period of the war would be the scene of constant encounters between the opposing navies, has been undisturbed, except for occasional encounters between small craft and the destruction of merchant and fishing vessels. This in itself constitutes the most convincing evidence of the moral ascendency which the British Fleet has obtained over the second greatest Naval Power of the world. From the opening of the war, the German Navy has been out-manœuvred and out-fought in every encounter which has occurred in the North Sea; and with every week that has passed its material inferiority has been increased, irrespective of the loss of morale which must have been incurred.

The operations in the Dardanelles have assumed a fresh phase. On March 18, the general naval attack on the forts in the Narrows was marked by the destruction of three of the Allied battleships, the 'Irresistible,' 'Ocean' and 'Bouvet.' There subsequently intervened a period of unfavourable weather, which prevented a resumption of the operations; and, in the meantime, it was realised that naval force alone could not achieve success. It was generally assumed, when the bombardment by the Allied men-of-war began, that adequate provision had been made for military support in order to enable the batteries put out of action by fire from the sea to be demolished by landing parties. That assumption proved unfortunately incorrect, the only military force available being the Royal Naval Division, consisting of a comparatively small number of officers and men. After the losses sustained on March 18, a period of six weeks intervened; and on April 25 a large force of British, Dominion and French troops was thrown ashore under the cover of the guns of the men-of-war and succeeded in obtaining a footing, in spite of determined opposition on the part of the Turks. It is impossible to read General Sir Ian Hamilton's despatch, published on July 7, without being convinced that, if the Navy alone could not force the Dardanelles, the Army, unsupported by the guns of the men of war, could never have landed, and, having landed, could not have advanced or even held its ground. As Sir Ian remarks, 'the Royal Navy has been father and mother to the Army.'

The time has not yet come for reviewing in detail the action taken with a view to destroying the Turkish power in Europe. Events have, however, shown that, whatever defects there were in the original naval and military plans, the objective in view was of the utmost importance in its bearing upon the general course of the war. It is impossible to over-estimate the influence which the Dardanelles operations have exercised on opinion in Italy, Greece and the Balkan countries; and the demonstration in the eyes of the people of the Near East of the long arm of sea-power has been invaluable. Evidence of the impression which this new campaign made upon the naval and military staffs of Germany is provided by the decision to detach considerable bodies of naval and military officers to direct and stiffen the Turkish defence, and by the risks which must have been run in dispatching one or more submarines from northern to southern waters in the hope of thereby embarrassing the transport arrangements and injuring the ships of the Allied Fleets while engaged in supporting the military forces ashore. As a result of the new campaign initiated by the Allied Governments, Turkey as an Ally of the two Central Powers of Europe has become not a support, but a grave embarrassment. Every military consideration compelled Germany to attempt to save Turkey from annihilation; and the diversion of force has contributed to the weakening of the German arms in other theatres of war. On the other hand, the Allied Governments found in these operations employment for surplus men-of-war, for the most part obsolescent, which they possessed after making adequate provision to contain the main fleets of Germany and Austria-Hungary. It was not to be expected that the Dardanelles could be forced without some loss. The eventual success of the operations will prove ample compensation for more considerable reductions in the strength of pre-Dreadnoughts than have yet been incurred.

ARCHIBALD HURD.

III. The Trustees' Report on the National Gallery

IV. Ines de Castro

V. French Idealism and the War
VI. The War and the Poets

VII. The Treatment of Enemy Aliens
VIII. Charles Fox

IX. Germany's Food Supply

X. Modern Austria

XI. Some Books on the War

By Robert C. Witt By Mrs. B. E. C. Dugdale

By William Morton Fullerton

XII. Exchange and the American Loan
XIII. Industrial-Scientific Research
XIV. Allens Wedgwoods and Darwins
XV. National Service

XVI. The Progress of the War

By Lascalles Abercrombie

By Basil Williams By Prof. W. J. Ashley By the Earl of Cromer By John Bailey

By T. LI. Humbertstone
By Humphry Ward

THE

QUARTERLY REVIEW.

No. 445.

PUBLISHED IN

OCTOBER, 1915.

NEW YORK:

LEONARD SCOTT PUBLICATION COMPANY.

LONDON:

JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET.