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Mr. SHAYS. OK. Is there any final comment that either of you would like to make?

Senator RUDMAN. My only comment would be that, to the extent that Members of the House and Senate recognize the seriousness of this problem and recognize that we're dealing with, you know, missile defense and we're dealing with a lot of other issues which we should be dealing with, this should be dealt with. This is a major threat to the American people. I'm not saying it is imminent. We have no such intelligence. But it is a major threat.

If you look at what happened to those wonderful, young American soldiers on the U.S.S. Cole, to the Air Force men and women in Saudi, and you just amplify that a bit, you'll understand what we're talking about.

Mr. SHAYS. I'd like to thank both of you and also thank our panel to come for their patience, but this has been very interesting, very helpful, and we'll look forward to continued contact with both of you.

Senator RUDMAN. We'll cooperate with you in every way we can. And, Congressman Kucinich, we will get an answer to you on the specific question you asked and how we address that issue.

Mr. KŪCINICH. Thank you.
Senator RUDMAN. Thank you.
Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, gentlemen.

At this time we will call our second and last panel, Dr. Bruce Hoffman, director, Washington Office, RAND Corp., General James Clapper, vice chairman, Advisory Panel to Assess the Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction; accompanied by Michael Wermuth, project director; and Mr. Frank Cilluffo, chairman, Report on Combating Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Terrorism, Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Do we have anyone else that may be joining us, as well? Is that it? Is there anyone else any of the four of you might ask to respond? We'll ask them to stand as we swear them in.

I would invite the four of you to stand, and we'll swear you in. Raise your right hands, please.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you very much. We'll note for the record all four have responded in the affirmative.

It is possible, gentlemen, that I might be out of here before 12 for just a few minutes because I need to testify before the Appropriations Committee and they adjourn at 12. I will come back, and it's possible I'll still be here. We'll see. But don't take offense if I all of the sudden take off here.

If you could go in the order I called you, we'll go first with-well, I guess we'll just go right down the line here, OK?

Mr. Wermuth, my understanding is you will not have a statement but respond to questions; is that correct?

Mr. WERMUTH. That's correct, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. So, Dr. Hoffman, thank you for being here. We'll take the clock 5 minutes. We'll roll it over and hope that you can be concluded before we get to the 10; 5 minutes, and then we'll roll it over.

We have sworn in everyone.

OK. Thank you.
Dr. Hoffman.



Mr. HOFFMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the subcommittee, for this opportunity to testify.

Clearly, much has been done in recent years to ensure that America is prepared to counter the threat of terrorism; yet, despite the many new legislative and programmatic initiatives, significant budgetary increases, and the intense Governmental concern that these activities evince, America's capabilities to defend against terrorism and to preempt and to respond to terrorist attacks arguably still remain inchoate and unfocused.

As last November's tragic attack on the U.S.S. Cole demonstra d, America remains vulnerable to terrorism overseas. Indeed, within the United States it is by no means certain 6 years later that we are capable of responding to an Oklahoma City type incident.

Today, however, the question is no longer one of more attention, bigger budgets, and increased personnel, but rather of greater focus, of better appreciation of the problem, a firmer understanding of the threat, and the development of a comprehensive national strategy. My testimony this morning will discuss how the absence of such a strategy has hindered American counterterrorism efforts by focusing on the critical importance of threat assessments in the development of a national strategy.

The title of this hearing, "Combating Terrorism: In Search of a National Strategy,” is particularly apt. Notwithstanding many accomplishments that we've had in building a counterterrorism policy, it is still conspicuous that the United States lacks an overarching strategy to address this problem. This is something that on numerous occasions, including before this subcommittee, the Gilmore Commission and its representative, its vice chairman, General Clapper, has called attention to.

What I would ask is that the articulation and development of a comprehensive strategy is not merely an intellectual exercise; rather, it is the foundation of any effective counterterrorism policy.

Indeed, the failure to develop such a strategy has undermined and forwarded the counterterrorist efforts of many other democratic countries throughout the years, producing ephemeral if not nugatory effects that in some instances have proven counterproductive in the long run. Indeed, this was one of the key findings of a 1992 RAND study, which I'd like to enter the executive summary of four pages into the record but leave a copy of the report for the subcommittee staff to consult at their leisure.

Using select historical case studies of close U.S. allies, such as the United Kingdom, West Germany, and Italy, this was precisely the conclusion that we had reached.

Accordingly, the continued absence of such a strategy threatens to negate the progress we have achieved thus far in countering the threat of terrorism.

A critical prerequisite in framing such a strategy is the tasking of a comprehensive net assessment of the terrorist threat, both foreign and domestic. Indeed, this is something, as well, that numerous witnesses before this subcommittee from the General Accounting Office, John Parkin from the Monterey Institute have previously called attention to. They have cited that there has been no net assessment for at least the last 6 years, and also that no means exists to conduct such an assessment of the terrorist threat within the United States, itself.

Equally as problematic, it is now nearly a decade since the last NIE-national intelligence estimate on terrorism, a prospective, forward-looking effort to predict and participate future trends in terrorism that was undertaken by the intelligence community. Admittedly, a new NIE on terrorism is currently being prepared as part of a larger process viewing all threats against the United States.

But let us ask, given the profound changes we have seen in the character, nature, identity, and motivations of the perpetrators of terrorism within the past years, one would argue that such an estimate is long overdue.

Certainly, the Global Trends 2015 effort undertaken by the National Intelligence Council last year was a positive step forward in this direction; however, at the same time, at least in the published, unclassified version of that report, little attention was paid to terrorism.

The danger of not undertaking such assessments and constantly revisiting previous assessments is that we risk remaining locked in a mindset that has become antiquated, if not anachronistic. Indeed, right now we very much view terrorism through a prism locked in the 1995–95 mindset, when some of the key or pivotal terrorist incidents of that particular period—some that were discussed by Senator Rudman and General Boyd this morning, the 1995 attack on the Tokyo subway and the bombing a month later of the Oklahoma City bombing-have framed our perceptions of understanding of the terrorist problems.

Now, those perceptions and that understanding may still be accurate, may still be correct, but, without constantly going back and asking and applying them to current developments in terrorism, we don't know that. Let me give you one example.

At the time and in my written testimony I refer to several statements made by directors of Central Intelligence that said in the mid 1990's we faced a worsening terrorist problem. The number of terrorist incidents was increasing. Terrorism was becoming more lethal. Therefore, this argument was used to present a framework that terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction had not just become possible, probable, or even likely, but that it was inevitable, imminent, and even certain.

This may well be the case, but at the same time, though, by not taking advantage of the long or unfolding of trends, we may miss the point.

For example, lethality in terrorism, in fact, at least as targeted against Americans, declined rather than increased throughout the 1990's. For example, overseas six times as many Americans were killed by terrorists in the 1980's as in the 1990's. On average, international acts of terrorism that targeted Americans in the 1980's killed, again, on average, 16 Americans per attack; in the 1990's, that average was 3.

The situation is not all that different domestically, either. Nearly eight times more terrorist incidents, according to FBI statistics, were recorded in the 1980's as compared to the 1990's. Admittedly, the death rate in the United States was greater-176 persons were killed by terrorists in America during the 1990's, compared to 26 in the 1980's. But, at the same time, viewed from a slightly different perspective, 95 percent of that total come from one single incident—the tragic, heinous bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Building in Oklahoma City.

My point, though, is that, of the 29 terrorist incidents reported in the United States by the FBI in the 1990's, only 4 resulted in fatalities.

So yes, Oklahoma is something we have to pay attention to, we have to prepare to, but Oklahoma City, at the same time, is not emblematic of the trend of terrorism in the United States.

Now, this isn't by any stretch of the imagination to suggest that the United States should become complacent about the threat of terrorism or that we should in any way relax our vigilance. Rather, what these statistics, I think, highlight is the asymmetry between perception and reality that a comprehensive terrorism threat assessment would go some way to addressing.

Without such assessments, we risk adopting policies and making hard security choices based on misperception and miscalculation, rather than on hard analysis built on empirical evidence of the actual dimensions of the threat.

Without ongoing, comprehensive reassessments, we cannot be confident that the range of policies, countermeasures, and defenses required to combat terrorism are the most relevant and appropriate ones for the United States.

Regular systematic net assessments would also bring needed unity to the often excellent but, nonetheless, separate, fragmented, and individual assessments that the intelligence community carries out on a regular basis.

This would enable us to present the big picture of the terrorist threat, which would facilitate both strategic analysis and the framing of an overall strategy. It would also profitably contribute to bridging the gap that lamentably has begun to exist between the criminal justice law enforcement approach to countering terrorism and that of the intelligence and national security approach.

This dichotomy, which has characterized the United States' approach to terrorism during the 1990's, is not only myopic but may also prove dangerous.

In conclusion, only through a sober and empirical understanding of the terrorist threat we will be able to focus our formidable resources where and when they can be most effective.

The development of a comprehensive national strategy to combat terrorism would appreciably sustain the progress we've achieved in recent years in addressing the threat posed by terrorists to Americans and American interests, both in this country and abroad.

Thank you very much.
Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, Dr. Hoffman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hoffman follows:]

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