The Solons asinine, to passion stung, "Away with him!" exclaimed, "Let him be hung." "Hung!" cried the Fox, "Can I have understood The Court aright? Sure, hanging is too good. My Lords, this gross depravity demands All Dire vengeance at your hoofs, I would say hands; Was cast into the stream, and there, they say, III. THE ANT. An Ant, the glory of the frugal race, Safe in the market, see our Ant advance, With other most extraordinary feats. But when he, nothing doubting that the streets "Is it even so ?" he cried, " Pernicious pack! Mortals, forgive my warmth. 'Tis not your crime, IV. THE WOLF AND THE CAT. A Wolf, pursued by hunters and by hounds, Say, Puss, whose friendly roof will grant defence ?" 66 Did not I know what Basil thinks of me. What shall I do?' "Dear friend, my heart will break. Yet bear this comfort to the shades' abode- V. THE WOLF AND THE MOUSE. A Wolf into the wilderness one day Resolved till supper time the rest to keep, Meanwhile, the smell allured a neighbouring Mouse A particle of meat he slily stole, Then swiftly sped him back into his hole. "Hallo there! Murder! Robbery! Will none Confound those miscreant Mice! O shame and grief That any four-legged thing should be a thief! VI. THE FOX IN ERMINE. For murder, aye and robbery beside, Saving this Sheep, could have approached the nest." 'Twas the Sheep's turn: "In sooth I cannot say," Whoever heard a Sheep was an assassin, Then spoke the Fox, with dignity surpassing: "The Sheep's iniquity cannot be hid, He might have killed the fowls, and therefore did. Tell this to Sheep, too flagrantly it shocks R. GARNETT. MAN AND ANIMALS IN NATURE. A SCIENTIFIC Conclusion, owing to the care which is taken during the process to eliminate any elements of doubt, tends to a fixity which is liable to become narrowness and dogmatism. For, in passing by the doubtful elements, in letting slip the difficult, ill-ascertained, or still mysterious constituents of the subject, it is quite possible to miss something without which no large and integral conception of it is possible. Science is classification, and, to be perfect, must include in every category one very large and important group of qualities, labelled as the Athenians wisely named one deity of the Pantheon-one side, that is to say, of universal God, -the Unknown. To show that a man and a monkey in physical structure manifest very decided resemblances, and carefully to note all of them, and all corporeal dissimilarities as well, is scientific. To assert that therefore man and monkey are on the same plane of universal life, on which by various processes the so-called human denomination has erected a step or raised platform, is plausible, but not scientific. All the elements of comparison are not allowed equal force, the great region of the unknown is defrauded of its prerogative, a place in the classification. What do we know of the life of man ?- -a phase of seventy years, or thereabouts. A phase! What reason is there for supposing human life more than any other to be only a phase? asks science. Perhaps none, but there is equally little reason for asserting that the manifestation of life which we behold in the career of a human individual is the sole and complete expression of the force in activity therein; it would be dogmatic and. not scientific to make that assertion, and science therefore is no science unless "not grudgingly or of necessity" it leaves room in the anthropological map for the extensive tract of the unknown. Alone of animals, man has an instinct of superiority to his earthly lot, an intuition which blossoms into shapes of beauty in imagination, and into forms of art which are felt to be related to a perfection only partially realisable under terrestrial conditions. This foreboding is an argument for the belief that the relation of man to the animal plane is a partial and temporary one only; but it is an argument which science shrinks from taking hold of. And while "we know not what we shall be," this element of man can belong only to the region of the unknown, which fact it is that makes unscientific folk instinctively rebel against their place being found for them next door to the ape. This instinct is an intelligible one, but strangely difficult to account for is the opposite instinct, that of aversion from any theory allowing for the extension into the unknown of the unexplorable side of the constitution of man. This aversion can only be understood on the hypothesis that in some minds the sense of orderly classification and definition is so strong, that pain is produced by contemplation of anything admitting neither of certain classification nor precise definition. Moreover, even on the theory that present life is but a phase of human spiritual existence, while we are here, we are here; and though certain individuals of high faculties to be conscious of a glory afar, the generality of mankind are glad to content themselves in making certain of the undoubted realities of terrestrial existence. seem The aversion to which we have referred shows itself in the growth of what is called materialism, a state of mind which probably affords rest to some minds, by relieving them of the strain of pressing forward into that vague unknown which is so attractive to others. The dislike manifests itself also in neglect of any theory which, by admitting the unverifiable, conflicts with theories which derive their force and solidity from its elimination. Some years ago we fell upon a curious little treatise* which, being scientifically objectionable, well illustrates the tendency to neglect of which we speak. The essay contains much that is interesting from a literary point of view, or as considered on the broad ground of general and philosophical thought rather than on the narrow arena of the prevalent creed of the day; and, as it is practically unknown, we propose making a few extracts from it to illustrate the oft-discussed relations of man and monkey. "When," says our author, "the end proposed in a classification of animals is to fortify the memory and to facilitate the record of knowledge, it would seem that similarity of form, and similarity in general, may constitute the basis of classification. On the other hand, when the end is of a philosophical character, when we wish to treat our classification as a truth, and to reason from it, we must have recourse to something more vital than analogy of form, and in this case, as I hope to show, we must rather consider affinities of use and character than the resemblances perceptible to the senses." The rigidity of scientific deduction meets with a due corrective when we bear in mind that “a classification framed upon the one principle of uniformity involves a hypothesis and not a fact; that, if used for higher purposes than those of reference and memoria technica, it will carry us away from the laws of nature; and that, when so abused, it must cause small facts to extinguish great ones, particular instances to override general laws, exceptions to put down rules, and the senses of the body to be discordant with the common sense of the mind." Animated nature the writer very fairly represents, not as a museum of stuffed specimens grouped in classes, but as a vast social organisation, a family: "The grouping of animals in nature is not according to a scale of similarities, but according to a scale of differences." "Take, first, a case from ranks in society, and look at the upper classes. Now, human society is a wonderful instance of grouping. But are its grades associated by extrinsic similiarity alone? Who are the parties that most copy the nobleman? Decidedly his own On the Grouping of Animals. By Mr. J. J. G. Wilkinson, M.R.C.S. (A paper read before the Veterinary Medical Association, April 8, 1845, and published in the Transactions of the Society in the same year.) London: Longmans. |