2. The MPC&A program has applied less stringent standards to similar materials in Russia-the same standards as those used at DOE facilities in the United States-but the involvement of other countries in funding the Plutonium Disposition Program will undoubtedly lead to MOX powders and fuel being subject to the more rigorous international rules. 3. Two tons of MOX powder-containing enough plutonium for 250 weapons, using the IAEA standard of eight kilograms per weapon-would be shipped from Ozersk to Zheleznogorsk for fabrication into fuel rods, and the rods would then be shipped back through Ozersk, a total distance of about 3,000 miles, en route to the reactors that will use them in western Russia. (The transportation link to the reactors would be unavoidable even if the two MOX plants were co-located in Ozersk, at issue is the added transportation required by siting the fuel fabrication plant at Zheleznogorsk.) 4. This point was confirmed by a former senior official in the Plutonium Disposition Program in a conversation in April 2001. A similar problem of potentially avoidable long-distance transportation of fissile material can be seen in the chain of Russian facilities processing HEU under the HEU Purchase Agreement. See General Accounting Office, Nuclear Nonproliferation: Status of Transparency Measures for U.S. Purchase of Russian Highly Enriched Uranium, September 1999, Figure 2 and Appendix I. Unfortunately, it does not appear that Russia has obtained the assistance of the MPC&A program in enhancing security over these transit links. 5. General Accounting Office, Nuclear Nonproliferation: Security of Russia's Nuclear Material Improving; More Enhancements Needed, February 2001. 6. See references in note 1. In fact, in 1996 Congress adopted legislation to establish a national coordinator for non-proliferation matters, whose responsibilities would have included coordinating U.S. non-proliferation programs in Russia. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (P.L. 104-221) Title XIV, Subtitle D. 7. The spreadsheet examines the total Russian inventory of HEU and plutonium not in weapons and the accomplishments of U.S. programs to secure the material remaining in this inventory so as to identify the date when all material remaining in the inventory will be secured through the MPC&A program and in the Mayak FMSF. Based on the February 2001 GAO report on the MPC&A program, the spreadsheet assumes that the total beginning inventory in 2001 is 603 metric tons, that 86 metric tons of this total has received comprehensive security upgrades under the MPC&A program, and that the remaining 517 metric tons will be secured by 2011. This implies that the program secures material at a rate of 47 metric tons per year. The Mayak FMSF is assumed to receive 50 tons of plutonium between 2002 and 2008. Increases to the inventory of material occur because of (1) new weapon dismantlements (assumed, as a placeholder, to add 10 metric tons per year to the inventory of material not in weapons, for six years); (2) new production of weapons plutonium; and (3) new production of civil plutonium. (The last two categories taper off as relevant U.S. programs to end plutonium production take effect.) Decreases to the inventory occur because of (1) the HEU Purchase Agreement; (2) the MPC&A Materials Consolidation program; and (3) beginning in 2007, the Plutonium Disposition Program. 8. To be sure, "tons of material secured" is not the only valid metric for assessing program accomplishments; the proportion of buildings containing fissile material that have been secured compared to the number needing such upgrades might be better. However, tons of material secured is a standard used by the MPC&A program itself, and an integrated approach to assessing progress in this sphere would be a useful starting point for looking at progress building by building, which presumably will also be affected by the accomplishments of other programs. 9. Two metric tons of plutonium would be sufficient material for 250 weapons (at eight kilograms per weapon). Since 25 kilograms of HEU are needed for a weapon, 250 times this amount, or 6.25 metric tons would be the equivalent of the two metric tons of plutonium. Leonard S. Spector is deputy director of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, based in Washington. From September 1997 through January 2001, he served as deputy assistant secretary of energy for arms control and non-proliferation. Combating Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction with Nonproliferation Programs: Testimony of Vann H. Van Diepen Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Before the Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation & Federal Services Chairman Akaka, Senator Cochran, Members of the Committee: I am very pleased to be here in response to your invitation to Under Secretary Bolton to discuss nonproliferation assistance programs and coordination. I agree with the points made by participants in the November 14 hearings you hosted about the urgency and complexity of the environment in which we operate. While the Cold War weapons legacy still must be addressed, these threats are not new to us. The Cold War has been over for more than a decade and we have moved beyond "post Cold War" to new relationships and strategic frameworks with Russia and other countries in the region. The proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and the missiles capable of delivering them, is now a central security threat facing the United States, our allies, and our friends. Where once we faced thousands of nuclear weapons under centralized command of a great rival power, September 11 and the biological attacks since have shown how much more diverse and less predictable the threat has become. In this new world, it is not just the Soviet legacy that demands our attention, but many avenues from 2 which rogue countries and terrorists and their supporters may choose when seeking to advance their attack capabilities. The programs that we use to counter this threat originated in 1992 under the first Bush Administration. They have served us well. The programs and the agencies that manage them have also responded and evolved as they gained experience and as circumstances changed. The hallmark of something that was well crafted is that it can be adapted without losing its essential characteristics. I believe that our nonproliferation programs meet that test. I would like to address each of the five questions you posed: State Department Nonproliferation Programs The State Department has direct responsibility for several nonproliferation programs directed at or relevant to the countries of the former Soviet Union. More broadly, we provide foreign policy guidance and diplomatic support for the programs of other agencies, and participate actively in the review, approval, coordination, and implementation of other programs concerning nonproliferation and former Soviet weapons of mass destruction or advanced conventional weapons materials, facilities, 3 Weapons Materials and Technologies When the Soviet Union collapsed, the absence of any system of controls over the export of technology and materials needed in WMD and missile programs posed an immediate threat. The new countries lacked laws, expertise, and technical resources to implement controls. At first our export control assistance program concentrated on establishing and improving export control systems in the new independent states of the former Soviet Union that inherited nuclear weapons related facilities and materials, and in eastern Europe. The early focus of the program was to establish basic legal and regulatory frameworks and licensing and enforcement processes in countries that supply key technologies. As funding increased and the program matured, the focus has expanded to working with the neighbors of potential supply countries as well as with key transshipment states countries through which WMD materials and technologies are likely to transit, while continuing to support the development of more robust systems in the supplier states, including providing advanced imaging and detection equipment. This program has grown from less than $5 million per year in the mid-1990s to the President's request for $39 million for this fiscal year ($17 million from NADR; $22 million from FREEDOM Support Act/NIS account). The State Department chairs an inter-agency working group on export control assistance, which directs and coordinates the work of the various U.S. agencies that implement these 4 programs in over 25 countries worldwide. These efforts are also coordinated with the international narcotics and law enforcement programs which also provide assistance to customs and border guard agencies of other countries. Weapons Expertise Among our earliest concerns was addressing the threat posed by the thousands of Soviet weapons scientists who no longer would be supported after the Soviet Union's demise. With continued economic flux in Russia and elsewhere in the region and aggressive pursuit of this expertise by countries like Iran, this effort continues to be a high priority. The international science and technology centers began their work in Moscow in 1994, and in Kiev in 1995. The original focus of these centers was to stem the threat of "brain drain" of underemployed and unemployed weapons scientists and engineers to WMD programs in other countries. As the science center programs matured, the focus has shifted to emphasize redirecting scientists toward sustainable careers in peaceful, transparent, civilian endeavors in their home countries, be these commercial ventures or continuing scientific contributions to areas of international and global interest. The program started with Russia and Ukraine and now embraces communities in nations of particular interest to the United States' war in Afghanistan: Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Armenia, and Georgia. Other key regional states -- Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, and Moldova -- are in the process of joining one of the science centers. Belarus also participates in the program, but currently |