At first sight this might seem to be a mere question of precedence and, as such, of little consequence to the Crown. But, as representing its interests, an AttorneyGeneral is bound to watch most jealously any attempt to establish the existence of a barony 'by writ' without producing any valid proof of sitting. I showed in 'Peerage and Pedigree' that the decision in the Fauconberg case had left the question in doubt, owing to the unexplained and unfortunate addition of the words 'in right of his wife' to the perfectly correct Resolution which was moved by the Lord Chancellor ; and I observed that, if claims were made to the baronies of Furnival and Fitzwarine, we might learn if the heiress of a non-existent barony could transmit that barony to her husband,' and how a barony can be 'vested in a man in right of his wife, when there was no recognised barony, as the law is now settled, to which she could have succeeded. Petitions for both the above dignities have been presented since then; and in the Fitzwarine case, the later of the two to be decided, this question was the subject of a long and important judgment' by Lord Dunedin, and the Committee unanimously upheld the Crown's contention. The barony, therefore, was definitely dated, not from 1295 (or 1283, as claimed), but from the summons to and sitting of Sir W. Bourchier, Lord Fitzwaryn in 1455.' This date, however, though that of his first sitting, was not that of his first writ, 1449, which would doubtless have been allowed, in accordance with the usual practice, if it had been claimed. But the Attorney-General's report shows that the earliest writ produced to him was that of 1455, while that report and the printed case, signed by Mr Fox-Davies, show that the Parliament Roll of 39 Henry VI was actually cited for the sitting of Sir William's son Fulk, though it relates to his father, while in the printed case the Close Roll of 12 Edward IV was no less wildly cited as that of 12 Henry VI. Intolerable trouble has been caused to those who represent the Crown by such carelessness as this.

In the other case, that of Furnival, the question was no less fully argued; and it was at least established that a sitting by the husband of the heiress cannot prove per se the existence of a barony in her, but must be

supplemented by evidence, not merely of writs, but of a sitting in her own ancestry. So far, this was satisfactory; but the proof of sitting accepted was very much the reverse. The only proof vouchsafed in petitioner's printed case was the occurrence of Thomas de Furnival as a witness to a royal charter early in 1300. The Crown objected both to the proof and to the mode of proof. It was shown that the date of the charter was eight days after the prorogation of Parliament; and it was urged that such a charter could not be, in any case, a record of Parliament.' We may add that a previous and unsuccessful attempt had been made, in the Hastings case, to use this evidence as proof of sitting. A second string' was then unexpectedly produced to prove a sitting, namely Thomas de Furnival's attestation to a royal charter granted at Carlisle in 1307, when he had been summoned to a Parliament there held. The late Lord Ashbourne, who delivered the principal 'judgment,' held that this charter made it highly probable' that he sat in that Parliament; and indeed, to the lay mind even of a critical historian, it would certainly seem clear that he and his heirs were peers. Yet such a conclusion from the evidence is, if historically right, wrong in strictness of law. We had here, in fact, one instance the more that 'hard cases make bad law.' No one would allege that a royal charter is a 'record of Parliament,' or that those who witnessed it are thereby proved to have taken part in 'a parliamentary proceeding.' Wishing to do substantial justice, their Lordships were resolved that petitioner should not suffer for the want of that technical proof of sitting which the law, as long settled, undoubtedly requires. But in thus departing from the rigour of the game' and accepting such evidence as proof of sitting, they have opened the door to claims which, till then, were hopeless. Indeed the charter in question alone would supply the proof wanting for at least one barony.

Probably the most important question, alike for the constitutional historian and for the student of peerage law, which recent decisions have helped to determine, is that of the first valid Parliament' from the standpoint of the House of Lords. When Stubbs wrote his 'Constitutional History,' he cautiously observed (Ed. 1875, II,

183-4), of the writs of summons issued by Edward I, that:

'it may be not unreasonably held that the practice of the reign owes its legal importance to the fact that it was used by the later lawyers as a period of limitation, and not to any conscious finality in Edward's policy. It is convenient to adopt the year 1295 as the era from which the baron, whose ancestor has been once summoned and has once sat in parliament, can claim an hereditary right to be so summoned.'

Yet, here again, the peculiar principle that a Committee for Privileges is not bound by preceding decisions,' as are Courts of Law, affords a priceless safeguard. Of this the Earldom of Wiltes case (1869) has been the standing illustration; but it is now reinforced by the latest of recent cases, that of the barony of St John. The very existence of this barony, like that of the (original) barony of Hastings, depended on the validity, as proof of a sitting in Parliament, of an entry on the Parliament Roll of 1290. Guided by the Chancellor, Lord Cottenham, in 1841, the Committee admitted the proof as valid, with the result that the barony of Hastings now figures on the roll of peers; in 1914 the Committee rejected the validity of the proof, with the result that the claimant failed to establish the barony's existence. Strange and even inequitable as this principle may seem, it has at least the merit ef enabling the House to avail itself of the latest learning in a sphere illumined in our own time by the indefatigable researches of those who, not only in this country, but in France and America as well, have devoted themselves to the study of English medieval history with the aid of those incomparable records which are the envy of foreign lands.

J. H. ROUND.

Art. 4.-PATRIOTISM.

1. Letters on Patriotism. By Lord Bolingbroke. London.

1749.

2. An Introduction to Social Psychology. By W. McDougall. London: Methuen, 1913.

3. Thoughts on the War. By A. Clutton-Brock. London: Methuen, 1914.

And other works.

THE sentiment of patriotism has seemed to many to mark an arrest of development in the psychical expansion of the individual, a half-way house between mere self-centredness and full human sympathy. Some moralists have condemned it as pure egoism, magnified and disguised. 'Patriotism,' says Ruskin, 'is an absurd prejudice founded on an extended selfishness.' Mr Grant Allen calls it 'a vulgar vice-the national or collective form of the monopolist instinct.' Mr Havelock Ellis allows it to be 'a virtue-among barbarians.' For Herbert Spencer it is 'reflex egoism-extended selfishness.' These critics have made the very common mistake of judging human emotions and sentiments by their roots instead of by their fruits. They have forgotten the Aristotelian canon that the 'nature' of anything is its completed development (ἡ φύσις τέλος ἐστίν). The human self, as we know it, is a transitional form. It had a humble origin, and is capable of indefinite enhancement. Ultimately, we are what we love and care for, and no limit has been set to what we may become without ceasing to be ourselves. The case is the same with our love of country. No limit has been set to what our country may come to mean for us, without ceasing to be our country. Marcus Aurelius exhorted himself 'The poet says, Dear city of Cecrops; shall not I say, Dear city of God?' But the city of God in which he wished to be was a city in which he would still live as a Roman and an Antonine.' The citizen of heaven knew that it was his duty to hunt Sarmatians on earth, though he was not obliged to imbrue his hands with Cæsarism.'

6

Patriotism has two roots, the love of clan, and the love of home. In migratory tribes the former alone

counts; in settled communities diversities of origin are often forgotten. But the love of home, as we know it, is a gentler and more spiritual bond than clanship. The word home is associated with all that makes life beautiful and sacred, with tender memories of joy and sorrow, and especially with the first eager outlook of the young mind upon a wonderful world. A man does not as a rule feel much sentiment about his London house, still less about his office or factory. It is for the home of his childhood, or of his ancestors, that a man will fight most readily, because he is bound to it by a spiritual and poetic tie. Expanding from this centre, the sentiment of patriotism embraces one's country as a whole.

Both forms of patriotism-the local and the racial, are frequently alloyed with absurd, unworthy or barbarous motives. The local patriot thinks that Peebles, and not Paris, is the place for pleasure, or asks whether any good thing can come out of Nazareth. To the Chinaman all aliens are outer barbarians' or 'foreign devils.' Admiration for ourselves and our institutions is too often measured by our contempt and dislike for foreigners. Our own nation has a peculiarly bad record in this respect. In the reign of James I the Spanish ambassador was frequently insulted by the London crowd, as was the Russian ambassador in 1662; not, apparently, because we had a burning grievance against either of those nations, but because Spaniards and Russians are very unlike Englishmen. That at least is the opinion of the sagacious Pepys on the later of these incidents. 'Lord! to see the absurd nature of Englishmen, that cannot forbear laughing and jeering at anything that looks strange.' Defoe says that the English are 'the most churlish people alive' to foreigners, with the result that all men think an Englishman the devil.' In the 17th and 18th centuries Scotland seems to have ranked as a foreign country, and the presence of Scots in London was much resented. Cleveland thought it witty to write :

'Had Cain been Scot, God would have changed his doom; Not forced him wander, but confined him home.'

And we all remember Dr Johnson's gibes.