and bureaucratic implementation of its provision was complex. Although direct U.S. assistance as a rule is not subject to taxes, subcontractors often are taxed, especially since many forms of contracts could be construed as services rather than participation in an assistance program. A recently adopted law "On Grants (Assistance) to the Russian Federation" provides for considerable tax exemptions. However, salaries and benefits paid by subcontractors are taxable and implementation procedures for the law have also not been developed or put into effect. Immunity Issues - The privileges granted to CTR personnel emerged as a problem during negotiations on the extension of the 1992 umbrella agreement in Russia that grants CTR personnel the same privileges as technical and administrative personnel under the Vienna Convention. The U.S. asked that these be expanded to the scope of privileges accorded to diplomatic personnel, including full immunity from prosecution. The Russian side refused to grant such extensive privileges, and employees of private contractors performing CTR functions continue to not have diplomatic immunity. Both taxation and immunity issues, while not preventing CTR programs from moving forward, drain time and energy from the implementation of the program and undermine some of the trust that has developed on both sides. Environmental Concerns and Regional Governments – a relatively new problem is the increasing role of local authorities. The power of environmental groups, whether working with or against regional governments, also deserves notice. Many environmental concerns need to be taken seriously, given the toxic nature and complex technologies involved in elimination processes. CTR programs must work in an open and direct manner and closely with local Russian governments, contractors, and Russian non-government organizations. Funding and Sustainability – the future of the CTR program depends on domestic and international politics. CTR programs are clearly vulnerable to possible fluctuations in levels of funding that could be caused by unrelated political developments. The CTR programs are not at an advanced stage and involve expensive, multi-year projects that cannot be easily terminated. Even with constant funding, plans must be made for ensuring that the dismantlement infrastructure is sustainable over the long term. After a period of three to seven years, the whole infrastructure the U.S. is now creating might become unusable because Russia cannot replace some critical elements of equipment. This problem is partially alleviated by the fact that the U.S. is transferring relevant technologies so that Russia will hopefully be able to build its own replacement equipment. Creeping Missions and Slippery Slopes - the original expectation for the CTR program (provision of money and equipment to facilitate weapons elimination) has turned into a considerable more massive endeavor of creating the infrastructure for elimination, disposal and safe storage and transportation of weapons, materials and delivery vehicles. This expansion was perhaps inevitable because one cannot eliminate, for example, Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBM) and leave the problem of liquid propellant aside. While most CTR programs are now established, and further mission expansion is unlikely, there is another form expansion taking place as now CTR funds are increasingly being used to provide “support services," i.e. the infrastructure shortcomings, or transportation and support costs. Many are also concerned that the CTR program is becoming the funding source of first resort, rather than last resort for many of these support activities. Fungible Funds and Strategic Modernization – One of the strongest critiques of nonproliferation programs is that, by funding operational tasks and projects, funds are being freed for Russian military buildup, and may allow Russia to maintain and even modernize it strategic forces. Based on trends in Russian strategic modernization in the 19990s, if the Russian military and government face the choice between spending money for modernization, or spending on elimination, the latter task is likely to be relegated to second places. In Russia, nuclear weapons are the centerpiece of security guarantees. The other political issue that could affect nonproliferation programs are the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and changes to Russian tactical nuclear weapons. Concerns Relating to Chemical and Biological Weapon Non-Proliferation Activities: The current brain drain prevention programs favor funding research grants to former Soviet nuclear weapons scientists. The four brain drain prevention programs spent a combined $310.3 million on scientific grant activities from 1994 to 1998, for a total of 1,733 collaborative research projects. However, only $26 million went to biotechnology grants and $11.3 million to chemistry grants to fund 178 and 69 projects involving biological and chemical weapon scientists, respectively. The U.S. government conservatively estimates that there are 10,500 key biological and chemical scientists and engineers that pose a proliferation risk. However, the grant assistance programs have yet to reach important segments of the chemical and biological weapons communities, such as the experts in poison gas aerosolization and weaponization, the specialists in anti-crop and anti-animal agents, and the biowarfare researchers at four military institutes still closed to outsiders, totally about 3,500 scientists. On average annually, the four brain drain prevention programs have provided $8.4 million in chemistry and biology grants, an amount that would be insufficient to enable 10,500 critical scientists and engineers to keep small families above the poverty line. U.S. non-proliferation efforts have been hindered by decreasing access to many of the bioweapon laboratories. Four military bioweapon facilities are still closed to outsiders. Setting nonproliferation program priorities will require a detailed threat assessment which is dependent on knowing what capabilities and materials are housed in all former Soviet bioweapon laboratories. Appendix : Multilateral Nonproliferation Regimes Biological Weapons Convention General Background The Biological Weapons Convention took effect in 1975 after it was ratified by 143 nations, including the U.S. The treaty prohibits the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling and use of biological weapons and weapons agents. Parties to the treaty have agreed not to transfer or assist any state or organization to manufacture or acquire any biological weapons agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery. The BWC also requires all parties to destroy biological weapons stockpiles. The BWC was negotiated in a short period of time (1969-1972) and contains no provisions for enforcement or verification of compliance, often the most difficult elements of arms control. The treaty is run by the United Nation - there is no independent mechanism. BWC members have sought to identify possible verification measures and then negotiate a verification protocol. This was submitted at the BWC Review Conference in 2001, but was opposed by the U.S. Challenges and Concerns Biological weapons pose unique challenges to proliferation efforts. Unlike other weapons, biological agents are not countable or measurable and are naturally occurring. Biological agents are ubiquitous, difficult to identify and necessary for a wide range of legitimate purposes, such as pharmaceutical and medical research. Biological weapons labs can be quite small, difficult to identify and virtually indistinguishable from a peaceful research laboratory. The Administration's position on BWC has been influenced by the belief that biological weapons proliferation is inherently unverifiable and that efforts are best spent on ensuring greater compliance among Iraq, Iran and North Korea. The position states that compliance should not compromise bio-defense preparation, risk intellectual property of pharmaceutical and biotech firms or undermine the system of export controls for items that could be used offensively. The U.S. stance on verification measures within the BWC differs from its European allies. The Administration opposes random visits to declared facilities and instead supports managed access, where the facilities themselves control access. In November of 2001, a meeting of BWC member states discussed protocols under negotiation since 1995 to create a legally binding agreement to include verification measures within the BWC. The administration recommended focusing efforts on compliance among BWC member states and cited concerns over non-compliant members, particularly Iraq, Iran and North Korea. The administration proposed an alternative plan which does not include the protocol's provision for an international implementing body with the power to conduct challenge inspections and routine non-intrusive visits. The proposal does include some protocol provisions such as requirements for members to enact domestic legislation criminalizing treaty-prohibited activities. However, it does not specify what criminal penalties individual countries would enforce. It would also expand the UN Secretary's mandate to investigate suspicious biological weapons use and would require states to report biological releases. Some question how the proposal can achieve member compliance without verification provisions that include challenge inspections. Chemical Weapons Convention General Background The Chemical Weapons Convention is considered to be the most comprehensive non-proliferation treaty on chemical weapons. CWC negotiations were initiated in 1980 and entered into force in 1997. There are 145 states that have ratified or acceded the convention. The CWC is a multilateral treaty that bans the production, acquisition, stockpiling or transferring of chemical weapons. The convention also prohibits states and parties from assisting and encouraging chemical weapons development. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) oversees implementation of the CWC. The convention restricts chemical transfers to non-state parties. The OPCW is based in The Hague, Netherlands with a staff of 464 people representing 70 nationalities. The CWC recognizes the dual-use nature of chemical weapons technology and materials. It focuses basic prohibitions on end-use rather than specific chemicals or technologies. This allows the CWC to prohibit the application of chemicals for offensive military purposes, while permitting commercial use. It focuses on chemicals and activities that may be subjected to monitoring and verification and incorporates an inventory of known chemical warfare agents. This inventory is amended as new chemical weapons agents and precursors are identified. The CWC requires verification and compliance among all parties. On-site inspections are conducted to verify that facilities are being used for legitimate purposes. Parties are required to destroy chemical weapons stockpiles within 10 years of signing the treaty. Choice of destruction methods are left up to each state party and must be approved by the OPCW. The convention has established on-site activities aimed at generating confidence among CWC members. Routine inspections of chemical weapons-related facilities and industry facilities are conducted to verify declarations and confirm that activities are consistent with CWC obligations. The OPCW receives declarations of chemical weapons related activities or materials and pertinent industry activities. States and parties are required to declare chemical industry facilities that produce chemicals of concern and are required to destroy all chemical weapons and production facilities and chemical weapons abandoned on other state's territories. The CWC allows for challenge inspections of declared or undeclared facilities to deter chemical weapons development at clandestine facilities. Once a request for a challenge inspection is submitted, the host country must grant access to the facility no later than 108 hours after arrival to allow for enough time to protect confidential equipment and information unrelated to the CWC, but not enough time to remove traces of illicit activity. The OPCW may recommend punitive measure for parties that engage in actions that could result in "serious damage" to the convention and for more damaging noncompliance may bring issues before the United Nations National Security Council and General Assembly. The treaty makes efforts to protect industry proprietary information while allowing for intrusive inspections. These measures were developed with active participation of the international chemical industry and have resulted in support from the U.S. chemical industry. Challenges and Concerns Several concerns have arisen since the implementation of the CWC. Countries with large chemical weapon industries have taken longer than expected to identify to meet declaration deadlines. The Sixth Session of the Conference of States Parties (CSP) of 2001 revealed that less than a quarter of states had declared their activities for 2000 and notification of national implementing measures remained below requirements. There are also funding issues including delays in dues payments by states and a lack of reimbursements for verification costs.' There are also concerns over enforcement. Sanctions were negotiated late in CWC negotiations and lack specificity. The CWC faces issues over the number of nations who are willing to ratify its provisions. While 171 nations have signed and 140 have ratified the convention, some nations have not, including Iraq, North Korea, Libya and Syria. A number of other nations, including Egypt and Jordan, have linked their participation in the treaty to removal of Israel's nuclear capability. There are continued concerns about Iraq's intentions including evidence it has rebuilt plant formerly used for chemical weapons production. Many assume that a resurgence of Iraq's missile program will see a continuance of previous efforts to develop CW warheads. There are verification concerns over effectiveness and the potential impact on the rights and property of the chemical industry. Questions have arose over whether the OPCW will be able to detect all clandestine production or stockpiling of chemical weapons. Since verification is not absolute, it could create a false sense of security among member states. Because of the intrusiveness of the verification regime, there are concerns over how the CWC may impact the chemical industry. The potential loss of trade secrets from disclosure is the greatest concern to private industry. However, the Chemical Manufacturers Association and the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association have strongly supported the convention's confidentiality measures and have supported ratification. 'Kelle, Alexander. Implementation on a Low Flame. CWC Update Issue No. 57, May |