"Countries pledging to abide by MTCR guidelines include the People's Republic of China, Israel, Romania, and Slovakia. Source: Center for International Trade and Security, Nonproliferation Export Controls: A Global Appendix II SELECTED GAO REPORTS ON EXPORT CONTROLS AND EXPORT CONTROLS Export Controls: State and Commerce Department License Review Times Are • Export Controls: Regulatory Change Needed to Comply with Missile Technology Licensing Requirements, GAO-01-530, May 31, 2001 Export Controls: Inadequate Justification for Relaxation of Computer Controls • Export Controls: System for Controlling Exports of High Performance Computing Is Ineffective, GAO-01-10, December 18, 2000 Department of Energy: National Security Controls Over Contractors Traveling to Foreign Countries Need Strengthening, RCED-00-140, June 26, 2000 • Export Controls: Challenges and Changes For Controls on Computer Exports, TNSIAD-00-187, May 26, 2000 Export Controls: National Security Risks and Revisions to Controls on Computer Systems, T-NSIAD-00-139, March 23, 2000 • Export Controls: National Security Risks and Revisions To Controls on Computers, TNSIAD-00-104, February 28, 2000 Export Controls: Statutory Reporting Requirements for Computers Not Fully • Export Controls: International Space Station Technology Transfers, NSIAD-00-14 November 3, 1999 • Export Controls: Implementation of the 1998 Legislative Mandate for High Performance Computers, T-NSIAD-00-53, October 28, 1999 Export Controls: 1998 Legislative Mandate for High Performance Computers, NSIAD99-208, September 24, 1999 • Defense Trade: Department of Defense Savings From Export Sales Are Difficult to Capture, NSIAD-99-191, September 17, 1999 · Export Controls: Better Interagency Coordination Needed on Satellite Exports, NSIAD-99-182, September 17, 1999 Department of Energy: DOE Needs To Improve Controls Over Foreign Visitors To Its Weapons Laboratories, T-RCED-99-28, October 14, 1998 • Export Controls: Change in Licensing Jurisdiction for Commercial Communications Satellites, T-NSIAD-98-222, September 17, 1998 • Export Controls: Changes in Controls Applied to the Export of High Performance Computers, T-NSIAD-98-250, September 16, 1998 • Export Controls: Information on the Decision to Revise High Performance Computer Controls, NSIAD-98-196, September 16, 1998 Export Controls: National Security Issues and Foreign Availability for High Export Controls: Issues Related to the Export of Communications Satellites, T- • Export Controls: Issues Related to Commercial Communications Satellites, T-NSIAD98-208 June 10, 1998 Department of Energy: DOE Needs to Improve Controls Over Foreign Visitors to Weapons Laboratories, RCED-97-229, September 25, 1997. Export Controls: Sales of High Performance Computers to Russia's Nuclear Weapons Laboratories, T-NSIAD-97-128, April 15, 1997. Export Controls: Change in Export Licensing Jurisdiction for Two Sensitive Dual-Use Items, NSIAD-97-24, January 14, 1997 Export Controls: Sensitive Machine Tool Exports to China, NSIAD-97-4 November 19, 1996 Export Controls: Sale of Telecommunications Equipment to China, NSIAD-97-5, Nuclear Weapons: Russia's Request for the Export of U.S. Computers for Stockpile Nuclear Nonproliferation: Information on Nuclear Exports Controlled by U.S.- Export Controls: Issues Concerning Sensitive Stealth-Related Items and Export Controls: Concerns Over Stealth-Related Exports, NSLAD-95-140, May 10, Export Controls: Some Controls Over Missile-Related Technology Exports to China Are Weak, NSIAD-95-82, April 17, 1995 FORMER SOVIET WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION Cooperative Threat Reduction: DOD Has Adequate Oversight of Assistance, But Weapons of Mass Destruction: State Department Oversight of Science Centers • Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE's Efforts to Assist Weapons Scientists in Russia's · Nuclear Nonproliferation: Security of Russia's Nuclear Material Improving; Further Enhancements Needed, GAO-01-312, February 28, 2001 Biological Weapons: Effort to Reduce Former Soviet Threat Offers Benefits, Poses New Risks, GAO/NSIAD-00-138, April 28, 2000 Cooperative Threat Reduction: DOD's 1997-98 Reports on Accounting for Assistance Were Late and Incomplete, GAO/NSIAD-00-40, March 15, 2000 Weapons of Mass Destruction: U.S. Efforts to Reduce Threats from the Former Soviet Union, GAO/T-NSIAD/RCED-00-119, March 6, 2000 Nuclear Nonproliferation: Limited Progress in Improving Nuclear Material Security in Russia and the Newly Independent States, RCED/NSIAD-00-82, March 6, 2000 · Nuclear Nonproliferation: Status of Transparency Measures for U.S. Purchase of Russian Highly Enriched Uranium, RCED-99-194, September 22, 1999 Weapons of Mass Destruction: Effort to Reduce Russian Arsenals May Cost More, Achieve Less Than Planned, NSIAD-99-76, April 13, 1999 • Nuclear Nonproliferation: Concerns with DOE's Efforts to Reduce the Risks Posed by Russia's Unemployed Weapons Scientists, RCED-99-54, February 19, 1999 Nuclear Nonproliferation and Safety: Uncertainties About the Implementation of U.S.Russian Plutonium Disposition Efforts, RCED-98-46, January 14, 1998 Weapons of Mass Destruction: Review of DOD's June 1997 Report on Assistance Provided, NSIAD-97-218, September 5, 1997 Cooperative Threat Reduction: Status of Defense Conversion Efforts in the Former Weapons of Mass Destruction: DOD Reporting on Cooperative Threat Reduction Nuclear Safety: Status of U.S. Assistance to Improve the Safety of Soviet-Designed Weapons of Mass Destruction: Status of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, NSIAD-96-222, September 27, 1996 Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Help Newly Independent States Improve Their Nuclear Material Controls, T-NSIAD/RCED-96-118, March 13, 1996 · Nuclear Nonproliferation: Status of U.S. Efforts to Improve Nuclear Materials Controls in Newly Independent States, NSIAD/RCED-96-89, March 8, 1996 Nuclear Safety: Concerns with Nuclear Facilities and Other Sources of Radiation in the Former Soviet Union, RCED-96-4, November 7, 1995 Weapons of Mass Destruction: DOD Reporting on Cooperative Threat Reduction Weapons of Mass Destruction: Reducing the Threat From the Former Soviet Union-- Weapons of Mass Destruction: Reducing the Threat From the Former Soviet Union, NSIAD-95-7, October 6, 1994 Nuclear Safety: International Assistance Efforts to Make Soviet-Designed Reactors Safer, RCED-94-234, September 29, 1994 Soviet Nuclear Weapons: U.S. Efforts to Help Former Soviet Republics Secure and Destroy Weapons, NSIAD-T-93-5, March 9, 1993 Soviet Nuclear Weapons: Priorities and Costs Associated with U.S. Dismantlement Russian Nuclear Weapons: U.S. Implementation of the Soviet Nuclear Threat Statement by Richard T. Cupitt, Associate Director, Center for International Export Controls and WMD Proliferation Threats New Opportunities for Reform Prompted by the Gulf War, in the early 1990s the United States and its partners strengthened the system of multilateral export control arrangements related to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery. In recent years, however, the impetus to adapt export controls continuously to the emerging challenges of the post-Cold War world dissipated. Consequently, the four major export control arrangements entered into an era of stagnation without their members having resolved several critical deficiencies in the multilateral system.1 The tragic events of the past two months not only emphasize the need to reform the multilateral system, they have shaken the international community enough that reform initiatives may succeed. In particular, the attacks on September 11 scuttled any doubts that some terrorists have the will to use WMD if they have the capability to do so. The importance of limiting WMD capabilities of terrorists and states that support terrorists never has been more clear to the international community. Squandering this opportunity will have severe consequences. The world of WMD export controls has two fundamental principles: 1 The four major export control arrangements are the Australia Group (for chemical and biological items), the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), and the Wassenaar Arrangement (for advanced conventional weapons). |