First and foremost, of course, is to develop and update the strategy, which would, of course, be presented and approved by the President. The office should have a programming and budgeting responsibility in which it can oversee and, through the process of certifying or decertifying, ensure that our programs and budgets among all the plethora of departments and agencies are synchronized and coherent. An area that is of particular interest and near and dear to my heart is the area of intelligence, which Bruce has already spoken to. This office would also be responsible for coordinating intelligence matters, to foster the national assessments that Dr. Hoffman spoke to, to analyze both foreign and domestic intelligence in a unitary way, rather than as two separate, disparate pursuits, and to devise policy for dissemination to appropriate officials at the State and local levels. We believe this office should have certain characteristics or attributes that we think are important. The person who heads the office should be politically accountable-that is, nominated by the President, confirmed by the Senate and enjoy Cabinet-level status. The office must have complete oversight over all the Federal programs and funding to influence resource allocation. It should be empowered to certify what each department, agency, or office is spending in the interest of following a strategy, sticking with priorities, and minimizing duplication. Finally, the office should not have operational control over execution. Indeed, we don't want to see the various Federal stakeholders abrogate their responsibilities. What we do want to see is to have them carried out in a coherent, synchronized, coordinated way. In conclusion, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, the Gilmore panel members are convinced that these two recommendations are crucial for strengthening the national effort to combat terrorism. We need a true national strategy and we need somebody clearly in charge. This is not a partisan political issue. We have members on our panel who identify with each of the parties, virtually all the functional constituencies, and all governmental levels-Federal, State, and local. This is simply something we all agreed that the country needs. Contemplating the specter of terrorism, as you are doing this morning, in this country is a sobering but critically necessary responsibility of Government officials at all levels and in all branches. It is truly a national issue that requires synchronization of our efforts-vertically, among the Federal, State, and local levels, and horizontally among the functional constituent stakehold ers. The individual capabilities of all critical elements must be brought to bear in a much more coherent way than is now the case. That fundamental tenet underlies our work over the last 2 years. Our most imposing challenge centers on policy and whether we have the collective fortitude to forge change, both in organization and process. I would respectfully observe that we have studied the topic to death, and what we need now is action. Mr. Chairman, this concludes my brief statement. I would be pleased to address your questions. Mr. SHAYS [assuming Chair]. Thank you, General Clapper. We will reserve the opportunity of questioning you at the conclusion of our panel's testimony. [The prepared statement of General Clapper follows:] Congress of the United States House of Representatives Committee on Government Reform SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, VETERANS AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Testimony of JAMES CLAPPER, JR. Vice Chairman, Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 27 March 2001 TESTIMONY OF JAMES CLAPPER, JR. Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee, I am honored to be here today. I come before you as the Vice Chairman of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, also known as the "Gilmore Commission" (after its Chairman, Governor James S. Gilmore, III, of Virginia). Thank you for the opportunity to present the views of the Advisory Panel. The Advisory Panel was established by Section 1405 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Public Law 105–261 (H.R. 3616, 105th Congress, 2nd Session) (October 17, 1998). That Act directed the Advisory Panel to accomplish several specific tasks. It said: The panel shall- 1. assess Federal agency efforts to enhance domestic preparedness for 2. assess the progress of Federal training programs for local emergency responses to incidents involving weapons of mass 3. assess deficiencies in programs for response to incidents involving 4. recommend strategies for ensuring effective coordination with 5. assess the appropriate roles of State and local government in The Act requires the Advisory Panel to report its findings, conclusions, and recommendations for improving Federal, State, and local domestic emergency 1 preparedness to respond to incidents involving weapons of mass destruction to the President and the Congress at three times during the course of the Advisory Panel's deliberations on December 15 in 1999, 2000, and 2001. Mr. Chairman, you have asked that we provide testimony today on two of the findings and their related recommendations contained in the second report of the Advisory Panel, entitled "Toward a National Strategy for Combating Terrorism," dated December 15, 2000. First: The United States has no coherent, functional national strategy for And second: The organization of the Federal government's programs for combating A National Strategy for Combating Terrorism Mr. Chairman and Members, the Advisory Panel believes that a truly comprehensive national strategy will contain a high-level statement of national objectives coupled logically to a statement of the means to be used to achieve these objectives. Currently, there is no overarching statement of what the United States is trying to achieve with its program to combat terrorism. Goals must be expressed in terms of results, not process. Government officials have, in the past, spoken of terrorism preparedness goals in terms of program execution. A comprehensive national strategy will answer the more |