Elisa D. Harris Statement

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February 12, 2002

inspections are expected in 2002. All of these issues - universality, noncompliance, CW destruction, and the budget -- must be addressed.

Policy Recommendations

Clearly, both the BWC and the CWC have the potential to make a much greater contribution to international efforts to prevent the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons to national and sub-national groups. Steps can and should be taken to enhance the effectiveness of and reinforce the prohibitions in each of these treaties.

With respect to the BWC, we should:

Resume multilateral discussions on measures to strengthen the BWC: The Bush Administration's determination to kill both the BWC Protocol and the Ad Hoc Group last December blocked agreement on a process whereby the Administration's own BWC proposals could be considered by the international community. The U.S. should abandon its opposition to multilateral discussions and agree at the November 2002 meeting on a process that will allow both the U.S. and other proposals for strengthening the BWC to be explored.

Expand the UN Secretary General's authority to investigate illicit BW activity: In 1982 and again in 1987, the UN General Assembly gave the Secretary General the authority to investigate allegations that chemical or biological weapons had been used. Pending international agreement on legally-binding enforcement measures for the BWC, the U.S. should support efforts to expand the Secretary General's authority to include allegations of the development, production or possession of biological weapons.

Strengthen controls over dangerous pathogens: The FBI's investigation of the anthrax attacks has revealed serious gaps in the controls over pathogens that could be used for biological weapons purposes. The U.S. should take the lead in securing tighter international controls on culture collections and other repositories of biological materials. We should also work with other countries to strengthen oversight of laboratories to prevent deliberate or inadvertent misapplications of biotechnology for destructive purposes.

Enhance oversight of the U.S. biological defense program: Revelations that the U.S. has produced weapons-grade anthrax and replicated a Soviet-era biological bomblet as part of its biological defense program have raised questions both here and abroad about the nature and scope of U.S. activities in this area. Until now, there has been no comprehensive review of these secret U.S biological defense activities, individually or in combination. The U.S. Congress should hold oversight hearings on the biological defense program to ensure that its scientific, legal and foreign policy impact are

Elisa D. Harris Statement

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February 12, 2002

With respect to the CWC, we should:

Make adherence to the CWC an explicit foreign policy goal: Libya's recent decision to join the CWC demonstrates that even in a complicated region such as the Middle East, there are opportunities for expanding membership in the treaty. It is not unimaginable that North Korea might agree to abandon its chemical weapons program and join the CWC as part of a broader security arrangement on the Korean peninsula. The U.S. should ensure that CWC adherence is a prominent issue in its foreign policy toward the remaining holdout countries.

Use challenge inspections to pursue noncompliance concerns: In the initial years after entry into force of the CWC, the U.S. used the treaty's consultation provisions to try to resolve questions and concerns about a number of other Parties' declarations. Last month, Under Secretary of State Bolton described challenge inspections as a "flexible and indispensable tool” that can be instrumental in achieving the treaty's goals. The U.S. should be prepared to use challenge inspections to address serious compliance concerns, especially in countries where consultations were unsuccessful or not appropriate.

Devote the resources necessary to meet the treaty's destruction deadlines: By the end of last year, both Russia and the U.S. had submitted documentation to the OPCW concerning their inability to meet the April 2007 deadline for destroying their chemical weapons. The U.S. should ensure that its technology and funding decisions allow it to complete destruction operations safely, and in time to meet the 20012 CWC extension deadline. The U.S. should also take the lead in creating an international consortium to assist Russia in meeting its CWC destruction obligations.

Rectify the OPCW's budget problems: Partly because of the zero growth budget imposed on the OPCW over the past five years, the OPCW has begun another year millions of dollars short of what is required to carry out its implementation responsibilities. The U.S. should work with the OPCW and other Parties to ensure that there are sufficient funds to carry out all planned verification activities.

Finally, we can further strengthen the BWC and the CWC by making it an international crime for individuals to develop, possess or use chemical or biological weapons. Both treaties impose legally-binding obligations on governments, but not on individuals, not to engage in prohibited activities. The U.S. should support the negotiation of a treaty like that proposed by the Harvard-Sussex Program that would make it a crime under international law for individuals to acquire or use chemical or biological weapons or to knowingly assist others in doing so.

Prepared Statement

Before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs

Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services 12 February 2002

Amy E. Smithson, Ph.D.

Director, Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Project
Henry L. Stimson Center

In the aftermath of last fall's multiple terrorist attacks, much focus has been placed on taking the most immediate steps needed to protect this nation's safety and security in an era where terrorists seek to inflict widespread and indiscriminate harm on US citizens and interests. Emphasis has rightly been placed on strengthening intelligence capabilities so that future terrorist plots can be thwarted as well as on better training and equipping of the nation's emergency responders to contend with all manner of terrorist-caused calamities. Initiatives to stiffen airline and border security have also come to the fore in the past few months, among other proposals and programs.

Adjusting policies and programs to address the threat of terrorism is not easy. I would like to thank this committee for convening a hearing that looks beyond the obvious, a hearing that examines the utility of international treaties in helping to assure this nation's well being. Some tend to dismiss treaties out of habit or lack of understanding of the role they can and should play in an overall strategy for reducing security threats to this country. Critics deride accords that ban categories of weapons as weak tools that governments can break with impunity. Yet, arms control critics would hardly advocate that US laws against murder be scrapped, even if those laws are broken with disturbing frequency. Rather, they would call for better enforcement of those laws. As lawmakers, you can appreciate that even a good law is only as effective as its enforcement. Member governments are the custodians of international arms control treaties. The United States, arguably the world's most powerful nation and always self-described as a champion of nonproliferation, has a special responsibility to lead efforts to enforce these treaties.

One of the frequent refrains of the past few months has been how easy it is for terrorists to acquire and use chemical and biological weapons. This misleading claim has led many to believe that mass casualty unconventional terrorist attacks are imminent, if not inevitable. While it is true that technical advances have made some aspects of chemical and biological weapons proliferation easier, there are many technical obstacles to the acquisition of a mass casualty capability with these types of weapons. A case in point is Aum Shinrikyo, the Japanese cult that released the nerve agent sarin in the Tokyo subway system on 20 March 1995. Aum Shinrikyo's sizeable corps of scientists figured out how to make small quantities of several chemical agents, as one might expect given how long both the formulas and the ingredients for such agents have been readily available. However, what stymied Aum Shinrikyo was the cult's inability to "scale up" its production of agent from a small quantity to the large amounts needed to inflict massive casualties. Aum's chemical weaponeers were unable to do this despite the

advantages of a $10 million state-of-the-art production facility, considerable scientific expertise, and years to work out the kinks in their program. As for Aum's biowarfare program, the cult's scientists never managed to get their hands on virulent biowarfare strains, and their efforts to disperse their concoctions were complete and total flops.

Perhaps for this reason, Aum Shinrikyo turned to the former Soviet chemical and biological institutes for assistance. Fortunately, the former Soviet weaponeers declined to help the cult with its chemical and biological weapons programs. Given Aum Shinrikyo's considerable resources, it stands to reason that sub-national actors will be seriously challenged in any attempt to build from scratch a mass casualty unconventional weapons capability. This statement is not intended as a guarantee that terrorists cannot overcome the technical hurdles involved. Aum Shinrikyo, the individual(s) behind the anthrax letters sent to Capitol Hill and several media outlets, and other groups have indeed made noteworthy progress. Rather, my point is that terrorists are likely to encounter technical hurdles that trip them up if their intent is to cause mass casualties with these weapons. Therefore, terrorists could well seek out help from governments, which have such vast resources they can become truly proficient in chemical and biological weaponry. Accordingly, one key to keeping unconventional weapons out of the hands of terrorists is to tackle the proliferation problem at the nation-state level.

The committee has posed several questions that I will address in the passages that follow. First, I will discuss the differences between chemical and biological weapons proliferation and why the former category of weapons is somewhat easier to monitor than the latter. Then, I will discuss the impact that the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) can have on governments and sub-national actors. I will close my testimony with thoughts on the verification and enforcement of treaties and on the steps that the US government should take to enhance the utility of international treaties in the war against terrorism.

Distinguishing Features of Chemical and Biological Weapons Proliferation

Although chemical and biological weapons are often lumped into one category, they are distinct in several important ways. Chemical agents consist of man-made substances, namely the component chemicals known as precursors. The penultimate precursors for poison gas are often chemicals that are processed many steps beyond the basic chemical weapons building blocks of phosphorous, sulfur, and fluorine. Many precursor chemicals can have widespread and legitimate commercial uses. For example, thiodiglycol, a precursor for mustard gas, is used to make ballpoint pen ink. The quantities of precursor chemicals poured into the reactor equate roughly to the amount of agent that will result. In other words, three tons of precursor "X" mixed with one ton of precursor “Z” and one ton of precursor “Y” will make five tons of poison gas.

In contrast, biological agents originate in nature. Anthrax, for example, is a disease of herbivores including cattle, sheep, and goats. Many strains of anthrax exist, as is the case for Clostridium botulinum, the causative agent of botulinum toxin. To make the most effective biowarfare agent, one must know which strains are most deadly to man or to the crop or type of livestock that is the intended target. In the case of Clostridium botulinum, there are over 675 variants. Biowarfare agents are made by injecting a virulent seed

culture into the appropriate growth media. With the appropriate growth media (e.g., peptone, glucose, casein, augmented animal feeds), the seed culture cells replicate into a much larger amount of the biowarfare agent. Depending upon whether the agent is to be dispersed in a wet slurry or dry formulation, the quantity of resulting agent will vary. These fundamental differences between the way that chemical and biological agents are produced explain why the proliferation of biological agents is more difficult to track than the proliferation of chemical weapons. With considerable effort, the quantities of precursor chemicals being produced and traded can be monitored and inspections can ascertain whether facilities are using them to make commercial products. The production and sale of growth media and whether a particular pharmaceutical or biotechnology company is purchasing growth media appropriate for its product line(s) can also be watched. The monumental stumbling block in trying to hinder the spread of biological weapons is that an aspiring proliferator can acquire the seeds of destruction from a vast array of natural sources. Moreover, it would be extremely difficult, it not impossible, to catch smuggling of lethal seed cultures from country to country or from a government weapons program to terrorist groups. Lethal seed cultures can be found in an offensive bioweapons program, in biowarfare defense facilities, and in some five hundred registered culture collections in fifty-nine nations that serve as huge repositories of strains to support legitimate scientific research. Only a tiny drop of a virulent seed culture is needed to jumpstart the fermentation of a biowarfare agent.

Of course, equipment is needed to produce chemical and biological weapons. Since the reactors and fermenters required for the task are employed to make everything from textile dyes, disinfectants, and toiletries to medications, yogurt, and beer, a proliferator can find these items for sale in the marketplace. Therefore, inspectors trying to identify illegal weapons production would have to look for telltale signs that a supposedly commercial plant was making chemical or biological agents on the sly. For example, use of Hastelloy reactors and glass-lined pipes would automatically catch the attention of chemical weapons inspectors if the plant were not making pesticides or another type of product that required corrosion-resistant equipment. An inspector looking to distinguish a genuine pharmaceutical plant from a covert biowarfare site might be tipped off by inappropriate levels of biosafety, an unusual set-up of production equipment or waste treatment facilities, or lack of post-production procedures suited for the product(s) purportedly being made at the site, among other factors.

Manufacturers of reactors, fermenters, and other equipment needed for weapons programs (e.g., filling equipment, large capacity freeze dryers and aerosol inhalation chambers) can be identified. For the purposes of hindering proliferation, sales of such equipment tracked. However, these efforts would not be definitive since equipment can be resold or manufactured in a hidden plant with the appropriate machine tools and craftsmen. Nonetheless, the Australia Group-an export control cooperative among the countries home to the major equipment, chemical, and growth media manufacturers includes on its control lists a lengthy roster of items that could be used in chemical or biological weapons production.