fundamental and important question: To what end are these programs being implemented? Instead of a national strategy, the nation has had a loosely coupled set of plans and specific programs that aim, individually, to achieve certain particular preparedness objectives. Senior U.S. officials have previously stated that several official broad policy and planning documents that were published in the prior administration-Presidential Decision Directives 39 and 62, the Attorney General's 1999 Five-Year Interagency Counterterrorism and Technology Crime Plan, and the most recent Annual Report to Congress on Combating Terrorism—taken as a whole, constitute a national strategy. These documents describe plans, the compilation of various programs already under way, and some objectives; but they do not either individually or collectively constitute a national strategy. Although Executive Branch agencies are administering programs assigned to them in the various pieces of legislation, the Executive Branch, under the former administration, did not articulate a broad national strategy that would synchronize the existing programs or identify future program priorities needed to achieve national objectives for domestic preparedness for terrorism. Moreover, it is our view that, given the structure of our national government, only the Executive Branch can produce such a national strategy. As a result, we recommended that the incoming Administration begin the process of developing a national strategy by a thoughtful articulation of national goals for combating terrorism, focusing on results rather than process. The structure and specifics of the national program should derive logically and transparently from the goals, not the other way around. Basic Assumptions The Advisory Panel agreed on several basic assumptions to guide its approach to strategy development. First, "local" response entities-law enforcement, fire service, emergency medical technicians, hospital emergency personnel, public health officials, and emergency managers--will always be the "first" and conceivably only response. Second, in the event of a major terrorist attack, however defined--number of fatalities or total casualties, the point at which local and State capabilities are overwhelmed, or some other measure—no single jurisdiction is likely to be capable of responding to such an attack without outside assistance. That assumption is critical to understanding the need for mutual aid agreements and coordinated operations. Third-and perhaps most important-there are existing emergency response and management capabilities, developed over many years, for responses to natural disasters, disease outbreaks, and accidents. Those capabilities can and should be used as a base for enhancing our domestic capability for response to a terrorist attack. We can strengthen existing capabilities without buying duplicative, cost-prohibitive new capabilities exclusively dedicated to terrorism. Major Elements of the National Strategy The national strategy should be geographically and functionally comprehensive. It should address both international and domestic terrorism. The distinction between terrorism outside the borders of the United States and terrorist threats domestically is The Office of Management and Budget, Annual Report to Congress on Combating Terrorism, Including Defense against Weapons of Mass Destruction/Domestic Preparedness and Critical Infrastructure eroding. International terrorism crosses borders easily and may directly affect the American homeland. That was evident in the New York World Trade Center bombing in 1993, and more recently in the activities around the turn of the century. The terrorist bombings of the U.S. garrison at Khobar Towers, Saudi Arabia, the two U.S. embassies in East Africa, and the recent USS Cole incident, also illustrate the reach of terrorists against U.S. interests and the profound domestic implications they pose. To be functionally comprehensive, the national strategy should address the full spectrum of the nation's efforts against terrorism: intelligence, deterrence, prevention, investigation, prosecution, preemption, crisis management, and consequence management. Our nation's highest goal must be the deterrence and prevention of terrorism. The United States cannot, however, prevent all terrorist attacks. When deterrence and prevention fail, the nation must respond effectively to terrorism, whether to resolve an ongoing incident, mitigate its consequences, identify the perpetrators, and prosecute or retaliate as appropriate. The national strategy should deal with all aspects of combating terrorism and must carefully weigh their relative importance for the purpose of allocating resources among them. The national strategy should apply to the nation as a whole, not just the Federal Executive Branch. The Federal government should lead a strategic planning process that involves States and communities as essential and equal partners. The national strategy must be appropriately resourced, by all levels of government, to provide a reasonable opportunity to achieve its successful implementation. At the Federal level, that will require a closer relationship between the Protection, May 18, 2000. Executive and Legislative Branches. Nationally, that will require better coordination with State and local governments. Articulating the End State: National Goals The first step in developing a coherent national strategy is for the Executive Branch to define some meaningful, measurable expression of what it is trying to achieve in combating terrorism. The Federal government's goals have previously been expressed primarily in terms of program execution. Administrative measurements alone do not foster effective management of a national program. The national strategy must express preparedness goals in terms of an "end state” toward which the program strives. Since there exists no ready-made measurement of a country's preparedness for terrorism, especially domestically, the Executive Branch must develop objective measurements for its program to combat terrorism, to track its progress, to determine priorities and appropriate funding levels, and to know when the desired "end state" has been achieved. The nation's strategy for combating terrorism requires results-based goals for three reasons. First, the programs need an end-state goal. Elected and appointed officials from Federal, State, and local governments must be able to allocate resources to specific geographic regions according to requirements of that region. Resources should be allocated to achieve that broadest application for all emergency and disaster needs, consistent with preparedness goals. That approach is fundamental to the principles of building on existing systems and to achieving the maximum possible multipurpose capability. Second, programs for combating terrorism need accountability. Legislators and public officials, especially elected ones, must have some reliable, systematic way of assessing the extent to which their efforts and taxpayers' money are producing effective results. The performance and results of programs for combating terrorism are currently assessed almost solely according to anecdote. The only concrete measure available at the moment is the dispersal of Federal funds—a process measurement that does not achieve effective strategic management. Third, programs for combating terrorism need clear priorities. It is impossible to set priorities without first defining results-based objectives. The essence of any coherent strategy is a clear statement of priorities that can be translated into specific policy and programmatic initiatives. Priorities are the transmission mechanism that connects ends to means. Fostering the Means of Strategy: Program Structure and Priorities Setting priorities is essential in any strategy, but priorities require clear, resultsbased objectives. With some meaningful sense of objectives, it will be possible to develop coherent priorities and an appropriate set of policy prescriptions. For instance, should the nation seek a different level of preparedness for large urban centers than for rural areas? What should be the relative importance of preparing for conventional terrorism, radiological incidents, chemical weapons, biological weapons, or cyber attacks? Should the nation seek to improve its preparedness more against the types of attacks that are most likely to occur, such as conventional terrorist bombings or the use of industrial chemicals, or for those that are most damaging but less likely to occur, such as nuclear weapons or military-grade chemical or biological weapons? With respect to |