S. 673 The Nonproliferation Assistance Coordination Act of 2001 Senators Hagel, Biden and Lugar Section by Section Analysis Section 1. Short Title The Nonproliferation Assistance Coordination Act of 2001 Section 2. Findings The nonproliferation efforts in the former Soviet Union have achieved important results but lack coordination among US Government agencies. Increased spending by the US private sector on nonproliferation efforts and job creation efforts for unemployed Russian weapons scientists is key in isolating such knowledge from terrorists. Increased spending requires the establishment of a coordinating body to realign conflicting programs and maximize the efficiency of such programs Section 3. Definitions Defines 'independent states of the former Soviet Union' as Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. (22 U.S.C. 5801) Section 4. Establishment of Committee on Nonproliferation Assistance to the Independent States of the Former Soviet Union. Establishes a Committee of five members representing the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and Departments of State, Energy, Defense, and Commerce. The Secretaries of the aforementioned departments shall designate their respective representative who is an official not below the level of an Assistant Secretary of the department. The representative from the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs will serve as the Chair. The Chair may ask that representatives from other departments or agencies participate in the Committee's activities. Section 5. Duties The Committee shall have responsibility for monitoring US nonproliferation efforts in the independent states of the former Soviet Union and coordinating and implementing policy related In carrying out their responsibilities, the Committee shall, with respect to the independent states of the former Soviet Union, 1. arrange for the preparation of analyses on the issues and problems relating to coordination of United States departments and agencies on nonproliferation efforts; 2. arrange for the preparation of analyses on the issues and problems relating to coordination between the United States public and private sectors on nonproliferation efforts, including coordination between public and private spending on nonproliferation programs and coordination between public spending and private investment in defense conversion activities; 3. provide guidance on arrangements that will coordinate, de-conflict, and maximize the utility of United States public spending on nonproliferation programs to ensure efficiency and further United States national security interests; 4. encourage companies and nongovernmental organizations involved in nonproliferation efforts to voluntarily report these efforts to the Committee; 5. arrange for the preparation of analyses on the issues and problems relating to the coordination between the United States and other countries; and 6. consider, and make recommendations to the President and Congress with respect to proposals for new legislation or regulations relating to United States nonproliferation efforts in the independent states of the former Soviet Union as may be necessary. Section 6. Administrative Support Requires all US departments and agencies to provide, to the extent permitted by law, any information and/or assistance requested by the Committee or the Secretary of State in carrying out their functions under this Act. Section 7. Confidentiality of Information States that information submitted or received in confidence will not be publically disclosed, except to the extent required by law, and that such information will only be used by the Committee for carrying out its functions under this Act. Section 8. Statutory Construction Clarifies that nothing in this Act applies to the data-gathering, regulatory, or enforcement authority of any existing US department or agency over nonproliferation efforts and that the review of such efforts shall not supersede any other process provided by law. It further clarifies that nothing in this Act applies to any activity that is reportable pursuant to title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.) relating to accountability for intelligence activities. USEC A Global Energy Company Combating Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Elimination of Highly Enriched Uranium From Nuclear Warheads Through the Megatons to Megawatts Program Submitted for the Record by USEC Inc. Executive Agent for the United States Government For the Hearing on Combating Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction United States Senate Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services Committee on Governmental Affairs November 14, 2001 USEC Inc. 6903 Rockledge Drive, Bethesda, MD 20817-1818 Summary Since the end of the Cold War, the United States and Russia have made enormous progress in reducing their nuclear arsenals. Along with this unprecedented reduction of nuclear stockpiles have come heightened concerns about ensuring safeguards for these weapons and weapons-grade fissionable materials. Through the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program and other initiatives, the U.S. government has provided Russia with financial assistance and expertise to help improve the effectiveness of its nuclear safeguards activities. The urgency of these safeguards and non-proliferation efforts was obvious. A steady stream of news reports told of terrorist group intentions and efforts to secure nuclear weapons of mass destruction. Through the early 1990s, U.S. and Russian negotiators sought mutually acceptable ways to increase the effectiveness of Russian safeguards for its nuclear weapons and weapons materials. One such effort culminated in a 1993 government-to-government agreement to implement an historic and innovative program to reduce the potential threat posed by excess Russian nuclear fissile materials. In essence, the agreement put a new twist on the swords into plowshares goal-the two nations would work together to beat Russian nuclear bombs into fuel rods to generate electricity. The 1993 U.S.-Russian HEU Purchase Agreement stipulated that over a 20-year period 500 metric tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU) extracted from dismantled Russian nuclear warheads would be diluted in Russia into low enriched uranium (LEU) suitable for use as fuel for commercial nuclear electric generating stations. The total value to Russia for conversion of this weapons material would be $12 billion--$8 billion for the enrichment component of the fuel and $4 billion for the natural uranium component. The parties also agreed that this program would be implemented on a commercial basis. Purchases by the United States of the Russian enrichment component of the low enriched uranium would fund Russian conversion of the warhead material into fuel. The fuel would be sold to electric utility customers operating nuclear power plants. This commercial transaction would be financially self-sustaining-no taxpayer funds would be required. The United States appointed USEC and Russia appointed Tenex as their executive agents authorized to implement the agreement. In 1994, the executive agents signed a 20-year commercial implementing contract and promptly began working together on the historic program, which has come to be known as Megatons to Megawatts. In September 2001, the parties celebrated an important milestone in the Megatons to Megawatts program. Fissionable material equivalent to 5,000 warheads has been eliminated by its conversion into power plant fuel. At a time of global concern about weapons of mass destruction, the elimination of that many potential nuclear warheads is indeed good news. The Megatons to Megawatts program is continuing to fulfill its mandate, and the number of weapons In brief, this is the current status of the Megatons to Megawatts program as of November 14, 2001: The U.S and Russian executive agents, USEC and Tenex, are forty percent ahead of the original 1993 schedule for implementing this 20-year program which, when completed, will have eliminated weapons-grade material equivalent to 20,000 nuclear warheads. As of November 14, 2001, 137 metric tons of warhead HEU has been converted into power plant fuel purchased by USEC, eliminating the equivalent of 5,481 nuclear warheads. A seven-year working partnership between USEC and Tenex has established a record of trust, cooperation and accommodation by the executive agents. USEC inventory and financial resources have ensured continuity during periods of temporary shipment disruptions and accommodation of Russian financial needs. Current terms for commercial implementation of the Megatons to Megawatts program expire December 31, 2001. A review of the program has been underway by the Administration, and USEC is in consultation with the Administration about pursuing new financial terms with Russia beginning January 1, 2002. These new, market-based terms will apply through the completion of the contract in 2013. Given recent events and possible future threats to our national security, it is likely that an increased urgency and emphasis will be placed on nuclear weapons material management and protection. In that context, effective and timely implementation of the Megatons to Megawatts program becomes even more important. Concern is growing about the risks of proliferation of nuclear weapons and the threat of weapons of mass destruction. The Megatons to Megawatts program is one successful effort to minimize those risks. USEC is committed to the continued success of this program. ### |