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reasons proliferators seek these capabilities in the first

place.

nonproliferation"

Despite our successes, areas for improvement do exist. We need to continue to work with our regime partners on "regional focusing on steps they can take individually or collectively to impede non-member WMD and missile programs beyond simply relying on members to effectively control their own exports. The regimes will also need to: 1) continue to update control lists to reflect technological advances and ensure they keep pace with proliferation trends; 2) work to extend export controls, in line with regime standards, to potential suppliers of items related to WMD, missiles, and advanced conventional weapons, as well as to transshipment points (including via export control assistance); and 3) increase efforts to make non-members more aware of the threat

and consequences of unchecked proliferation, help them understand that responsible nonproliferation policies and practices do not hinder trade and can actually be beneficial to

trade by increasing exporting-country confidence in them as

reliable recipients, and urge them to adopt policies and

practices consistent with regime standards.

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Questions for the Record Submitted Mr. Vann H. Van Diepen by Senator Fred Thompson

Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on International
Security, Proliferation and Federal Services

Question 8: NSG members protested Russia's export of nuclear fuel to Tarapur in India by issuing bilateral demarches. Additionally, the US Department of State issued a strongly worded public statement protesting Russia's failure to comply with its commitments.

Are there other instances where the United States has demarched regime members, questioning their compliance with regime commitments?

Please provide for the Record a list of cases over the past 3 years where the United States demarched other regime members, questioned their compliance with regime commitments, or raised concern over proposed exports and identified the relevant regime.

· For each case on this list, provide the outcome of the case: whether the proposed export was stopped or whether the United States subsequently found that the case was consistent with the members regime commitments.

Answer:

· There has been only one other instance where the U.S.

found it necessary to demarche another Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) member regarding a proposed export that was not consistent with the NSG Guidelines. That case involved a proposed export by Belgium of reactor control room instrumentation to Pakistan for the Karachi Nuclear

Power Plant (KANUPP). Belgium notified the other NSG member governments in November 1996 that it intended to

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approve this export as an "exceptional case" deemed

essential for safety and thus exempt from the full-scope safeguards requirement for nuclear cooperation under the Guidelines. The U.S. and other NSG member governments

argued that the proposed export did not meet the standard of the 1994 "Common Understanding" on the definition of

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"exceptional cases. The term "exceptional cases" is

generally understood to mean those cases when a transfer of a Trigger List item is "deemed to be essential in order to prevent or correct a radiological hazard posing a significant danger to public health and safety, and which cannot be realistically met by other means. The Belgian Government, after much discussion and high-level internal review, finally decided in January 2000 not to approve the export.

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• There have been no other cases to our knowledge of NSG members approving or considering approval of exports that are clearly inconsistent with the NSG Guidelines.

Hearing Date: July 29, 2002
Committee: SCGA

Senator/Member: Sen Fred Thompson
Witness: Marshall Billingslea
Question #: 1

Russian Export Control Policy

Question: Assistant Secretary for Nonproliferation John Wolf testified before this subcommittee in June that "Russian export control policy is contributing to the proliferation threat" and that "Russian implementation and enforcement of its export controls remain insufficient."

Please explain how Russia gained admittance to three of the four multilateral export control regimes when one of the key membership criteria is to have an effective and legally-based export control system in place.

Which other regime members have gained admittance to the regimes without fulfilling basic membership criteria?

Answer: Admission to any of the export control regimes is decided by consensus of all members. Russia became a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in 1995 and assumed MTCR obligations to control missiles, related equipment, and technology and took steps to enhance and improve its export control system to restrict the unauthorized transfer of missile-related equipment and technology. However, while Russia strengthened its export control legislation, it has insufficiently implemented those legislative improvements.

In the case of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Russia's export policy is a serious problem. The former Soviet Union was a founding member of the NSG in the mid-1970s and implemented its controls more rigorously than is Russia today. We also have the same concerns regarding Russia's participation in the Wassenaar Arrangement.

Because there are no provisions in export control regimes to expel a member that is not following its obligations, we are pressing Russia to enforce rigorously its export control rules and legislation, but they remain weak and we continue to see problematic missile and nuclear-related trade activities.

Hearing Date: July 29, 2002

Committee: SCGA

Senator/Member: Sen Fred Thompson
Witness: Marshall Billingslea
Question #: 2

MTCR Controls

Question: As you know, the MTCR controls not only ballistic missiles, but also cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Missile expert Dennis Gormley testified before ISGFS subcommittee in February that the MTCR has failed to achieve consensus on determining the true range and capability of cruise missiles and other UAVs. He pointed to the UK and French decision to transfer the Black Shaheen cruise missile to the United Arab Emirates.

If the regime cannot reach consensus on payload and range definitions with our closest allies, how does this impact the effectiveness of the regime?

Would the Black Shaheen transfer signal to other MTCR members and adherents, such as Russia and China, that a Category I transfer to volatile regions such as the Middle East is MTCR compliant?

Does this proposed transfer undermine the credibility and purpose of the MTCR?

Answer: The Black Shaheen is still in the development phase and has not been transferred to the United Arab Emirates.

The principle of range/payload tradeoff is codified in the MTCR Annex and the MTCR Partners recently agreed at the 2002 MTCR Plenary to definitions for both range and payload. These definitions will provide a common base allowing Partners to arrive at similar determinations of the range/payload characteristics of individual systems. However, final determinations are made by each MTCR member, in accordance with national legislation and discretion - a fact that also works to U.S. advantage. If the U.S. is concerned about the activities of an MTCR member, the U.S. will first consult that nation bilaterally and then consider bringing the matter to the attention of all MTCR members if the matter cannot be resolved on a bilateral basis.

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