B. THE CHANGING ENVIRONMENT PRELUDE TO THE 1970's When the Nixon Administration assumed office in January 1969, it was clear that our complex national security problems demanded a basic rethinking of the existing policies in the light of changing world and domestic conditions. It was clear that new directions were needed. In my Defense Report to the Congress last February, I discussed the problems we found and the initial steps we instituted to cope with them. At least seven factors, taken together, indicate that the economic, political, military, and manpower realities existing now are significantly different from the situation just five years ago. These factors are: - A growing Soviet military capability and technological momentum. An expanding Soviet influence around the world, as evidenced by worldwide deployment of its growing naval forces. An emerging Chinese Communist nuclear threat. The reordering of national priorities, with a reduced percentage of Gross National Product for defense spending. Sharply rising U.S. personnel costs and a start toward A changing world economic environment because of vigorous growth, particularly among Free World nations. An increasing awareness among NATO members of the need for burden sharing and among many of our Asian friends of the need for regional support. Confronted with this changing environment, we concluded after careful analysis in the National Security Council that we must, whatever else, assure the following criteria in national security planning for the decade of the 1970's: Preservation by the United States of a sufficient Development and/or continued maintenance of Free An International Security Assistance Program that TRANSITION TO A NEW NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY In my Defense Report last year, I characterized 1969 as largely a transition year in which we reviewed strategy, current capabilities, and possible major future programs. But I also stated that 1969 was a year of decision and that as a result of the reviews and decisions in 1969, the President had established the main directions of our foreign policy and national security strategy for the 1970's. The changing international security environment was recognized and discussed by President Nixon in his first Foreign Policy Report to Congress in February 1970. The President's 1971 Foreign Policy Report amplifies these changes, and discusses some of the other major initiatives taken by this Administration; including the Middle East and Indochina peace initiatives, and a revised policy for Chemical Warfare and Biological Research. The The two major initiatives undertaken in 1969 which have a strong impact on our future defense planning were, of course, the Nixon Doctrine and the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). first emphasized our determination to instill a new basis for cooperation between us and our allies which takes into account their growing capabilities. The other demonstrated our commitment to serious and meaningful negotiations as the preferred path toward peace. SALT is a crucial effort by the United States, in the field of negotiations, to seek agreement with the Soviet Union on strategic arms limitation. SALT represents an attempt (a) to reduce the likelihood of strategic nuclear war between the U.S. and the Soviet Union; and (b) to preserve U.S. strategic sufficiency through negotiations, rather than through competition in an arms race. SALT represents, among other things, an effort to avoid major increases in strategic force expenditures which will be necessary in the absence of an early successful agreement. The application of the Nixon Doctrine can provide Free World strength and security as a realistic way to support peace initiatives through meaningful negotiations. The institution of the Vietnamization program occurred almost simultaneously with the first public articulation of the Nixon Doctrine by the President in 1969 at Guam. Vietnamization, the first significant application of the Nixon Doctrine, was accorded top priority in our first two years of responsibility for national security affairs. Both 1969 and 1970 were years of transition, during which new directions were set and major elements of our new strategy were structured. We chose in 1970 to break the cycle of submitting a five-year defense plan to Congress in order to permit time for a safe and orderly transition from the national security policies of the past decade to those more appropriate for the decade of the 1970's and beyond. The FY 1971 transitional program and budget was designed essentially to preserve the basic capabilities the Nixon Administration inherited as final decisions were being made on the major elements of our new national security strategy. Although both FY 1970 and 1971 were transitional with respect to program and budget levels, the FY 1971 plan contained many of the key elements of the President's Strategy for Peace. Among the elements distinguishing the FY 1971 plan from the previous strategy a concept of strategic sufficiency which is based on specific criteria for the design of our strategic capabilities, a strong conventional capability buttressed by adequate peacetime general purpose forces for simul- smaller U.S. active forces, with great emphasis to be a re-emphasis on maintaining and using our technological superiority; increased international security assistance for the defense needs and roles of other Free World nations, and a new approach to U.S. military manpower, based on a What has emerged from the review and decisions of the 1969-70 transition years is a new approach to national security planning concepts and a reformulation of older concepts. The new strategy is one of "Realistic Deterrence." D. A STRATEGY OF REALISTIC DETERRENCE As Secretary of Defense, my primary responsibility is to address those aspects of the President's Foreign Policy which bear directly on the defense programs and defense strategy of this nation. Figure 3 in the Appendix schematically illustrates the essential components of the President's Foreign Policy and the interrelated nature of the three pillars of peace partnership and negotiation. - strength, It demonstrates in their broadest aspects the close relationship between the President's policy objectives on the one hand, and the close correlation of foreign policy activities guided by the State Department and those aspects of national security strategy which are the primary responsibility of the Department of Defense. The President's foreign policy objectives concentrate on long-term objectives and long-term policies. He noted in describing the Nixon Doctrine that it is neither practical, nor the most effective way to build a lasting structure of peace to rely solely upon the material and manpower resources of the United States to provide this capability. We have said, and I would repeat, that we do not intend to be the policeman of the world. Many of our allies are already prosperous; others are rapidly becoming so. Therefore, it is realistic and more effective that |