Current and Future Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Proliferation Threats I. Threat Assessment This assessment provides an objective consideration of the probabilities of chemical, biological, nuclear and radiological threats in order to assign export control policy priorities that address the proliferation of WMD. At least 25 countries are suspected of having or seeking to develop nuclear, biological or chemical weapons. As many as 28 countries have pursued and probably developed chemical and biological weapons programs. These countries include the former and current WMD programs of many close US allies, as well as current or suspected programs in rogue states. A smaller number of nations have pursued research and development programs for nuclear weapons. The proliferation of WMD extends beyond states because some terrorist groups currently have the resources and sophistication to develop or otherwise obtain these weapons. However, states and terrorist groups should not be considered separately because both may work in tandem to obtain, develop and use WMD. Chemical, biological, nuclear and radiological WMD do have distinctions in how proliferation threats are posed. A fundamental factor in chemical and biological proliferation threats is the assumption that many types of legitimate technologies could be modified for use or used directly in the manufacture and distribution of WMD. Nuclear proliferation is largely concerned with controlling nuclear material and expertise from the former Soviet Union and other states with nuclear weapons programs. Radiological threats are related to the security of radiological sites including nuclear power plants and medical facilities. Chemical Weapons The most common chemical agents for warfare and terrorism fall into two broad categories: 1) blister agents such as the mustard gas used in the trenches during the First World War, and 2) nerve agents such as the sarin gas used by the Aum Shinrikyo cult in the Tokyo subway attacks. Many of the precursor chemicals that are key ingredients in blister and nerve agents are already controlled, which may limit their threat for proliferation. An additional source of concern invokes a more shadowy set of compounds described as "binary" nerve agents, which may have been developed by researchers in the former Soviet Union. In binary agents, two relatively non-toxic or commonplace chemicals are combined at the moment of weapon deployment to create a compound that could be 5 to 10 times more deadly than ordinary nerve agents. Whether these binary compounds pose a realistic threat is a matter of dispute. Many unsophisticated, minimally-regulated and readily-available chemical compounds pose an additional threat as crude chemical warfare agents. This may be more relevant to the issue of WMD terrorism by non-state actors. Chlorine gas, anhydrous ammonia, phosphate compounds, 1 diesel or jet fuel and other industrial and agricultural chemicals are used in vast quantities in the US and abroad. Their legitimate uses extend from the chemical synthesis of fertilizers to the treatment of water in backyard swimming pools. The globalization of industry and the widespread dissemination of information technologies will pose significant challenges to any controls on chemical warfare technology. Globalization poses problems when the equipment and technological expertise necessary for developing chemical WMD is available in many of the countries where a multi-national corporation has research and manufacturing capabilities. In addition, the Internet currently details on the synthesis of chemical weapons, and this observation extends to the biological, nuclear and radiological weapons that will be discussed below. (http://www.chm.bris.ac.uk/webprojects2001/sharp/new_page_4.html and http://www.chm.bris.ac.uk/motm/sarin/synthesis.html) Biological Weapons The threat of biological agents has been driven to the forefront of national security considerations following the recent anthrax attacks in Florida, New York and Washington D.C. It is now clear that the technical and operational challenges to developing or acquiring anthrax weapons have been overcome. The current anthrax attacks may warrant a reexamination of the terminology to include "weapons of mass disruption" or "weapons of mass exposure" rather than the conventional idea of biological WMD that could cause 1,000 or more casualties. So far, the number of individuals infected with anthrax is well below any accepted threshold for casualties in a true WMD attack, and yet the impact on the public health and law enforcement infrastructure in at least three metropolitan areas has been substantial. One reasonable concern is that the emphasis on anthrax may obscure attention to other biological agents that have been considered or actually developed as agents of biological warfare and bioterrorism. Other credible bioterrorism agents that affect human health include smallpox, Q fever, plague and tularemia. A much less publicized but equally significant threat involves bioterrorism attacks against our national agriculture industry, also called agroterrorism. Examples of agroterrorism include the intentional release of biological agents that infect livestock, such as foot and mouth disease, as well as agents that cause various crop diseases. Bioterrorism is of particular concern because of the potential for clandestine distribution of infectious biological agents, as well as the potential for epidemic disease outbreak following the distribution of infectious agents. Fortunately, neither of these factors have been crucial in the recent anthrax attacks, which were "well announced" in the sense that some of the letters carrying anthrax spores were clearly identified as such. Because anthrax is not a transmissible disease, experts do not currently believe that it has significantly spread beyond the paths of the contaminated letters. The recent infection of a woman in New York who had no obvious contact with mail facilities is causing a reevaluation of the possible modes of anthrax transmission in the current attacks. A bioterrorism scenario with smallpox or plague might develop very differently due to the transmissible nature of those diseases. An attack with plague bacteria would be spread by contagious transmission, but it could also be controlled, due to our ability to treat this 2 disease with antibiotics. Antibiotic treatment is not possible for smallpox, which is caused by a virus. Vaccination is the only valid protection against viral diseases such as smallpox or influenza. A significant population of the American population is not vaccinated against smallpox. Bioterrorism could extend to the use of biological toxins, especially the botulism toxin and ricin, which is purified from castor beans. The potential for creating mass casualties by environmental distribution of biological toxins is probably low due to technological challenges, but these agents might be effective for contaminating a food supply. Genetic modifications of existing biological warfare agents are perhaps the most peobable scenario for future developments in biological WMD. The most likely genetic modifications would involve antibiotic resistance genes that would protect the biological agents from treatment with standard antibiotics. There are no indications that the anthrax strains in the mail attacks were engineered with antibiotic resistance genes. Unfortunately, genetic manipulations techniques may represent the most difficult proliferation issue from an export control standpoint, because virtually the entire basis for genetic manipulation of bacteria and viruses is a matter of open record in scientific journals. Nuclear/Radiological The threats posed from nuclear proliferation to terrorist groups mainly involve the material and knowledge required for the creation of a nuclear weapon. The spread of nuclear material and expertise from the former Soviet Union remains a top concern that many believe increases the likelihood of a terrorist group obtaining a nuclear weapon. The key obstacle to building a nuclear weapon is acquiring a sufficient quantity of fissile material, either plutonium or highly enriched uranium. Most nuclear experts conclude that there is no evidence to suggest that terrorist groups have obtained the material necessary for the development of a nuclear weapon. Nevertheless, many experts fear the misuse of lost or stolen nuclear material, especially from states in the former Soviet Union. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) recently warned that terrorist attacks involving nuclear material are more likely than before the September 11 attacks. The agency specifically cites the possible threats from radiological weapons or dirty bombs. While it would be difficult to make a dirty bomb lethal over a large geographic area, such a weapon would have the effect of creating public fear and prolonged health problems for those exposed to the radioactive fallout. A terrorist organization would not face serious technological barriers in creating a radiological weapon. Such weapons use conventional explosives to disperse nuclear waste material, nuclear fuel or other radiological material. The material required for a radiological weapon is easier to acquire and less expensive than the fissile materials needed to develop nuclear weapons. Another radiological threat is the sabotage or suicide attack on a nuclear power reactor. A large airplane suicide attack could destroy the containment dome of a reactor and potentially create a 3 meltdown. According to some, the area impacted by fallout from a sabotaged nuclear reactor would be more severe than a radiological bomb.' There are tens of thousands of radioactive sources around the world. These sources include nuclear waste such as cesium and cobalt, which are not safeguarded as stringently as nuclear weapons grade material such as plutonium and uranium. In mock attack exercises performed in the U.S., participants were able to obtain weapons-grade nuclear material or otherwise achieve their goals. Little material would required and it could be obtained from a power plant or medical facility with a source for radiation therapy. The level of technical sophistication required to make these dirty bombs is also much lower than the expertise needed for nuclear weapons. However, working with radioactive materials poses significant risks to personal health unless proper safety and protective equipment is available. The willingness of terrorists to sacrifice their lives to achieve their aims makes nuclear terrorism more likely than before. Because terrorist groups have demonstrated the will to die for their cause, nuclear material could conceivably be removed from radioactive sources without concerns for health and safety. The trafficking of nuclear expertise represents another significant nuclear threat. There is a credible threat of proliferation of nuclear expertise or "loose nukes," the leakage of nuclear weapons knowledge from the former Soviet Union. There is substantial concern over the threat of Russian or Pakistani nuclear experts training terrorist groups to make nuclear weapons. In a study conducted by the Nuclear Control Institute (NCI), nuclear explosive experts concluded that a group of dedicated terrorists without nuclear backgrounds could assemble a nuclear weapon if provided with the right material. The NCI report estimates that it would take about a year to complete assembly. If a state or terrorist group covertly obtained an assembled nuclear weapon, built-in safeguards and self-destruction mechanisms would pose serious challenges for successful detonation. The techniques recently used by suspected terrorists to obtain radiological material call attention to the issue of how export control policies could play a role in curbing proliferation. There are indications that terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda have sought to obtain radiological weapons through the use of front companies. In one example, an environmental firm was used as a front to buy nuclear waste.2 This example raises questions over how export controls can be adapted to control WMD material from terrorist groups. II. Dual-Use Technologies Chemical Weapons The standard equipment and technologies used in the chemical industry are easily diverted for use in chemical weapons production. With sufficient time and effort, refineries and other chemical plants could be modified to allow the production of chemical weapons. The recent discovery of chemical weapons production facilities within a larger industrial chemical complex Edward Lyman, Science Director, Nuclear Control Institute. in the former Soviet Union underscores the difficulty involved in determining whether certain industrial-scale chemical engineering equipment requires strict controls on sales and exports. Because many chemical warfare agents are highly corrosive and toxic, there are basic operational requirements for safely producing and distributing them. The necessary containment facilities, corrosion-resistant reaction vessels, reaction temperature control instruments and distillation equipment are probably prohibitively expensive for all but the most well-financed organizations and states. Non-state terrorist groups would still face significant challenges when attempting to produce chemical WMD, even if they could obtain the equipment needed to produce chemical weapons. Nevertheless, we have seen how the significant financial resources of the Aum Shinrikyo enabled that group to prepare small amounts of crude nerve agents, most notably the sarin nerve gas used in the Tokyo subway attack. Biological Weapons Similar to chemical weapons, the role of dual-use technologies and equipment is an integral part of biological weapons proliferation. The basic equipment for producing biological weapons includes: 1) growth media; 2) sterilization equipment for preparing the growth media; 3) fermenters for controlling the basic environmental conditions when growing microorganisms; and 4) sterile biocontainment equipment that prevents contamination when working with "seed cultures" of microorganisms or when preparing and refining large quantities of the organisms once they have grown. More sophisticated equipment includes: 1) specialized chemicals that contribute to the dispersal of biological agents; 2) milling machines used to prepare dried biological agents that can be easily dispersed; and 3) sprayers or other devices for dispersing wet or dry biological agents. Taken alone, any piece of equipment mentioned above could have a perfectly legitimate use in industrial or agricultural practice. For example, several types of equipment described above are used by the pharmaceutical industry to prepare invaluable vaccines and drugs. Crop irrigation and pesticide application equipment is used by farmers across the country. The basic arguments for export controls on these types of equipment may be countered with claims that legitimate businesses, at home and abroad, could be hurt by unnecessary limitations on their sale and export. One of the most important aspects is the scale of the equipment used for production. Large-scale equipment will allow easier production of biological agents, whether yeast for the baking and brewing industries or anthrax for biowarfare purposes. Clearly, the scale problem can be overcome by producing smaller batches of bioweapons over a longer period of time. If a group is able to work without any constraints on time (or space, if enough equipment is available), they will eventually be able to produce significant amounts of weapons even if they are restricted to using small-scale equipment. The scale of the Soviet bioweapons program was probably very large, in terms of employees, equipment and overall infrastructure. This observation leads to concerns that a "brain drain” might result in former Soviet bioweaponeers leaving unfavorable conditions at home to work for bioweapons programs in other countries. However, the sheer numbers associated with the scale of the Soviet bioweapons program (65,000 people employed) may be misleading in the sense that a large number of those people probably had no specific scientific knowledge for |