Kazakhstan inventoried radiological sources and designed packaging for the transport of the sources to secure storage facilities. Biological Weapons Increased cooperation with the biological weapons designers and engineers in the former Soviet Union has enabled us to identify many research institutes that house dangerous pathogens and production-capable facilities. The Biological Weapons Proliferation Prevention (BWPP) program area is consolidating and securing or eliminating dangerous pathogen collections, dismantling former Soviet BW research and production facilities, and, as described earlier, targeting research to enhance US bio-defense capabilities against dangerous pathogens. Right now, we are working with Russia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. In the future, we hope to expand our efforts to Ukraine and Georgia. In FY 2001, DoD continued six ongoing pathogen security enhancement projects and initiated efforts at six additional sites; continued 6 ongoing collaborative research projects and initiated seven new projects; continued dismantlement of the former BW production facility at Stepnogorsk, Kazakhstan; began development of dismantlement efforts at four Russian institutes; and completed an assessment of the former BW test facility at Vozrozhdeniye island for future dismantlement and pathogen elimination efforts. In our view, the Biological Weapons Proliferation Prevention (BWPP) aspect of the CTR program is of exceptional, and increasing, importance. We also attach great importance to comparable programs maintained by other agencies, such as the State Department's ISTC program. We have two objectives for the BWPP: the consolidation and elimination of pathogenic stocks (to prevent them from falling into the wrong hands); and collaborative research and development with foreign scientists who can assist the U.S. in better protecting the American people, and the global community, from these diseases. In this vein, the Department of Defense believes the Joint Statement on Bioterrorism between Presidents Bush and Putin creates an important opportunity for closer collaboration. Chemical Weapons We are no less concerned with the threat of chemical weapons proliferation. We are troubled by inadequate security and safety measures currently being maintained on stocks of chemical agent. The Chemical Weapons (CW) Destruction program in Russia is demilitarizing two former CW production facilities, and enhancing security at two nerve agent storage facilities (Kizner and Shchuch'ye). We are interested in expanding our physical security program to other chemical agent storage sites - particularly those where weaponized agent is vulnerable to theft. To do this, however, we are going to need the cooperation of the Russian government, which must identify for us all of their stockpile locations, and permit the necessary access to do site surveys and to install security measures. We also are interested in assisting with continuing destruction of CW production facilities in Russia, and are urging full and complete declaration of these sites as required under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). In terms of chemical agent destruction, the Administration is actively reviewing how best both Russia and the United States can meet their respective CWC-mandated destruction obligations. In Uzbekistan, DoD is dismantling the former Soviet chemical weapons research, development, and testing facility at Nukus. In FY 2001, this project dismantled, decontaminated and removed all pilot plant reactors, vessels and piping along with lab equipment, filtration systems and ducting. The Future of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program In summary, DoD believes that the CTR program has played a crucial role in the U.S. government's proliferation prevention strategy. Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine acceded to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1994 based on promises of United States assistance to rid their countries of their nuclear weapons. The DoD portion of the CTR program had rid these countries of nuclear weapons by 1996. In total, the DoD CTR program has helped deactivate 5,708 nuclear warheads and eliminate 774 ballistic missile launchers, 88 heavy bombers, 21 ballistic missile submarines and 701 ballistic missiles. It is less easy to quantify the contribution made in the chemical or biological fields, but we are making progress on putting better safeguards on existing stockpiles, and are beginning an important, collaborative research program with Russia that could yield important dividends to our bio-defense programs. The Congress, the Executive Branch, and the American people can and should be proud of the Cooperative Threat Reduction program's accomplishments to date. Coming so quickly on the heels of the Cold War, the degree of U.S. cooperation with the republics of the former Soviet Union was unprecedented. In many ways it reflects the importance that the United States, Russia, and all of the newly independent states placed on reducing the new challenges to international security caused by the chaotic and sudden breakup of the Soviet Union. Testimony of Ken Baker Principal Assistant Deputy Administrator for Introduction Mr. Chairman, members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to be here today to talk about the Department of Energy's nuclear non-proliferation programs. You've asked me to address some very specific concerns and I look forward to doing just that. Before I do, however, I would like to make a few general comments. First, I want to thank this Committee and indeed, all members of the Senate for their strong interest in and support for our programs. Congress' demonstrated commitment to our mission has sent a strong signal that the mission is critical and enduring, and has helped us to plan effectively for our future. Second, I want to note that in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks against our country, the work of the National Nuclear Security Administration, within the Department of Energy, has taken on a higher visibility and even greater importance. Almost a year ago, in its January, 2001 report, the bipartisan Baker-Cutler task force concluded that "the most urgent unmet national security threat to the United States today is the danger that weapons of mass destruction or weapons-usable material in Russia could be stolen and sold to terrorists or hostile nation states, and used against American citizens at home." We now know that this threat has become "a little more clear, a little more present, and much more dangerous and real.” We have all seen reports that Osama Bin Laden has tried to acquire weapons of mass destruction, and that he has called the attainment of such weapons a "religious duty." That's the face of the threat confronting us today. Let me assure you, all of us in the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) are committed to supporting with all our resources this country's efforts to eliminate that threat. Third, I would like to discuss some steps we're already taking, consistent with the objectives of the proposed legislation. We share your twin objectives, as described in the draft legislation, of improving coordination of cooperation programs with the Former Soviet Union among U.S. agencies, and ensuring that U.S. public and private efforts are mutually supportive and not in conflict. These are worthwhile objectives and NNSA is committed to making sure they continue to be realized. We too want to ensure that interagency coordination is as good as it can be, and to develop effective public-private partnerships. We have already been successful at the latter objective, for example, in the context of our Initiatives for Proliferation Program, which I'll discuss momentarily. Non-proliferation programs in the former Soviet Union As we formulate and implement our nonproliferation programs with Russia, we understand the threat of unsecured nuclear material and technology, as well as the threat of adverse migration of weapons experts with knowledge of weapons of mass destruction. To address these concerns, our programs seek to reduce the potential for diversion of Russian nuclear materials, technologies, and expertise. We want to make sure, moreover, that downsizing of the Russian nuclear complex is irreversible. To accomplish these objectives, we work closely with our colleagues throughout Government, most specifically in the Departments of Defense and State, and in the intelligence community. Even before September 11, reducing the potential for diversion of Russian nuclear warheads and materials has been a critical priority for the United States. It's essential that such warheads and materials be kept out of the hands of the so-called "rogue" states, as well as terrorist organizations. We're attacking the problem on many fronts: -- Since 1993, we have been working with Russia to improve security at 95 nuclear storage sites, both civilian and military. -- We've completed rapid security upgrades for thousands of Russian Navy warheads and improved the security for approximately 220 metric tons of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) and plutonium in Russia and other newly independent states— enough material for roughly 20,000 nuclear devices. -- In a program we implement jointly with our colleagues in the Department of Defense, Russia and the United States exchange unclassified information to increase the safety and security of nuclear warheads and fissile material. Russia and the United States recently agreed to expand our cooperation in this area significantly. We're also taking a number of steps to help train Russian experts to take responsibility for long-term security at sensitive sites, consolidating Russian materials into fewer buildings at fewer sites, and converting tons of materials to forms less attractive to terrorists. We're also finding ways to work with Russia to help it dispose of its own surplus materials. -- We're also working with our counterparts to improve Russia's export control system, from the enforcement level with Customs, to the industry level with internal compliance training, and at the regulatory and legal level of the ministries involved. Last year, Russia and the United States agreed to dispose of 68 Metric Tons (MT) of surplus weapon-grade plutonium - 34 MT in each country. At the same time, the Administration is examining alternatives to reduce the cost of this program and |