bioweapons research, nor did they have specialized engineering skills for designing, building and operating large scale production facilities. Therefore, the absolute number of people with scientific and technical expertise to develop advanced biological weapons programs is probably small and could be more easily monitored with the cooperation of officials from states in the former Soviet Union.

Nuclear/Radiological Weapons

The dual-use technologies required in nuclear weapons production largely consist of the scientific expertise necessary for their development and the devices used to test and deliver them. There is growing concern that this knowledge could be used to train terrorist groups that seek to develop nuclear weapons of their own, no matter how crude those weapons may be. This was recently demonstrated by Pakistan's detainment of three of its leading nuclear scientists for questioning to determine whether nuclear weapons technology may have been transferred to Osama Bin Laden.

Much of the technology required for the production of a nuclear weapon is dual-use. The examination of dual-use nuclear technology has typically included missile technology required for weapons delivery and supercomputers used for accurate and covert weapons testing and simulation. Machine tool technologies used for the production of aircraft engines are also used for missile technology. Spent fuel rod from civilian power plants can be used for the development of a nuclear weapon.

There are also many sources of radiological material that can be used in a dirty bomb. The security measures to protect radioactive materials used for the civilian purposes of cancer treatment and industrial and food irradiation is light relative to the damage these materials can cause. Since today's terorrists are willing to die for their cause, the danger of handling intensely radioactive material can no longer be seen as an effective deterrent.

Despite the threats posed by dual-use technologies, high-technology threasholds for building nuclear weapons would make it easier for terorrist groups to buy or steal a complete weapon. It may also be preferable for terrorist groups or rogue states to use or deliver nuclear weapons by asymmetric means such as by ship, plane or suitcase. For example, if delivered by ship, design limitations would be minimal, since the weapon could fit into a much larger container. Therefore, constraints on a weapon's weight, shape and volume would be low. Radiological weapons can be made from nuclear waste, which could have been used for civilian purposes. Sources of radiological material can range from power plants to medical facilities.

III. Current Export Control Mechanisms

This hearing will also examine how recent developments in WMD technology affect the utility of export controls and what new measures may be needed to curb the threat of WMD proliferation. The existing export control systems continue to foster frustration among those in government and industry. Current and future national security trends will likely force a wider

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analysis of how export controls - initially designed by states to regulate state behavior - can address the threats posed by non-state terrorist groups. In the current diffuse security environment, states may need to consider how the federal agencies that enforce control regime policies can work more closely with national ministries of justice to determine the proper melding of foreign policy and law enforcement. The importance of coalition building for the war on terrorism is likely to complicate the current situation by illustrating the importance of sharing dual-use technologies with our long-standing allies and new coalition partners.

• Rapid technological developments and virtually instantaneous information transfer Increased numbers of suppliers that produce high-technology items

The Department of Commerce is the lead agency for controlling the export of dual-use technologies. The current export control system process is complicated both by the way export controls are enforced and the interagency export license review process between the Departments of Commerce, State, Defense and Energy.

Under current regulations, exporters are required to apply for licenses for all potentially dual-use technologies. Exporters are required to follow a step-by-step process to determine whether an export license is required for a technology they wish to export. The Department of Commerce administers the Commodity Control List (CCL) of approximately 2400 dual-use items including equipment, materials, software, and technology (data and expertise) which might require an export license. Export licenses are also required for dual-use technologies that are exported to particular countries that pose security concerns and friendly countries where there may be a risk of diverting technologies to third party. An analysis of end-use and end-users also may determine the need for an export license. The current interagency approach is considered by many to be overly burdensome and lacking transparency. The export control system is better at licensing items than determining which dual-use technologies to control. The CCL is periodically updated with input from other government agencies including the Departments of Defense and State.

The Department of Commerce Bureau of Export Administration (BXA) must provide a complete analysis of several thousand export licenses applications each year. The BXA reviews not just the item to be exported, but also the country it will be exported to, its intended end-use and the reliability of the exporter and the recipient of the technology.3 The BXA has 9 days to notify an applicant whether the application is accepted, denied, requires more information or additional review.

Current regulations give the Departments of Defense, Energy and State a direct and equal role in the review of all license applications submitted to the BXA. The Departments of State, Defense

3 For current rules governing the export license review process, see Executive Order 12981, "Administration of

and Energy partcipate in an interagency review process administered by the Department of Commerce. The review process is facilitated by the involvement of several groups that provide broad expertise and allow for interagency coordination. If no recommendation is made within a 30-day period, reviewing agencies will be deemed to have no objection to the license decision of BXA. Disagreement over the granting of an export license for a particular dual-use technology will trigger a three-tiered dispute resolution process. One basis of appeal is an assessment of foreign availability. If the item in question can be shown to be readily available from a non-U.S. source in sufficient quantity and of comparable quality, license denials may be reversed. Such disagreements arise in about 6% of all license applications. About 93% of all disputes are resolved by consensus in the first tier. A representative from the Department of Commerce chairs the dispute resolution process.

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The U.S. has been broadly criticized for taking a "go it alone" approach despite increased participation in efforts to secure and expand the foundation for a truly effective multilateral system. There are common perceptions that the US is slighting other nations by suggesting that their export controls are “leaky" and that all US export controls are thinly-disguised protectionist policies that benefit US companies and place other nations at a disadvantage. Many experts believe that a gradual approach involving bilateral or regional agreements may be the best path toward developing an effective multilateral export system. Most experts also support technology sharing with allies based on a policy of building "higher walls around fewer items."

IV. Existing International Export Control Mechanisms

There are several multilateral export control regimes in place to prevent the proliferation of sensitive WMD technology and military articles. There are four key multilateral export control regimes designed to achieve nonproliferation and national security objectives.

The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)

This regime was established in the 1970's and establishes an agreement among nuclear supplier states. Common guidelines govern nuclear transfers to non-nuclear weapons states. These guidelines were initially published by the IAEA in 1978. In 1991, NSG adherents met over WMD proliferation concerns regarding Iraq. The 35 member countries agreed to new guidelines on the transfer of dual-use technologies that could contribute to a nuclear weapons program. Among the major challenges are updating the lists of controlled items, managing the increasing number of countries that seek to join for the prestige that accompanies membership and establishing a more coordinated process for licensing and enforcement.

The Australia Group (AG)

This organization was established in 1985 to prevent any contribution to chemical and biological weapons programs through inadvertent supply of chemical precursers, biological agents or dual-use technologies. It also seeks to preserve the legitimate trade of these items. Members agree to common guidelines for export licensing of chemical and biological materials. AG members now view their institution as an important way of meeting their obligations for the implementation of export control and verification protocals under the Chemcial Weapons

Convention (CWC) of 1993 and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) of 1972. The AG faces particular challenges in controlling biological weapons, since this capability rests more on the acquisition of information relative to material and equipment. Since the initial stages of legitimate biological applications and weapons production are identical, verification limits on biotechnology are likely to be more intrusive than in the case of chemical and nuclear weapons.

The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)

The MTCR is an informal, voluntary association of countries that share the goals of nonproliferation and seek the coordination of export licensing of missiles and related technology. Since it was established in 1987, membership has steadily grown to 32 countries. It controls the export of missiles and related technology according to payload (500 kg) and range (300 km) parameters. Export contol arrangements also cover specially designed production facilities and related missile technology. Rules, incentives and sanctions for either adhering to or violating the agreement have varied considerably.

The Wassenaar Agreement (WA)

This informal agreement of 33 countries is the successor to the Cold War export control regime (COCOM) and was established in 1995 to control the transfer of conventional weapons and sensitive dual-use items and technologies. The agreement was established to promote transparency in export control policies and greater responsibility in preventing destabilizing accumulations of conventional weapons and related technologies. The arrangement does not identify countries that member states must avoid when exporting dual-use technologies. It does not require member countries to consult others prior to granting licenses and the regime does not have a single-member veto for either adding or removing items from controlled lists. States use aggregate reporting to obfuscate understanding of which specific technologies were exported.

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1.

Appendix: Background on Non-proliferation Assistance Programs

Former Soviet WMD Programs, Stockpiles and Treaties:

Most former Soviet states, except for Russia, were unaware and unprepared for the materials they inherited when the Soviet Union collapsed. The weapons of mass destruction stockpiles turned over to their control included complete weapons and weapon systems, materials, facilities, technology and critical personnel.

A. Nuclear Stockpile and Arms Control Agreements

A comprehensive inventory of all Russian nuclear weapon assets does not exist. In 1991, at the close of the Cold War, Russia had more than:

40,000 nuclear weapons

1,000 metric tons of highly enriched uranium

at least 150 metric tons of weapon grade plutonium that could be used to make an additional 40,000 weapons.

A number of factors have come together to present an immediate risk of theft of these weapons and materials: delays in payments to guards at nuclear facilities, breakdowns in command structures, and inadequate budgets for protection of stockpiles and weapon laboratories.

The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) series were written to reduce the size of the American and Russian nuclear weapon stockpile, specifying the overall number of complete nuclear warheads, weapons, and delivery systems, and setting up a detailed verification system. The Office of Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) within DOD works with the former Soviet states to comply with START provisions. The Table below contains the numbers of nuclear weapons at the end of the Cold War, currently, and projected at future START milestones. As of April 2001 per START I, the Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus are nuclear weapons free. Therefore, all numbers below reflect Russian stockpiles only.