I would like to yield to the Ranking Member and friend, Senator Cochran, for any statement. Following his statement and before the questions, I am going to ask that we recess. There is a vote that is on now that is on the floor, and then we will be back shortly. Senator Cochran.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COCHRAN

Senator COCHRAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I congratulate you for organizing and calling this hearing. It is a very important subject for us to learn as much as possible about.

I wonder, while we are over voting, whether the panelists can be thinking about whether the recent experiences that we have had with the anthrax attacks have led them to reach any new conclusions about the proliferation of bioterrorism capabilities and what, if anything, we should plan to do about it.

One of the major efforts that we have made is to reach agreements with other countries to try to prevent the export of weapons or technologies that could be made into weapons of mass destruction, especially in the chemical and biological area. Do you think any of these agreements can serve as guides for the future and have we prevented any terrorist acts or activities by reason of these conventions and agreements that countries have joined to use as a way to combat proliferation of weapons, particularly_the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention? Have they kept states or terrorist groups from acquiring weapons of mass destruction?

Mr. Chairman, I think, since we have jurisdiction over the proliferation subject, it is certainly important for us to begin a set of hearings on this subject and I congratulate you for leading that effort.

Senator AKAKA. As I mentioned, you have worked on this before in this Subcommittee and we are still continuing this.

We all have questions for you, and I would ask that we recess and come back to ask you the questions. In the meantime, I want to say that your full statements will be printed in the record. Are there any further comments before we recess?

[No response.]

Senator AKAKA. The Subcommittee recesses.

[Recess.]

Senator AKAKA. The Subcommittee will be in order.

I want to thank you again for your testimony. I am impressed with the work you have accomplished on nonproliferation issues.

Let me begin with some questions for Dr. Moodie, and you mentioned this, so I am asking the question about this. I agree that the threat of agriculture terrorism has been given little attention, as you mentioned. Do you believe that USDA has access to the intelligence reports and information required to perform a full risk assessment of American agriculture?

Mr. MOODIE. Mr. Chairman, I do not know the inner workings of the Department of Agriculture to be able to say exactly whether they have access to that material or not. I do think that the appreciation of the agricultural dimension of this problem was slow in developing, and therefore, the Department of Agriculture as a play

table. As a consequence, I think they are still trying to establish the kind of relationships among the other players, probably including the intelligence community, that they need to do the job that they have to do.

So while I cannot be specific, my hunch would be that they probably need to improve their access, not just in terms of looking at the information or the intelligence, but dealing with the intelligence community on an ongoing basis so that they have an ongoing, evolving appreciation of the nature of the challenge that they confront.

Senator AKAKA. You suggest that smallpox is unlikely to be a threat, if you would mention something about that again. Which kinds of chemical and biological threats do you see as more likely at this time?

Mr. MOODIE. Well, first, Mr. Chairman, with respect to the smallpox threat, I would put smallpox into that category within the threat assessment that I talked about of contingencies against which we have to hedge. Certainly, the consequences of a smallpox attack are potentially so great that we have to have taken some measure of preparation. But you can have a smallpox scenario that either is that is so horrific that it either causes policy paralysis because it is too hard to do or that you put so much money against it that you never have enough.

And I think that for those of you who are responsible for allocating limited resources, this kind of open-ended vulnerability assessment that has huge consequences is not the best scenario on which to do your planning and to make the kinds of decisions with respect to limited resources that you have to make. Having said that, as I mentioned, I do think you have to get a hedge against that possibility.

I think, though, that we have not necessarily, in our focus on smallpox on anthrax, necessarily examined the full range of other biological agents that have traditionally been examined as potential biological weapons, including hemorrhagic fevers, plague, tularemia, and things of that kind.

I also do not think that we have necessarily looked, especially on the chemical side, looked at some of the low-tech threats. We have been fascinated by the higher-end, VX, sarin, the nerve gases, when, in fact, a contingency or a couple of contingencies that we have not really looked at in as much detail as perhaps we should are simple things like somebody hijacking a chlorine tanker and blowing it up outside Wall Street or somebody trying on a deliberate basis to produce the kind of consequence at a chemical production facility that we saw in Bhopal, essentially a deliberate Bhopal that caused enormous loss of life. Those do not involve sophisticated or exotic agents, but they are the use of chemicals to create mass disruption and potentially mass casualties.

Senator AKAKA. Dr. Tucker, in your testimony, you mentioned that many developing countries have obtained or might develop chemical and biological weapons capabilities as a result of foreign investment by chemical and biotechnology industries. Just as we have laws against bribery by American companies in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, should we be considering restrictions on

Mr. TUCKER. I think we should with respect to countries of proliferation concern, though it may be difficult. If we do not invest in such a country, it is very likely that our competitors will do so. So the problem with unilateral U.S. action in this area is that we can be very easily undercut by other countries, not only our allies, but also countries that are not friendly to the United States but that are increasingly investing in the developing world.

So that is why I view the utility of U.S. export controls with some skepticism. I think this is a threat that has to be dealt with in a multilateral context. We have the Australia Group, but it encompasses only 33 like-minded countries that export chemical or biological-relevant materials and equipment. But there are other countries that are now in a position to provide equipment and materials to countries of proliferation concern, so it is a broader problem that we need to look at in a multilateral framework.

Senator AKAKA. You mentioned the Bush Administration several times in your testimony. The Bush Administration has recently made proposals to enhance the enforcement of the Biological Weapons Convention. You recently stated that these efforts are insufficient, since they would not be part of a treaty with rights and obligations. What other measures would you recommend the administration take in this area or in regard to other unilateral actions? Mr. TUCKER. Well, I should say that the proposals by the Bush Administration would be useful. I do not criticize them. I just do not think they go far enough. For example, the idea of urging countries to pass uniform domestic laws that would regulate access to dangerous pathogens to make sure that these materials are only accessible to legitimate scientists and not terrorists or people who would misuse these materials to make weapons, I think that is a very desirable goal and should be encouraged.

But as you know, the United States withdrew in July from a 61⁄2year effort to negotiate a formal treaty that would provide measures to enhance compliance and deter violations of the Biological Weapons Convention. I do not think that the alternative U.S. proposals, at least as far as we know, will be effective. The details of these measures have not been released yet, but from the press release that the White House released last week, it appears that these measures are all voluntary, they are not legally binding, and, hence, they really depend on the good will of the participating countries.

My concern is, for example, if we set up a mechanism to investigate alleged use of biological weapons or suspicious outbreaks of disease and if this is done, let us say, within the context of the United Nations but not in a treaty context, then any country that is accused could simply refuse access to the investigation team. It would have no legally binding obligation to grant access to the inspectors or investigators to determine that it is, in fact, in compliance or noncompliance with the Biological Weapons Convention.

So my concern about the Bush Administration approach is that it is too weak, and clearly, we are facing a real threat. These anthrax attacks have made it very clear that this is not a hypothetical threat, that this is a real threat. The actual use of anthrax against civilians is challenging the norm that has existed for many,

I think a growing number of states and terrorist groups will be attracted to these weapons and we will face a much more serious proliferation problem in the future.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. Ms. Gottemoeller, you mentioned the danger of a terrorist developing a so-called dirty bomb using nuclear waste. There are about 440 nuclear reactors in the world and countless facilities with other types of nuclear materials. What should we be doing now to secure those plants or to monitor their use so terrorists cannot take them? Do we need a new international agency or a new agreement?

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. Sir, I think the International Atomic Energy Agency already has responsibility for many related types of missions and the Director General of the IAEA, Mr. el Baradei, called last week for enhanced funding for surveillance of nuclear sites around the world, nuclear reactor and research sites, related industrial sites, as you have stated. So I think for certain missions, certainly, there is already an international agency well experienced in this arena. I do not think we need to create anything new.

I do think that we need to set some priorities. I mentioned that the IAEA would like to enhance its capability for surveillance of threats around plants. I think we also need to pay attention to those research reactors, for example, where the highest level of nuclear material is currently stored. Few people know, for example, that there is a research reactor at Belgrade where not so long ago U.S. bombs were dropping in the vicinity, and at that site is stored a significant amount of highly enriched uranium to fuel that reactor.

So I think it is important to look at some of the higher-priority sites in order to get that material out of there. I would urge for Soviet-built research reactors in Eastern Europe, for example, that such materials be moved back to Russia and down-blended so they no longer pose such a proliferation threat in the future.

And then in regard to the radiological threats that I mentioned, again, you do point to a good fact, sir, and that is there is an enormous number of sites around the world where such materials might be stored or used in one way or another. So it does require some prioritization, as well, but I think particularly with regard to training of facility operators and some other perhaps lower-cost options, there are ways to proceed that would not cost an enormous amount but could overall increase and improve the security at these sites.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. Senator Carper is here. I would yield to the Senator for any statement or questions.

Senator CARPER. I have no statement, but a question or two, if I could, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome one and all. I am glad you are here and thank you. Obviously, I have missed your statements, and I would just ask, if I could, for each of you just to maybe take a minute and share with me, with respect to the issues that are before us today, what should the Congress be doing? What is our appropriate role? Dr. Moodie, we will start with you, if you will.

Mr. MOODIE. How much time do you have, Senator?

Senator CARPER. Well, I have about 5 minutes. The Chairman is

Mr. MOODIE. I think, first of all, conceptually, we have to recognize that the problems we are dealing with with respect to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons are a single problem now. It is not the state problem on one hand and the terrorists on the other. They are two sides of the same coin, and to begin from that point.

Second, I think we have to focus on a strategic response that ensures that, first of all, all the tools we have in our toolbox-intelligence, diplomacy, defenses, military options, arms control, and export controls each individual tool is as strong as it can be, but at the same time that our strategy is one in which we allow those tools to work together to achieve the same objective, not at cross purposes, and that is not always an easy task.

Third, I think the Congress in terms of its own organization should look at where it is. The Congress suffers from the same problem the administration does in terms of the vast number of people who are stakeholders in this and who have responsibility for doing it, and just as the administration is being called on to streamline their decision making processes with respect to some of these issues, that Congress may take a look and streamline how it does its business in this area, as well.

Senator CARPER. Good. Thanks very much. Dr. Tucker.

Mr. TUCKER. Yes. I would endorse everything that my colleague, Michael Moodie, has said, and I would add that the United States really cannot go it alone in the field of nonproliferation.

Senator CARPER. You said can or cannot?

Mr. TUCKER. Cannot go it alone in the field of nonproliferation. I mean, we can enhance our defenses. We can improve our intelligence, develop better consequence management in case we are attacked, but if we are going to try to attack this problem at the roots, we need to do it through multilateral instruments and mechanisms, including existing treaties that are in force, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention, that are potentially useful tools but have been underutilized by the United States.

For example, they have been underfunded. We have instruments such as the opportunity to request challenge inspections of countries that we believe are violating the convention and we have not used those instruments. And as a result, they

Senator CARPER. Could I ask, why do you think that is?

Mr. TUCKER. I think there are a number of reasons, concern that, for example, there might be a retaliatory challenge. If we challenge Iran, which we have openly accused of violating the Chemical Weapons Convention, they might challenge us back, and I think there has been some concern about a harassing type inspection.

But I think we should be able to deal with that contingencythere are mechanisms within the Chemical Weapons Convention to manage access and to protect legitimate national security information and proprietary information, and there is a provision under the treaty for a three-quarter majority of the Executive Council to block a frivolous or abusive inspection request. If we make a compelling argument that a retaliatory challenge is, in fact, frivolous