CNS Center for Nonproliferation Studies Table I: Chemical and Biological Weapons: Possession and Programs, Past and Present This table summarizes data available from open sources. Precise assessment of a state's capabilities is difficult because most weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs were, and/or are, secret and cannot be independently assessed. Evidence for the existence of a program is characterized as: Known - where states have either declared their programs or there is clear evidence of chemical Probable - where states have been publicly named by government or military officials as Possible - where states have been widely identified as possibly having chemical weapons or a CW Former - where states have acknowledged having a chemical weapons stockpile and/or CW Detailed references for the table are available on the Center for Nonproliferation Studies web site at Statement of Rose Gottemoeller Senior Associate of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Committee on Governmental Affairs This is a critical time to review weapons of mass destruction (WMD) technologies and materials and examine the effectiveness of export controls to curb these threats. Suddenly, the press is full of terrible scenarios: Nuclear weapons in the hands of Osama bin Laden. A suitcase bomb detonating in the middle of the Golden Gate Bridge. A radiological bomb spewing plutonium over the White House, creating a keep-out zone in central Washington that could last for many years. After reading about threats such as these, many people are worried. I commend the Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation and Federal Services for confronting these complex and difficult issues in the search for new answers. I would like to begin my remarks by examining the nuclear and radiological threats, how they differ, and what the level of concern should be about them. In describing these threats, I will also summarize the kind of technological challenge that they present to any would-be proliferator, whether state-sponsored, or non-state actors with a terrorist agenda. I will then move on to discuss the nuclear and radiological threats that, in my view, deserve more attention than they currently receive. I will conclude by commenting on how export controls have related to the nuclear nonproliferation regime and peaceful uses of nuclear technologies in the past, and offer my view of how they should relate in the future. Nuclear and Radiological Weapons: The Threats and The Technologies A simple nuclear device of the Hiroshima design is actually not the easiest nuclear capability for a proliferator to acquire, be he a terrorist or a rogue state actor. Although the design is now almost fifty years old, the Hiroshima device, also called a "gun-type" weapon, requires a large amount of nuclear material to achieve a nuclear explosion. We assume that 15-30 kg of highly enriched uranium or 3-4 kg of plutonium are needed for a sophisticated nuclear weapon.' Cruder devices may require more. One estimate, for example, places the likely size of a Pakistani weapon at around 1,500 pounds. Therefore, although achieving a workable trigger device and other components would not be a trivial matter, the principal barrier to acquiring a nuclear weapon is the large amount of weapons-usable material that is needed. 2 For this reason, international nonproliferation policy has stressed keeping nuclear material production and enrichment technologies out of proliferators' hands. The crisis 1 David Albright, Frans Berkhout and William Walker, "Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996: World Inventories, Capabilities and Policies," SIPRI (Oxford Press, 1997), p. 8. 2 William J. Broad, Stephen Engelberg and James Glanz, "Assessing Risks, Chemical, Biological, Even Nuclear," New York Times, November 1, 2001. |