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Can Bus and Putin Control Russia's Arsenal?

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he events of Sept. 11
shattered any illusion
that America is se
cure from foreign at-
tack. As horrible as
that day was, future
attacks could be far more deadly. If
terrorists had used a nuclear weapon
in lower Manhattan, hundreds of
thousands might have died.

President Bush has noted the poten-
'tial threat we face if Al Qaeda. or
other terrorist groups obtain weapons
of mass destruction. These groups are
seeking chemical, biological and nu-
clear weapons, he told European lead-
ers last week. If they obtain them,
they will be a threat "to every nation
and eventually to civilization itself."

The primary sources for these ma-
terials of destruction are weapons
plants and reactors in the former
Soviet Union, where thousands of tons
of weapons-grade uranium, plutoni-
um, chemicals and pathogens are
stored at hundreds of sites. Some of
these sites lack fences, alarms or
qualified security guards. Systems to
account for fissile material are rudi-
mentary or nonexistent.

ery of deadly chemical and biological agents on a broad scale.

As President Bush meets with
President Vladimir Putin of Russia
this week, he should discuss clevising

Senator Sam Nunn and Senator Rich-
ard Lugar, more than 5,600 warheads
have been deactivated since 1992. The
United States has spent more than $2
billion to aid Belarus, Ukraine and
Kazakhstan in the destruction of their
weapons, and has helped Russia safe-
ly dispose of thousands of tons of
nuclear weapons and materials. De-

Several times in the last decade, Nuclear materials, spite this effort, most Russian nucle

individuals or groups have attempted to steal and then sell nuclear, chemical or biological materials from sites in Russia. We know this because we have captured them. But how many incidents have happened that we don't know about? It would only take a softball-sized lump of highly enriched uranium, or a baseball-sized lump of plutonium, along with materials readily available on the commercial market, to put together a nuclear device that could fit in an S.U.V.Terrorists are also working to perfect the deliv

Christopher J. Dodd, Democrat of
Connecticut, and Chuck Hagel, Re-
publican of Nebraska, serve on the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

unguarded and unaccounted for.

effective ways to ensure that weapons
and materials of mass destruction in
and around Russia remain safe, ac-
counted for and secure.

In 1991, Congress approved legisla-
tion that provided money to Russia
and other former Soviet states to help
them dismantle their nuclear ar-
senals and create safe storage for
weapons-grade nuclear material. Un-
der the program, named for former

ar material is inadequately secured.
Meanwhile, the United States gov-
ernment has hired or helped place
thousands of former weapons scien-
tists from the former Soviet Union to
work in university labs, hospitals and
power plants. Many more, however,
remain out of work or underem-
ployed. They are thus susceptible to
selling their expertise to terrorist
groups or rogue states.

Despite the success of these pro-
grams, we need a better plan to re-
duce the threat of these weapons -
one that takes into account the new
realities of the world after Sept. 11.

First, we need a clear mechanism for leadership and accountability.

Coordination between the dozens of
federal departments and agencies re-
sponsible for monitoring nonprolifer-
ation agreements must be improved.
Funding for these programs must be
drastically increased - and not just
by the United States. America's allies,
and international organizations like
the United Nations and the interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency, should
also do their part.

Russia's partnership is vital to the

Design Machine

On Sept. 11, the unthinkable hap-
pened. Worse could be yet to come,
especially if terrorists acquire and
use nuclear weapons. The only real
defense is an effective, long-term
strategy that prevents the spread of
dangerous chemical, biological and
nuclear materials. The United States
cannot do this alone. We need Presi
dent Putin's help - and he needs
D

ours.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 13, 2001

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Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

We are pleased to be here today to discuss our recent work on U.S. nonproliferation programs designed to reduce the threat to national security posed by the former Soviet Union's weapons of mass destruction and to comment on S. 673-a bill to establish an interagency committee to review and coordinate U.S. nonproliferation programs. Our statement today, which follows our testimony before this Subcommittee last week that provided an overview of U.S. tools for combating proliferation,' emphasizes how the events of September 11, 2001, have heightened the importance to our national security of global U.S. nonproliferation programs.

In summary, our most recent work on the U.S. government's various nonproliferation programs has found that they have achieved some success, but more needs to be done to keep nuclear weapons, materials, and technologies out of the hands of terrorists and countries of concern. For example, hundreds of metric tons of nuclear material remain at some risk because DOE's program to secure this material continues to experience problems with access to sensitive Russian sites. Furthermore, there are questions about how to sustain the security improvements being made. In addition, DOE and State Department programs to employ weapons scientists face difficulty in conclusively demonstrating that they are achieving their intended goal of preventing the spread of weapons-related knowledge and expertise.

With respect to S. 673, there is some debate among officials both within and outside government about the need for more coordination of U.S. nonproliferation programs. Based upon our work and the findings of two independent commissions that recently examined these programs, we believe that additional coordination would be helpful and that the legislation could serve as a vehicle to share information and best practices for addressing the problems we identified in

1 Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing U.S. Policy Tools for Combating Proliferation (GAO-02226T, Nov. 7, 2001).

our work. However, the legislation would not address a number of other problems, such as limited access to sensitive Russian sites and various program management concerns that diminish the effectiveness of U.S. nonproliferation efforts. We also believe S. 673 could be strengthened by mandating development of an overarching strategic plan that clearly identifies overall goals, time frames for meeting those goals, and ways to set priorities for allocating resources governmentwide to address U.S. nonproliferation concerns.

Background

The states of the former Soviet Union possess enormous assets, including nuclear material and scientific expertise, that could help terrorists or countries of concern acquire weapons of mass destruction. By some estimates, the former Soviet Union had, at the time of its breakup 10 years ago, about 30,000 nuclear weapons, 650 metric tons of weapons-usable nuclear materials, 40,000 metric tons of chemical weapons, an extensive biological weapons infrastructure, and thousands of systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction. The political changes and ensuing economic turmoil left 30,000 to 75,000 senior nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons scientists, as well as thousands of less experienced scientists, without full-time employment. In addition, Russia's 10 closed nuclear cities, which form the core of the nuclear weapons complex, have massive unemployment problems and face an uncertain future because Russia is downsizing its nuclear weapons activities.

To date, the Congress has authorized in excess of $5.5 billion for U.S. programs aimed at helping Russia and the other newly independent states to reduce the threats posed by their weapons of mass destruction. Much of this money has been spent on DOD's efforts to eliminate vehicles for delivering nuclear weapons and securing former Soviet weapons and their components. DOE is also a major player in U.S. nonproliferation programs. Its programs focus on, among other things, (1) improving the security of hundreds of metric tons of nuclear materials at various sites located throughout Russia and (2) employing Russia's weapons scientists, including those in Russia's 10 closed nuclear cities, so that they will not

sell sensitive information to countries or terrorist groups trying to develop weapons of mass destruction. The State Department also oversees two international science centers in Russia and Ukraine that pay former Soviet weapons scientists to conduct peaceful research.

S. 673 calls for a committee that would consist of representatives from the Department of Commerce, DOD, DOE, and State, and be chaired by a representative of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The committee would be responsible for monitoring and coordinating nonproliferation efforts in the former Soviet Union (1) within and between U.S. government departments and agencies, (2) between the U.S. government and the private sector, and (3) between the United States and other countries in order to minimize conflict among the programs and to maximize the utility of U.S. public spending. Specifically, the bill calls for the committee to arrange for the development of analyses and provide guidance on the issues and problems relating to coordination within and between the U.S. government, the private sector, and other countries' nonproliferation programs.

Nuclear Nonproliferation Programs Have Had Success, but More Work Needed to Secure Weapons, Materials, and Technologies

Today, I will focus my comments on our recent work related to several key nonproliferation programs: DOE's Material Protection, Control, and Accounting Program; the 1993 U.S./Russia Highly Enriched Uranium Agreement; and DOE's and State's programs to employ Russian weapons scientists. Successful implementation of these nonproliferation programs is clearly in our national security interests. While these programs have had some success, much more needs to be done to ensure their successful implementation.

In February 2001,2 we reported that the security systems installed by DOE's Material Protection, Control, and Accounting Program were reducing the risk of

2

Nuclear Nonproliferation: Security of Russia's Nuclear Material Improving; Further
Enhancements Needed (GAO-01-312, Feb. 28, 2001).

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