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according to FBI statistics, far fewer terrorist incidents were recorded in the U.S. during the 1990s, than during the previous decade. The FBI lists a total of 220 domestic terrorist acts as having been perpetrated between 1980 and 1989; compared to a mere 29 incidents for the period 1990 to 1998 (the last year for which published data is available from the FBI). Admittedly, 176 persons were killed by terrorists in the U.S. during the 1990s: a figure nearly seven times the 1980s total of just 26 persons. However, this tragic death toll is the result of four out of only 29 terrorist incidents: and of the four incidents, it was one especially heinous act--the Oklahoma City bombing--which accounts for the overwhelming majority-e.g., 95 percent of the total. 14 Once again, there is no doubt that terrorism remains a threat to the lives and well-being of Americans in our own country, but it must be kept in mind that the actual number of terrorist incidents-as opposed to the hundreds of hoaxes, often involving alleged chemical and biological agents, that the FBI and other law enforcement and public safety agencies now routinely respond to and which arguably have fueled our perception of a burgeoning, actual domestic terrorist threat-remains remarkably few and those that cause fatalities still less.15

The above arguments, it should be emphasized, are not meant to suggest that the U.S. should become at all complacent about the threat of terrorism (domestic or international) or should in any way relax our vigilance either at home or abroad. Rather they highlight an asymmetry between perception and reality that a comprehensive, integrated threat assessment could redress. The principal danger we arguably face is that by succumbing to intense fears that are not completely grounded in reality, we risk

14Statistics compiled from Terrorist Research and Analytical Center, Terrorism Section, Criminal Investigative Division, FBI Analysis Of Terrorist Incidents In The United States (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1984), p. 10; idem., Terrorism in the United States, 1982-1992 (Washington, D.C.. U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1993), p. 8; Counterterrorism Threat Assessment and Warning Unit, National Security Division, Terrorism in the United States 1997 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1998). pp. 22-23; and, idem., Terrorism in the United States 1998 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2000), pp. 3 & 6.

15 See Statement for the record before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, January 28, 1998, http//:www.fbi.gov/pressrm/congress/ congress98/threats.htm of FBI Director Louis J. Freeh, p. 6; Statement of Robert J. Burnham, Chief, Domestic Terrorism Section before the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, May 19, 1999, p.1 at http//:www.fbi.gov/pressrm/congress/congress99/ epa.htm; and, Statement for the Record of Mrs. Barbara J. Martinez, Deputy Director. National Domestic Preparedness Office before the U.S. House of Representatives Transportation and Infrastructure Committee. Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and Emergency Management, June 9, 1999, p.1 at http//:www.fbi.gov/pressrm/congress/congress99/

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adopting policies and making hard security choices based on misperception and misunderstanding rather than on hard analysis built on empirical evidence of the actual dimensions of the terrorist threat. Terrorism is among the most dynamic of phenomena because of the multiplicity of adversaries (and potential adversaries), the perennial emergence of new causes and different aims and motivations fuelling this violence, the adoption and evolution of new tactics and modus operandi and the greater access and availability of increasingly sophisticated weaponry. As France's senior intelligence officer responsible for counterterrorism observed in an interview with the author last May: "terrorism is always changing. The way I am looking at terrorism today, is not the way I looked at it yesterday."16

Without ongoing, comprehensive re-assessments we cannot be confident that the range of policies, countermeasures and defenses we adopt are the most relevant and appropriate ones. A process through which the American intelligence community would conduct at specified intervals regular, and systematic, net assessments of foreign terrorist threats-in addition to the individual, more narrowly focused assessments they are regularly tasked to provide-would be an important means to remedy this situation. However high the quality of this collection of individual assessments, by themselves they do neither comprise nor amount to an integrated, overall net assessment of the threat. Indeed, according to one well-respected American counterterrorism intelligence analyst, the current process produces a "mishmash" of assessments that are not fully coordinated or integrated into a comprehensive, integrated assessment.17

A mechanism whereby a domestic counterpart to the foreign terrorist net assessment could be undertaken also needs to be implemented and developed. The absence of such a means to gauge and assess trends in domestic terrorism and assess their implications is a major impediment towards framing a cohesive and comprehensive strategy. At one time it was thought that the NDPO (National Domestic Preparedness Organization) within the FBI and Department of Justice would undertake such an effort. The fact that this has not been done raises questions of how such a domestic net assessment should be conducted and which department within what agency would have the lead in collating and articulating the domestic assessment.

Similarly, given that terrorism today has become more complex, amorphous and transnational in nature, the distinction between domestic and international terrorist threats

16Interview, Paris, France, May 2000.

17Interview, Washington, D.C., March 2001.

is eroding. Accordingly, a process that facilitates the integration of domestic and foreign assessments might also help to bridge the gap created by the different approaches to addressing the terrorist threat respectively embraced by the law enforcement and intelligence communities in this country. For instance, in recent years terrorism has been regarded more as a law enforcement, cum criminal justice, matter than the intelligence and national security issue it also ineluctably is. This approach is problematical, if not dangerously myopic, and deprives the U.S. of a critical advantage in the struggle against terrorism.

In conclusion, it is clear that we need to be absolutely confident that the U.S. is both adequately and appropriately prepared to counter the terrorist threats of today and tomorrow. Accordingly, an essential prerequisite to ensuring that our formidable resources are focused where they can have the most effect is a sober and empirical understanding of the threat coupled with a clear, comprehensive and coherent strategy. Without such a strategy, we risk embracing policies and pursuing solutions that may not only be dated, but may also have become irrelevant; we also lose sight of current and projected trends and patterns and thereby risk preparing to counter and respond to possibly illusory threats and challenges. The development of a comprehensive national strategy to combat terrorism would likely appreciably sustain the progress made in recent years in addressing the threat posed by terrorism to Americans and American interests both here and abroad.

Mr. SHAYS. General Clapper.

General CLAPPER. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to have this opportunity to speak on behalf of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, lessawkwardly known as the Gilmore panel, after its chairman, Governor Jim Gilmore of Virginia.

I might mention that I guess the epiphany experience for me with respect to terrorism was my participation as a senior intelligence investigator in the aftermath of the Khobar Towers attack in June 1996 in Saudi Arabia.

In the brief time I have for these remarks, I will cut to the chase on the two specific findings and recommendations in our last report that you asked that we address-one, lack of a national strategy, which has already been spoken to at some depth this morning, for combating terrorism, and that the administration should develop one; and the other major point was the reorganization of the Federal Government's programs and at the present should establish a national office for combating terrorism in the Executive Office of the President and seek a statutory basis for it.

So our suggested solution organizationally and structurally is different than what you heard this morning from Senator Rudman and General Boyd.

On strategy, it is our view, after 2 years of looking at this, that the Nation now has many well-intended but often disconnected programs that aim individually to achieve certain preparedness objectives. Some of the sorted several policy and planning documents, such as the Presidential Decision Directives [PDDs] 39 and 62; the Attorney General's 1999 5-year plan, which Mr. Gilman mentioned; and the most recent annual report to Congress on combating terrorism, taken as a whole, constitute a national strategy.

In our view, the view of the panel, these documents describe plans, various programs underway, and some objectives, but they do not, either individually or collectively, constitute a national strategy.

We recommended in our report published in mid-December that the new administration develop an over-arching national strategy by articulating national goals for combating terrorism, focusing on results rather than the process.

We made three key assumptions about forging such a strategy, and I think these are reflective of the composition of our panel, which was heavily numbered with State and local officials representing emergency planners, fire chiefs, police chiefs, and emergency medical people, public health people, and State emergency planners. So our perspective, I think, was a little bit different perhaps than the Hart-Rudman Commission because of the composition of our group, which was heavily influenced, heavily populated by State and local people.

So the first assumption that we kept in mind in suggesting a national strategy was that local response entities will always be the first and conceivably only response. In the case of a major-God forbid-cataclysmic attack, however you want to define it, no single jurisdiction is likely going to be capable of responding without outside assistance.

What we have in mind here is a multiple jurisdiction, perhaps a multiple State event, rather than one that is localized to a single locale or a single State.

Maybe most important, we have a lot of capabilities that we have developed over many years for response to natural disasters, disease outbreaks, and accidents, so these capabilities can and should be used as the foundation for our capability to respond to a terrorist attack.

I'd like to briefly highlight some of what our panel sees as the major attributes of such a strategy.

It should be geographically and functionally comprehensive and should address both international and domestic terrorism in all its forms-chemical, biological, nuclear, conventional explosives, and cyber. It must encompass local, State, and Federal, in that order. It must include all of the functional constituencies-fire departments, emergency medical, police, public health, agriculture, etc.

To be functionally comprehensive, the strategy, we believe, should address the full spectrum of the effort, from crisis management, as well as consequence management, and it must have objective measures in order to set priorities, allocate funds, measure progress, and establish accountability.

The main point I would leave you with, with respect to a national strategy for combating terrorism, is that it must be truly national, not just Federal. It should be from the bottom up, not the other way around.

Our other major recommendation, that we need somebody in charge-a theme you have already heard-is directly tied to devising a strategy. The display boards behind you are from our first report that we published at the end of 1999. It was our attempt to depict objectively the complexity of the Federal apparatus, all the organizations and agencies and offices that, in one degree or another, have some responsibility for various phases of combating terrorism.

We found that the perception of many State and local people is that the structures and processes at the Federal level for combating terrorism are complex and confusing. Attempts that have been made to create a Federal focal point for coordination with State and local officials such as the NDPO have, at best, been only partially successful. Many State and local officials believe that Federal programs are often created and implemented without including them. We don't think the current coordination mechanisms provide for the authority, coordination, discipline, and accountability that is needed.

So for all these reasons we recommended a senior authoritative entity in the Executive Office of the President which we called the "National Office for Combating Terrorism," obviously a different construct than the Hart-Rudman Commission suggested.

This would have the responsibility for developing a strategy and coordinating the programs and budget to carry out that strategy. We feel strongly that this office must be empowered to carry out several responsibilities which are outlined in our full report. I will highlight three here by way of example.