Can Bus and Putin Control Russia's Arsenal? he events of Sept. 11 President Bush has noted the poten- The primary sources for these ma- ery of deadly chemical and biological agents on a broad scale. As President Bush meets with Senator Sam Nunn and Senator Rich- Several times in the last decade, Nuclear materials, spite this effort, most Russian nucle individuals or groups have attempted to steal and then sell nuclear, chemical or biological materials from sites in Russia. We know this because we have captured them. But how many incidents have happened that we don't know about? It would only take a softball-sized lump of highly enriched uranium, or a baseball-sized lump of plutonium, along with materials readily available on the commercial market, to put together a nuclear device that could fit in an S.U.V.Terrorists are also working to perfect the deliv Christopher J. Dodd, Democrat of unguarded and unaccounted for. effective ways to ensure that weapons In 1991, Congress approved legisla- ar material is inadequately secured. Despite the success of these pro- First, we need a clear mechanism for leadership and accountability. Coordination between the dozens of Russia's partnership is vital to the Design Machine On Sept. 11, the unthinkable hap- ours. THE NEW YORK TIMES, TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 13, 2001 Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: We are pleased to be here today to discuss our recent work on U.S. nonproliferation programs designed to reduce the threat to national security posed by the former Soviet Union's weapons of mass destruction and to comment on S. 673-a bill to establish an interagency committee to review and coordinate U.S. nonproliferation programs. Our statement today, which follows our testimony before this Subcommittee last week that provided an overview of U.S. tools for combating proliferation,' emphasizes how the events of September 11, 2001, have heightened the importance to our national security of global U.S. nonproliferation programs. In summary, our most recent work on the U.S. government's various nonproliferation programs has found that they have achieved some success, but more needs to be done to keep nuclear weapons, materials, and technologies out of the hands of terrorists and countries of concern. For example, hundreds of metric tons of nuclear material remain at some risk because DOE's program to secure this material continues to experience problems with access to sensitive Russian sites. Furthermore, there are questions about how to sustain the security improvements being made. In addition, DOE and State Department programs to employ weapons scientists face difficulty in conclusively demonstrating that they are achieving their intended goal of preventing the spread of weapons-related knowledge and expertise. With respect to S. 673, there is some debate among officials both within and outside government about the need for more coordination of U.S. nonproliferation programs. Based upon our work and the findings of two independent commissions that recently examined these programs, we believe that additional coordination would be helpful and that the legislation could serve as a vehicle to share information and best practices for addressing the problems we identified in 1 Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing U.S. Policy Tools for Combating Proliferation (GAO-02226T, Nov. 7, 2001). our work. However, the legislation would not address a number of other problems, such as limited access to sensitive Russian sites and various program management concerns that diminish the effectiveness of U.S. nonproliferation efforts. We also believe S. 673 could be strengthened by mandating development of an overarching strategic plan that clearly identifies overall goals, time frames for meeting those goals, and ways to set priorities for allocating resources governmentwide to address U.S. nonproliferation concerns. Background The states of the former Soviet Union possess enormous assets, including nuclear material and scientific expertise, that could help terrorists or countries of concern acquire weapons of mass destruction. By some estimates, the former Soviet Union had, at the time of its breakup 10 years ago, about 30,000 nuclear weapons, 650 metric tons of weapons-usable nuclear materials, 40,000 metric tons of chemical weapons, an extensive biological weapons infrastructure, and thousands of systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction. The political changes and ensuing economic turmoil left 30,000 to 75,000 senior nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons scientists, as well as thousands of less experienced scientists, without full-time employment. In addition, Russia's 10 closed nuclear cities, which form the core of the nuclear weapons complex, have massive unemployment problems and face an uncertain future because Russia is downsizing its nuclear weapons activities. To date, the Congress has authorized in excess of $5.5 billion for U.S. programs aimed at helping Russia and the other newly independent states to reduce the threats posed by their weapons of mass destruction. Much of this money has been spent on DOD's efforts to eliminate vehicles for delivering nuclear weapons and securing former Soviet weapons and their components. DOE is also a major player in U.S. nonproliferation programs. Its programs focus on, among other things, (1) improving the security of hundreds of metric tons of nuclear materials at various sites located throughout Russia and (2) employing Russia's weapons scientists, including those in Russia's 10 closed nuclear cities, so that they will not sell sensitive information to countries or terrorist groups trying to develop weapons of mass destruction. The State Department also oversees two international science centers in Russia and Ukraine that pay former Soviet weapons scientists to conduct peaceful research. S. 673 calls for a committee that would consist of representatives from the Department of Commerce, DOD, DOE, and State, and be chaired by a representative of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The committee would be responsible for monitoring and coordinating nonproliferation efforts in the former Soviet Union (1) within and between U.S. government departments and agencies, (2) between the U.S. government and the private sector, and (3) between the United States and other countries in order to minimize conflict among the programs and to maximize the utility of U.S. public spending. Specifically, the bill calls for the committee to arrange for the development of analyses and provide guidance on the issues and problems relating to coordination within and between the U.S. government, the private sector, and other countries' nonproliferation programs. Nuclear Nonproliferation Programs Have Had Success, but More Work Needed to Secure Weapons, Materials, and Technologies Today, I will focus my comments on our recent work related to several key nonproliferation programs: DOE's Material Protection, Control, and Accounting Program; the 1993 U.S./Russia Highly Enriched Uranium Agreement; and DOE's and State's programs to employ Russian weapons scientists. Successful implementation of these nonproliferation programs is clearly in our national security interests. While these programs have had some success, much more needs to be done to ensure their successful implementation. In February 2001,2 we reported that the security systems installed by DOE's Material Protection, Control, and Accounting Program were reducing the risk of 2 Nuclear Nonproliferation: Security of Russia's Nuclear Material Improving; Further |