We have seen that the various principles of election, nomination, and arbitration all gave way to the simple law of the strong arm, except where the schismatic, but effective, doctrine of Divine Right prevailed, as it does to this day, in various interpretations, in a notable part of the Moslem world. It remains to consider the views of orthodox (Sunni) jurists, which are, however, valid only for those who agree with them. The chief qualifications which they put forward as necessary in a rightful caliph are five in number. (1) Descent from the Kureysh. This, as we have seen, is probably an ex post facto condition; because a long series of caliphs were in fact Kurashis, therefore all must belong to that tribe. It is repudiated by many sects, but may still have value in the eyes of the Arabs. (2) Election by a conclave of Elders or Notables-a form still kept up by the 'Ulama of Constantinople, but merely as a form. Election has usually been a mere acceptance of an already settled succession. 'Omar was not elected, nor were most of

the caliphs of Damascus and Baghdad, nor, least of all, the caliphs of the Shi'a, of whom Sunni theologians take no count. (3) Nomination by a previous caliph. This condition was not fulfilled by Abu-Bekr or 'Ali or Mo'awiya or Abu-l-'Abbas, the four founders of the Righteous, the Schismatic, the Omayyad, and the 'Abbasid caliphates. When there was nomination, it was often set aside, and its necessity is not obvious. There is no conferring of Holy Orders in orthodox Islam. (4) The Guardianship of the Harameyn, or Holy Cities of Mecca and Medina. The cities have often been in other hands than the caliphs', and have even been held by Fatimid and Suleyhid schismatics. From the 10th to the 16th century they were not under the temporal authority of any caliphs. (5) Custody of certain alleged relics of the Prophet. This is a mere argumentum ad vulgus, which no serious jurist would press.

None of these conditions stands the test of history. There remains one more rule. When Moslem lawyers cannot deduce a rule from the Koran or Traditions, literally or by analogy, they rely upon ijmā', the general consensus of believers, corresponding to the Catholic canon 'quod ubique, quod semper, quod ab omnibus.'* It is not the same as the dictum 'vox populi vox Dei,' for it presumes qualified theologians, as in the councils of the Church, and excludes the mere opinion of the masses. Undoubtedly it is an important principle, and as such is recognised as one of the four roots of Moslem faith; but ijma' is difficult of attainment and subject to error, just as General Councils, according to the Articles of Religion, may err, and sometimes have erred,' so that 'things ordained by them . . . have neither strength nor authority.' Accordingly, the rule of the general consensus of Moslems has been variously interpreted by jurists. It really represents the gradual growth of the best public opinion, and holds hopes for the future of Islam; but it is exceedingly difficult in application. Supposing a caliph to be de facto caliph by consent of the whole Moslem world, his position, apart from any other qualifications, would be unassailable. History, however, shows that, since the seventh century, no such

* See Prof. D. B. Macdonald, op. cit., 57, 101, 105, 292.

general consensus has ever obtained, and no one caliph has ever been universally acknowledged. Therefore, the last rule proves as little valid as the rest; and we come back either to the view that 'might is right,' or else to the rival theory that the right is divine, conferred by God upon a privileged apostolical succession.

POSTSCRIPT.-Since this was written an article on 'The Caliphate' by the Right Hon. Ameer Ali has been published in the 'Contemporary Review' for June, which should be carefully studied by those who wish to understand the views of Indian Moslems, the great majority of whom-perhaps 80 millions-are orthodox Sunnis and pray for 'the caliph of the time' every Friday in the mosques. It is difficult, as the learned author says, for those unfamiliar with the history of the caliphate to form an even approximately just estimate of the real bearing of such an institution upon the sentiment of a people; but it is of the utmost importance that their feeling on the subject should be studiously respected. Time alone can show how deep it may be. Meanwhile the slightest interference is most earnestly to be deprecated. 'Solvitur ambulando' applies to this as to other problems.

STANLEY LANE-POOLE.

Vol. 224.-No. 444.

N