PROVIDED TRAINING AND EQUIPMENT TO LOCAL FIRST RESPONDERS. WHEN THESE COMMUNITIES EXPERIENCED FRUSTRATION WITH THE VARIED FEDERAL REQUIREMENTS, THE ADMINISTRATION WAS RESPONSIVE — IT ESTABLISHED THE NATIONAL DOMESTIC PREPAREDNESS OFFICE TO PROVIDE "ONE STOP

SHOPPING."

THESE INITIATIVES HAVE PROPELLED US FAR BEYOND OUR

PREPAREDNESS OF EIGHT YEARS AGO. NEVERTHELESS, IT IS CLEAR THERE IS MUCH WORK TO BE DONE TO IMPROVE OUR EFFORTS IN COMBATING

TERRORISM.

WHILE SOME DIFFERENCES EXIST, THERE SEEMS TO BE CONSENSUS ACROSS PARTY LINES AND AMONG VARIOUS ANALYSTS THAT A COMPREHENSIVE PLAN IS NEEDED. ALL OUR WITNESSES TODAY AGREE ON THE NEED FOR A NATIONAL STRATEGY. ALL HAVE PROPOSED IN THEIR TESTIMONY BOTH PREVENTIVE AND RESPONSIVE APPROACHES. ALL HAVE DISCUSSED THE IMPORTANCE OF AN INDIVIDUAL OR ENTITY THAT WILL FACILITATE COOPERATION BETWEEN AGENCIES AND BETWEEN STATES AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. ALL HAVE CITED THE INTEGRAL ROLE OF INTELLIGENCEGATHERING.

GIVEN THIS, I FIND IT STRANGE THAT THERE HASN'T BEEN A MORE FRANK DISCUSSION OF THE NATURE OF THE THREAT FACING THE UNITED STATES. I AGREE WITH MR. HOFFMAN THAT WE NEED A "FIRMER UNDERSTANDING OF THE THREAT" TO DEVELOP A COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL STRATEGY. BUT A TRUE UNDERSTANDING OF THE THREAT CANNOT BE GAINED BY ASSESSING "TERRORISM” IN ISOLATION. WE MUST CONSIDER ALL OF THE POTENTIAL THREATS TO AMERICA - WHETHER FROM TERRORIST GROUPS, FOREIGN STATES, OR DOMESTIC ORGANIZATIONS

POSE.

- AND UNDERSTAND THE RISKS THEY

I BELIEVE THAT WHEN WE DO THAT, WE MAY FIND THAT OUR PRIORITIES ARE SKEWED.

IN THE YEAR 2000, ANNUAL SPENDING TO COMBAT TERRORISM AMONG VARIOUS FEDERAL AGENCIES CREPT UP TO JUST OVER $10 BILLION, FROM AN ESTIMATED $4 BILLION AT THE START OF PRESIDENT CLINTON'S TERM. IN CONTRAST, NEARLY $60 BILLION HAS BEEN SPENT ON BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS SINCE 1983. ACCORDING TO MANY ESTIMATES, IT WILL TAKE $60 BILLION MORE BEFORE ANY TYPE OF SYSTEM IS DEPLOYED, NO EARLIER THAN 2006.

BASED ON THESE FIGURES, ONE WOULD THINK A MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM WOULD SAVE AT LEAST AS MANY LIVES AS ALL OTHER COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS COMBINED. BUT THIS SUGGESTION IS PREPOSTEROUS.

FIRST, THE LIKELIHOOD OF A BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM INTERCEPTING A MISSILE AIMED AT THE UNITED STATES IS SLIM. THE SYSTEM IN DEVELOPMENT HAS FAILED TWO CONSECUTIVE TESTS AND CAN BE OVERCOME BY THE SIMPLEST OF COUNTERMEASURES. ANY ENTITY WITH BALLISTIC MISSILE CAPABILITY WOULD HAVE ACCESS TO SUCH

COUNTERMEASURES.

MORE IMPORTANTLY, THE LIKELIHOOD THAT SUCH A MISSILE WOULD BE LAUNCHED AGAINST THE UNITED STATES IS EVEN SLIMMER BECAUSE OF THE VIRTUAL CERTAINTY OF PROMPT AND MASSIVE RETALIATION. WHY WOULD A STATE OR OTHER ENTITY SPEED ITS OWN ANNIHILATION BY SENDING WHAT WOULD AMOUNT TO AN INTERCONTINENTAL CALLING CARD PROFESSING

RESPONSIBILITY?

MUCH MORE EFFECTIVE - AND THUS A MUCH GREATER THREAT WOULD BE AN INDIRECT ATTACK USING A SO-CALLED "POOR MAN'S NUKE” — A

BOMB MADE WITH RADIOACTIVE WASTE PRODUCTS, FOR EXAMPLE, STOLEN FROM A NUCLEAR REACTOR. WHEN DETONATED WITH CONVENTIONAL EXPLOSIVES AND DELIVERED IN A TRUCK, CONTAINER, OR SHIP, THIS METHOD WOULD BE INEXPENSIVE, LIKELY ANONYMOUS, AND — GIVEN THE ABUNDANCE OF UNSECURED FISSILE MATERIAL IN RUSSIA — EASILY MADE. SUCH A WEAPON COULD CAUSE CATASTROPHIC LOSS OF LIFE AND SOCIAL BREAKDOWN. UNSURE OF THE ATTACKER'S ORIGIN, AND OVERWHELMED ATTEMPTING TO COPE WITH THE TRAGEDY, OUR GOVERNMENT WOULD BE PARALYZED.

IN THIS CONTEXT, OUR MASSIVE INVESTMENT IN PROGRAMS LIKE MISSILE DEFENSE SEEMS MISDIRECTED, AND OUR CALL FOR MORE EFFECTIVE COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS SEEMS HOLLOW.

SO I HOPE IN THIS HEARING WE CAN GO BEYOND THE PROGRAMMATIC DETAILS OF EFFORTS TO COMBAT TERRORISM AND DISCUSS FRANKLY THE OVERALL THREATS OUR NATION FACES AND THE PHILOSOPHY THAT UNDERLIES OUR EFFORTS TO ADDRESS THESE THREATS.

THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN.

Mr. SHAYS. At this time I recognize the vice chairman, Adam Putnam.

Mr. PUTNAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also have a statement to submit for the record, but I appreciate your calling this hearing. Clearly, as the charts around us indicate, the national strategy against terrorism is that there is not one national strategy against terrorism.

Recent events-Khobar, Oklahoma City, a number of other places around the world-have clearly indicated the need for us to further refine our efforts and our preparations for these types of acts of violence against American citizens and our interests, and I look forward to the testimony from the witnesses.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

I recognize Ron Lewis from Kentucky.

Mr. LEWIS OF KENTUCKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would just like to welcome our witnesses. I'm looking forward to their testimony. This certainly is a complex problem, but we certainly need to be doing everything we can to solve this as soon as possible.

Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

Before calling our witnesses and swearing them in, I just want to get rid of some housekeeping here and ask unanimous consent to insert into the hearing record a statement from the General Accounting Office discussing the fragmentation and lack of strategic focus in current Federal counterterrorism programs. Based on many of the studies and audits conducted for this subcommittee, GAO recommends greater use of Results Act principles to measure progress toward a truly national strategy.

Without objection, so ordered.

[The prepared statement of the General Accounting Office follows:]