conflicts during the rest of this century, which has begun as sadly as the last.

The technology that has made us rich, however, also threatens to be the technology that destroys us. High-speed computers, Internet access, dual-use materials, equipment, and know how are essential ingredients of these simple but deadly devices. Unfortunately, we know from sad experience with the recent anthrax attacks that these threats are real.

Our hearing is about how we can prevent more laboratories with dangerous weapons capabilities from being developed. Some might argue that it is too late. Technology is loose. Dual-use items are too difficult to control, or trying to control dual-use exports will only hinder our own economy.

I do not think we have the luxury of indulging in any of those arguments anymore. Our enemies are using our own technology and our own open society against us.

We cannot declare war against international terrorism while saying at the same time that we should conduct business as usual. There is no more time for business as usual. We need to examine every aspect of our society to see how we can harden ourselves against terrorist attack and we need to examine every aspect of our international transactions to see how we can inhibit our enemies from gaining technologies to use against us.

In World War II, export controls were not "dirty words." They were an essential part of our defense. In today's war, there is also a role for export controls because if we do not do everything we can do to deter our enemies from gaining deadly weapons, then we all will pay the ultimate price in our own backyards. This is the terrible message from today's terrorists.

This hearing is an effort to start identifying those technologies and the means to prevent them from hurting us later.

I am pleased to welcome my colleague, Senator Cleland, and ask him for an opening statement.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CLELAND

Senator CLELAND. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and members of our panel, thank you for coming. I am pleased that this Subcommittee is addressing this critical issue today and that we are further scheduled to address the Nonproliferation Assistance Coordination Act next week.

I note that a dear friend of mine, former Senator Sam Nunn, in his recent testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee called once again for enhancing the cooperative threat reduction measures that he helped put in place several years ago. I strongly support such action. There is no more important topic for our national security than addressing the threat posed by proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. I have long advocated a comprehensive national strategy for dealing with this threat and I believe that our strategy must be based on the likelihood of each type of incident as well as on our vulnerability to it.

For many years, I have argued that we were too focused on low probability, high-tech threats and not focused enough on high prob

that we must enhance the mechanisms for coordinating our response to WMD.

Coordination is essential. It is my conviction that we must better coordinate the efforts of all players that led me to develop legislation I am introducing today, the Public Health Emergencies Accountability Act. This act puts in place a procedure that allows clear assignment of responsibility in cases where the public health is threatened. It further mandates the exchange of information between institutions primarily responsible for public health, such as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and those primarily responsible for countering criminal and terrorist activities. We must also resource these agencies to enable them to carry out this essential coordination. Coordination is particularly important in the tough areas where the lines of responsibility and definition blur.

This hearing addresses another such arena, the dual-use technologies that lie at the heart of chemical, biological, even nuclear infrastructures that exist around the world today. To achieve the necessary coordination, we must tackle the hard questions that arise when talking about technologies that provide legitimate commercial opportunities, but which in the wrong hands can also mask potential threats.

It is no longer enough to throw up our hands and walk away from the table when the establishment and enforcement of necessary counterproliferation protocols conflicts with legitimate commercial interests. We have got to find a way to strike a balance that allows commercial enterprises a reasonable degree of autonomy while ensuring the greater public good is not compromised. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you for your statement, Senator. Senator Stevens.

Senator STEVENS. I have no statement, Senator. I wish I could stay longer. I am just here for a little while. Thank you very much. Senator AKAKA. Thank you for being here.

We are glad to have our panel this morning. I am pleased to welcome you. Dr. Moodie is co-founder and President of the Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute and former Assistant Director for Multilateral Affairs of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Dr. Jonathan Tucker is Director of the Chemical and Biological Nonproliferation Program and was a member of the biological weapons inspection team in Baghdad, Iraq, with the United Nations Special Commission.

Ms. Rose Gottemoeller is a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. She holds a joint appointment, the Russian and Eurasian program and global policy program, and is former Deputy Under Secretary for Defense, Nuclear Nonproliferation, in the U.S. Department of Energy and former Assistant Secretary for Nonproliferation and National Security.

I would like to at this time, before I call on Dr. Moodie, to yield to Senator Thompson for any statement he may have.

Senator THOMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do not have any statement to give. I am looking forward to hearing the testimony

of hearings that this Committee and Subcommittee has had for a long time on this subject, and, of course, it is much more timely now in a lot of people's minds than it has been in times past, but I commend you for keeping the spotlight on this important area. Hopefully, people will now pay attention. Thank you.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much.

Dr. Moodie, we welcome any opening statement you may have.

TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL L. MOODIE,1 PRESIDENT, CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL ARMS CONTROL INSTITUTE

Mr. MOODIE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the Subcommittee as it addresses this very important topic.

In the summary of my statement, in the few minutes that I have, I would like briefly to address three interrelated issues, the need for better threat assessments, the linkage between state and nonstate threats, and the need for a strategic response in which export controls continue to play an important role. My remarks today will focus on the chemical and especially the biological weapons threats. My starting point is the recommendation of the Gilmore Commission that we must improve our threat assessments. This is true not only with respect to the chemical and biological terrorism threat, but also for the challenge of proliferation at the state level. Traditionally, threat assessments have been overly simplistic. They have tended to focus on only a single factor, such as the agent that might be used or the motivations of the state or terrorist who might use them. In addition, these more simple threat assessments have emphasized vulnerabilities rather than genuine risks, which are a combination of vulnerability and likelihood.

But conducting more complex threat assessments is not easy. It demands good intelligence and creative analysis. But better threat assessments would do three things. First, they would describe a threat envelope that identifies the most plausible contingencies.

Second, they would provide a means to identify those contingencies that require hedging in that due to the severity of their consequences, some preparation for them should be undertaken even if they are relatively unlikely, and this combination of a plausible threat envelope and the hedging contingencies should give to policy makers some measure for making decisions regarding policy priorities and resource allocations.

Third, a good threat assessment will highlight the fact that the threat is not uni-dimensional, rather that it is composed of several elements, including the actor, his motivations, intentions regarding casualties and capabilities, the agent involved, the target, and issues regarding the mode of attack and other operational considerations.

The key to a successful threat assessment is disaggregating the threat into these component elements and assessing the possibilities that various combinations of them produce. Some combinations of factors will yield significant consequences, others will produce no consequences at all.

This approach to threat assessment leads to important conclusions that should inform policy decisions. First, the degree of risk declines as the level of desired casualties increases insofar as the contingency involving higher levels of casualties become less likely.

Second, we should not take great comfort from this conclusion because, despite the low probability of catastrophic attacks in the United States, there is still ample cause for concern because we do not know how massive a mass attack has to be. Worst case scenarios need not happen to stress the response system to the point of collapse. Moreover, the danger and harm inherent in the use of chemical and especially biological weapons is not limited to physical casualties. As we have seen with the anthrax attacks, psychological impacts and social and economic disruption are also potentially severe.

Third, the events of September 11 and subsequent anthrax attacks suggest that the connections between state and non-state actors warrant increased attention. Analysts have tended to conceptualize and address the state CBW proliferation challenge and chemical and biological terrorism along separate tracks.

Today, the distinction between war and terrorism has become blurred and they have become inextricably linked. Our adversaries have declared war on the West and the United States in particular and they are using terrorist tactics as part of their campaign. We confront an adversary that is not necessarily a State, although it might be, but nevertheless has chemical and terrorism weapons potential, at a minimum.

As this war unfolds, then, the United States may find itself at war against one or more chemical and biological armed adversaries, whether a state or non-state. How do they think about the strategic and tactical utility of such weapons? Saying that chemical and biological capabilities will be part of an asymmetric strategy of either a state or a terrorist is not enough. Different strategic goals point to different chemical and biological weapons uses and a number of possibilities, each of which has both a limited and an ultimate form, suggest themselves as examples.

One, the desire to generate fear among the U.S. population, ultimately pushing such fear to the point that it raises questions about the integrity of U.S. society.

Second, slowing military action or ultimately crippling U.S. strategies that depend on power projection and coalition warfare.

Or third, disrupting the U.S. economy or ultimately undermining it by attacking such critical components as the agricultural sector, a threat that I believe has received insufficient attention, or the financial centers of the country. The willingness of terrorists or states to resort to chemical or biological capabilities depends on these kinds of strategic objectives, and our response depends, in part, on understanding what those strategic objectives might be.

What does this approach to defining the threat suggest about the needs for responding effectively? First, that because the threat is a multi-dimensional one and a complex one, an effective response must be strategic in nature, one that addresses requirements that span a spectrum from deterrence through prevention, defense, and

To perform each of these strategic missions effectively, difficult challenges must be overcome. Effective responses, for example, whether on the battlefield or in terms of homeland defense, demand meeting both short-term needs, such as adapting military concepts of operations or upgrading the Public Health System, and long-term measures, including an effective research and development program.

Second, a strategic response is also a multi-faceted response. A range of tools must be exploited. These include intelligence, defenses, both active and passive, diplomacy, legal measures, preparedness, financial measures, military options, and arms control. Each of these tools of policy contributes something to an effective response to the CBW proliferation challenge, but each tool has shortcomings that must be overcome and none of them constitutes a silver bullet that provides the total answer.

In this context, export controls have an important role to play, but it is not necessarily the traditional contribution of the past. Export control regimes can be effective in delaying the acquisition of sensitive technologies by a committed proliferator. But in the longer term, they cannot realistically be expected to stop the transfer of technology that may be used for weapons purposes, particularly since so much of that technology also has legitimate commercial medical and other uses.

This does not mean that export controls should be abandoned. They perform other functions. Regulation through export controls, for example, facilitates the global dissemination of materials and equipment. By defining the rules of the game by which companies must abide, for example, export controls make it easier for those companies to engage in international trade and cooperation.

It is this kind of newly defined role for export controls that should be emphasized in the future. At the same time, the United States must maintain open markets and avoid neo-protectionist practices that deny or severely limit access to markets or appropriate technology which would make key states less inclined to pursue cooperative measures.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you for your statement.

Dr. Tucker, we welcome your statement.

TESTIMONY OF JONATHAN B. TUCKER, Ph.D.,1 DIRECTOR, CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAM, CENTER FOR NONPROLIFERATION STUDIES, MONTEREY INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Mr. TUCKER. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, distinguished Members of the Subcommittee and guests, many thanks for the opportunity to appear before you today on a topic of great importance and concern in the aftermath of September 11: The proliferation of chemical and biological weapons to states and terrorist organizations. The recent series of anthrax attacks through the U.S. mail indicates that the global spread of dual-use technologies, materials, and scientific know how relevant to the production and delivery of

1The prepared statement of Mr. Tucker with an attached table appears in the Appendix on