and the result justified Von der Goltz' opinion that a successful disembarkation was inconceivable. The indomitable bravery of the officers and men of the naval and military forces employed in what was really a forlorn hope was, however, equal to the task.

It is unnecessary to touch on the details of the operations, of which excellent descriptions have been published in the Press. The general plan was formed on normal lines, but the conditions presented unusual difficulties. The essential factor of surprise could only be attained in a very limited degree. The Turks, having had ample warning, had elaborated a scheme of defence, assembled large forces, and completed their dispositions. The few points at which a landing was at all practicable were occupied by detachments provided with machine-guns and quick-firers which swept the approaches. Reserves were conveniently placed for the speedy reinforcement of any threatened points. Feints at other points than those chosen for the actual disembarkation were, therefore, of little efficacy. Owing to the character of the coast, of which the Turks took full advantage, the fire of the ships failed to give the landing-parties effective support. But in spite of appalling losses from hostile fire which could not be subdued, the survivors persevered, and the landings were ultimately successful at all points. Reinforcements were promptly put ashore, and positions were won and held, under cover of which the further landing of troops and supplies could proceed in comparative security.

The unprecedented task of landing troops on a difficult coast, under the close fire of concealed positions, having been accomplished, it might have been expected that the chief difficulties had been overcome. Everything, however, depended on the initial success being followed up before the enemy could organise an effective resistance. It soon became evident that the forces immediately available were inadequate for the purpose. It was impossible to act on the fundamental principle of the offensive, namely, to 'strike quickly, strike hard, and keep on striking.' The disembarkation of troops, with the necessary matériel, at the restricted landing-places, was a tedious operation, and was hampered by the absence of communications over the steep and rugged

slopes which intervene between the beaches and the more practicable country inland. The heavy losses sustained at the outset had reduced the effective strength; and the numbers which the enemy could bring forward to oppose the advance had, doubtless, been underestimated. The Turks were able, in consequence, to occupy their prepared positions in superior strength; and the attempts made to dislodge them proved abortive. The ships were unable to co-operate effectively, partly on account of the flat trajectory of their guns, and partly because of the risk of mines and torpedo attack. The want of heavy guns, apparent during the first few weeks, was doubtless due to the difficulty of putting them ashore. The fighting assumed the now familiar character of trench warfare; and, while the Allies' positions are secure, and the enemy's strength is being gradually worn down, progress is necessarily slow.

The attack of June 4, which was directed against the entire front of the Turkish positions, appears to have failed to attain the success anticipated owing to inadequate artillery preparation. This, however, was not due to any fault on the part of the artillery. The Turkish positions, and the wire entanglements covering them, were skilfully concealed; and the former, owing to the nature of the country, supplemented by well-designed entrenchments, were of exceptional strength. The artillery of the field force was, therefore, unable to demolish the defences, or even to shake the moral of the troops occupying them. On the greater part of the left or western wing, where the fleet could render effective support, the attack was immediately successful; but owing to the nature of the country it was impossible to direct the fire on the defences further inland. Similarly on the eastern flank, the French made some progress; but the fire of the ships was probably less effective owing to their being obliged to keep at a distance to avoid torpedo attack. Our Allies are also under the disadvantage of being exposed to the fire of batteries on the Asiatic shore.

Though the attack on June 4 failed, the operations of June 28 were completely successful. In consequence of the information and experience gained during the previous fighting, the attack was restricted to about a

mile of front on the left flank. It was arranged to take place by two stages, each being prepared by the fire of heavy artillery. This, and the effective co-operation of the guns of the fleet, enabled the infantry to attain the objectives assigned to it; and the operations resulted in the left flank being advanced one thousand yards.

Turkey's military resources have been developed, under German management, to an extent that may well have seemed impossible. Statements regarding numbers are naturally conflicting, but there is no doubt that the training of new troops had made considerable progress before she joined in the war, and that seven or eight new divisions have been added to the field army. The troops available for the defence of Constantinople, including fortress troops, have been estimated at 275,000, the greater part probably being engaged in the Peninsula. The organisation and efficiency of the army have been much improved under the direction of German officers. The problem of arming and equipping new troops seems to have been solved. The Turks appear to be well provided with machine-guns and artillery, and according to all accounts they are lavish in the expenditure of ammunition. Shell-factories, worked largely by German skilled labour, are said to run night and day, and to be capable of manufacturing shells for the largest guns and howitzers. In fact, the forecasts which anticipated an early shortage of munitions were as fallacious as those which foretold that Germany would starve before July.

During the past three months the situation on the western front has undergone no material change. The German attack in the neighbourhood of Ypres, beginning on April 22, seemed at first to be the commencement of the promised spring offensive. It was probably designed to convey that impression; and it doubtless formed part of the scheme for influencing neutral opinion. With the aid of poisonous gas the enemy drove back a portion of the French front between Ypres and Dixmude, and gained possession of the Yser Canal between Boesinghe and Steenstraate, necessitating a retraction of the British line north and east of Ypres. Our French Allies subsequently recovered part of the lost ground; and, since

that period, the enemy's attitude on the whole of the western front has been in the main defensive. Among the Allies' gains the most important are those north of Arras, between Neuville and Notre Dame de Lorette, and on the heights of the Meuse at Eparges.

The success of the Germans in maintaining their line with numbers inferior to those of the Allies has been partly due to their elaborate system of entrenchments, consisting of successive lines of deep, narrow trenches, protected by barbed wire, and connected by communications of similar design; but chiefly, perhaps, to the skilful use of a large number of machine-guns, and a preponderance of heavy artillery amply supplied with ammunition. By means of these scientific adjuncts it has been possible to hold positions with relatively small numbers of men, and also to minimise losses. In this respect the Allied Powers were found unprepared; but all, except Belgium, who has lost her factories, have been working hard to repair the deficiency. Great Britain has been embarrassed in the effort by the want of any existing system of national organisation which would enable industries to be controlled and labour to be utilised to the best advantage. She has also been hampered by her political system, which causes the party in power to be haunted by an inordinate dread of losing votes should it adopt any measures that might prove unpopular with its supporters. Hence the months were allowed to slip away before any adequate step was taken towards organising the manufacturing resources of the country. In Russia other causes have operated to prejudice the output of munitions. Thus it has happened that the Russian and British armies have been fighting under a serious handicap, from which Russia has suffered most, because, for the past nine months, she has been the special objective of the enemy.

Apart from the consideration of labour, the manufacture of guns and shells is not, however, a form of industry that can be speedily put into operation unless ample preparations have been made beforehand. The requisite plant takes long to construct; and, after this has been provided, the process of manufacture is slow. The War Office, with the limited powers it possessed after the incubus of financial restrictions had been

alleviated, was still dependent on the good-will and exertions of contractors and workmen, whom it was unable to influence or control. Despite this disadvantage, and some miscalculation of the time needed to remodel the existing factories, for which the War Office was not responsible, the arrangements initiated on the declaration of war have begun to take effect; and the output of munitions has lately increased to an extent which, in relation to the means of production that existed at the outbreak of war, may be considered satisfactory. Manufacture has been hampered by the operation of tradeunion restrictions, and by the inability of certain classes of workmen in some districts to realise the gravity of the issues which depend on their efforts. The new Ministry of Munitions, by tact and firmness, and by the organisation of existing facilities, should be able to effect a further increase; but the establishment of new factories and the extension of those already existing, which is necessary to place production on a level with requirements, will take some months to accomplish.

There are, unfortunately, signs that with the formation of the Coalition Ministry, party politics may again become active, and cause embarrassment to the Government. Radical newspapers which were opposed to preparation for war in time of peace, and which, regardless alike of national honour and national interests, urged at the last moment that we should remain neutral spectators of the ruin of Belgium and the destruction of France, are now exerting such influence as they possess to retard the organisation of the national resources. It will be time enough, they urge, to prepare for such a novel departure when the necessity becomes clearly manifest. The Munitions Bill has been subjected to some hostile criticism; and the Registration Bill is freely denounced as a measure demanded by the Conservatives, and designed to promote their insidious aims. Politicians, released from the restraint of party discipline, have adopted a similar tone in Parliament.

It is easy to see that these obstructive tactics are dictated, in a great degree, by fear that the legislative measures referred to may be used hereafter as a basis for the organisation of a system of national service, industrial and military, opposition to which has become