Increasingly, trade in WMD and missile related items is occurring between countries outside the regimes. The very success of the non-proliferation regimes over the last 50 years has had the unintended consequence of creating a lucrative "black market" in WMD technology. Some key supplier countries, such as China and North Korea, operate outside of multilateral export control regimes. Moreover, states of concern, such as Iran, are becoming more and more self-reliant and becoming suppliers themselves. Their growing indigenous production capability allows them to fabricate what they previously had to import. There is also the new trend of "secondary proliferation,” i.e. former importers are now becoming exporters to other states of concern. And, most troubling of all, is the nexus that I have described between WMD, state-sponsors of terrorism, and terrorists seeking WMD capabilities.

As a result, the threat posed by proliferation today is diverse, unpredictable, dangerous, and increasingly difficult to counter using traditional nonproliferation approaches. Today's threat, unlike during the Cold War, is shaped by state and non-state actors, including radical extremists, who operate outside the boundaries of international law.

The potential for terrorists and other non-state actors gaining access to WMD capabilities has dramatically raised the cost of failing to contain proliferation. The world has already witnessed the use of chemical and biological agents by terrorist organizations and by states that sponsor terrorism.

The Rajneeshees cult poisoned a salad bar with salmonella in Oregon State in 1984; Aum Shinrikyo released sarin gas in the Tokyo subway in 1994; Iraq used chemical weapons against Iran during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war, and cold-bloodedly gassed its own citizens of Kurdish descent in the spring and summer of 1988.

The next terrorist attack against the U.S. could involve the use of a nuclear weapon, or involve a major chemical, biological, or radiological attack - by conventional or unconventional means. These threats highlight the need for the U.S., and the international Community, to develop a more robust and effective nonproliferation strategy. To be effective, our strategy must encompass a broad range of policies and programs, including proactive measures.

Next Steps

But while the dangers from proliferation are growing, the U.S. and the international community are formulating ways to improve their ability to deal effectively with these threats. We will continue to use existing diplomatic and economic tools to engage with countries involved in proliferation activities to urge them to constrain, halt, or reverse those activities. And we will continue to work with and assist friends and allies to develop and implement their own domestic export controls to deny proliferators

access to the necessary equipment, materials, and technology related to WMD. But to meet the threat head on and stop it will require a new definition of nonproliferation, a stronger global nonproliferation architecture, and strenuous national efforts.

On the international front, we need to expand and enhance enforcement of existing international nonproliferation treatics and regimes. This includes adoption of the IAEA Additional Protocol by all member states party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and insistence that all states fully comply with their obligations under that treaty and other treaties, such as the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the Biological Weapons Convention. "Naming names" is a powerful diplomatic tool and we will continue to "name names" at Review Conferences for these treaties as well as publicly.

The U.S. also has proposed an amendment to the 1988 Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (the "SUA Convention") to cover a wider range of additional offenses, including terrorist acts. Initially, the SUA Convention was designed to ensure that individuals who commit acts of terrorism that endanger the safe navigation of a ship, or endanger a person on board, are either prosecuted in the state in which they are found, or extradited to another state for prosecution.

The proposed amendment adds a provision making it a criminal offense to carry or transport, or cause to be carried or transported, items in violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). If adopted, the proposal would effectively transforms the SUA Convention from an after-the-fact extradite or prosecute treaty to a proactive treaty where military forces could board ships in international waters if they were carrying items in violation of the CWC, NPT, and BWC. The scope of activity envisioned goes well beyond what traditional law enforcement agencies can provide. In fact, in order to be effective, the proposed amendment will require the active role of signature country's militaries, and the U.S. military in particular.

We also need to continue to strengthen the multilateral export control regimes to better equip them to combat the evolving global proliferation threat. Sensitive dual-use items and technology cannot be controlled effectively unless there is broad cooperation among exporting and transit countries. We have made an important start in this effort with the decision taken by the Australia Group to broaden the number of dual-use items it would control and with the various diplomatic outreach programs initiated by several other multilateral export control regimes.

But these steps - unfortunately - will not be enough, given that yesterday's recipients of WMD-related systems and technologies are today's purveyor's of WMDrelated systems and technologies to other countries, and given the linkages between these countries and terrorist groups. As President Bush said in June at the West Point commencement ceremonies:

"We cannot defend America and our friends by hoping for the best. We cannot put our faith in the word of tyrants, who solemnly sign nonproliferation treaties, and then systematically break them. If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long... the war on terror will not be won on the defensive. We must take the battle to the enemy . . . In the world we have entered, the only path to safety is the path of action."

In Conclusion

The future is ours to lose. In preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, there no excuse for inaction. The U.S., and the international community, must act, and act decisively. As long as there are would-beproliferators or groups seeking WMD, we must remain vigilant and resolute, and we need to take the initiative away from these groups so that they are not able to choose the time and place of an attack. We will need to be much more proactive and creative in our diplomatic efforts; we will need to continue to strengthen existing international nonproliferation regimes; we will need to continue to provide direct, material assistance to transshipment countries to help them identify and stop dangerous shipments from slipping through their territory; and we will need to be prepared to act, when necessary, to halt dangerous shipments that threaten our security and that of our friends and allies.

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the International Atomic Energy Agency

General Background

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was established in 1970 and seeks to curb the spread of nuclear weapons. With the 187 signatories, there are two categories of NPT members: Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) - consisting of the U.S., Russia, China, France and the U.K. - and NonNuclear Weapons States (NNWS). The NPT has the widest adherence of any arms control agreement. India, Israel and Pakistan remain outside the NPT. Since the treaty restricts NWS status to those nations that have manufactured and exploded a nuclear device prior to 1967, these nations would have to join the treaty as NNWS by dismantling their nuclear weapons and placing them under international safeguards. The treaty prohibits NWS from aiding NNWS from acquiring or developing nuclear weapons. The NPT also establishes safeguards for the transfer of fissionable material and ensures transfers of nuclear material are not being used for nuclear weapons. The NPT conducts a review conference every five years and a decision after 25 years over whether the treaty should be extended. The 1995 review conference extended the treaty indefinitely.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is charged with inspecting non-nuclear weapons states nuclear facilities. It operates an international inspection system to provide assurances that nuclear materials and technology are not diverted for use in nuclear weapons. The agency also provides assistance in civilian applications of nuclear technology. All nuclear weapon members of the NPT agree to allow the IAEA to inspect their nuclear inventories. The IAEA conducts thousands of inspections annually. However, even if IAEA inspectors detect clandestine nuclear activity, the NPT contains no formal provisions for enforcement. The IAEA is headquartered in Vienna, Austria. There are approximately 2,193 staff representing 93 nationalities. The overall budget of the IAEA is about $300 million including voluntary contributions.

Challenges and Concerns

Events since September 11 have drawn attention to the political danger of terrorists obtaining nuclear weapons. IAEA inspectors recently helped Georgian scientists to transfer radioactive material discovered at a nuclear storage site. The IAEA recovered two Soviet era radioactive batteries which were plucked, steaming, from the bushes, and encased in lead in the remote mountains of the Caucuses mountains. While officials have declared this a success, the possibility of more radioactive material turning up to manufacture a crude nuclear weapon cannot be ruled out.

The IAEA held a special session on November 2001 to focus on the issue of combating nuclear terrorism. The IAEA Director General stated that the willingness of terrorists to commit suicide for their aims makes the nuclear terrorism threat far more likely than it was before September 11. According to the IAEA there have been 175 cases of trafficking of nuclear material since 1993

and 201 cases of trafficking other radioactive material. The IAEA estimates that $30-50 million annually will be needed to strengthen and expand its programs to meet the terrorist threat.

Some NPT member states, such as Iraq and North Korea have violated the NPT and diverted civilian nuclear technology and materials to covert weapons programs. Iraq was a party to the NPT for many years and has used its civil programs to disguise its nuclear weapons program. Iraq ended cooperation with UNCSCOM in 1999 and efforts to reestablish inspections in Iraq have been blocked by Russia and France in the U.S. Security Council.

North Korea acceded to the NPT in 1985 but refused to accept safeguards until 1992. When the IAEA discovered discrepancies, it reported them to the United Nations National Security Council, which urged North Korea to comply. North Korea remain obligated under the NPT to allow inspections, despite its noncompliance.

Inspections in Iraq and North Korea provide lessons for strengthening the IAEA. The IAEA has upgraded safeguards to prevent repeat problems in Iraq and elsewhere. Although prior to the Gulf War, member states have not provided intelligence information to the IAEA, they are increasingly using intelligence from member states. Recently the agency has begun to use commercial satellite imagery to augment its information databases. The IAEA has reasserted itself to gain access to facilities, additional authority is needed. A new inspection agreement, the Additional Safeguards Protocol, would increase inspector's authority to collect more information about a wider range of activities, use more intrusive inspection methods, and expand access to undeclared activities. The U.S. and the IAEA reached agreement based on the model protocol, but it was never ratified. The IAEA will continue to need technology upgrades for detection of nuclear materials and depends on support from member states and its budget is limited - divided among missions popular with certain members such as nuclear safety and technical assistance.

Missile Technology Control Regime

General Background

The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is a voluntary agreement among states pledges to control the export of missile systems and technology capable of delivering 500 kilograms of payload 300 kilometers or more. The objective of the MTCR is to create a common export policy for missile technology. There are 33 nations in the MTCR and membership is determined by consensus. The MTCR does not has a formal independent mechanism and does not have a budget. Technical meetings are held on an ad hoc basis. An office within the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs acts as the point of contact for coordination of meetings. Since there is no official secretariat, the regimes activities are carried out through bilateral diplomatic relations.

Unlike the NPT and the CWC, the MTCR is neither an international treaty nor a legally binding agreement. Its members voluntarily pledge to support the regimes export guidelines. There are no provisions for enforcement or sanctions. U.S. laws do require sanctions against entities that import or export items controlled by the regime even if traded with a state that is not an adherent