sights into the pathogenesis of various biological agents. The Department of Defense engages in targeted biodefense research projects with Russia in these areas, as agreed to in the interagency process. These projects are designed to cooperatively exploit knowledge to enhance U.S. detection of, protection from, and treatment of these potentially deadly substances. I will return to the matter of biological weapons in a moment, but I use it here to illustrate that we do have a good process in place and that that process is working well.

Let me turn now to an overview of the Cooperative Threat Reduction program and the areas of activity in the former Soviet Union. We believe that the CTR program is an important part of our national security strategy. We are privileged to have enjoyed sustained congressional support and robust funding since the inception of this program.

The President's fiscal year 2002 budget request included $403 million for the DOD CTR program, $403 million, which was virtually the same amount budgeted by the previous administration. We appreciate the House Appropriations Committee's full funding of our request and are hopeful that the Senate Appropriations Committee will be equally supportive.

The funds that we have asked for will be used in a variety of program areas that I can summarize. In the nuclear weapons and delivery systems area, we maintain a Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination program that is reducing Russia's strategic offensive arms by destroying strategic WMD delivery systems. I can give you a breakout of the numbers of nuclear submarines, launchers for submarine launch ballistic missiles and SLBMs. It is in my testimony. We also have a Weapons Transportation Security program with Russia that assists in the movement and consolidation of nuclear weapons from Russia's Ministry of Defense operational sites to Russia's Ministry of Atomic Energy nuclear weapons dismantlement facilities, and we are providing assistance to the Russian MOD to bolster their ability to respond to and to mitigate the effects of a nuclear weapons accident or an attempted theft.

For instance, in fiscal year 2001, we funded 53 train shipments designed to carry nuclear weapons to dismantlement sites. We funded the maintenance of 79 railcars and contracted for special emergency response vehicles and equipment to be given to the MOD.

We continue to be concerned, Mr. Chairman, with the potential for theft or diversion from Russia of nuclear weapons. Therefore, we have developed the Nuclear Weapons Storage Security program to make physical security upgrades to key sites, to install inventory control systems and practices to account for these weapons in the custody of the Russian Ministry of Defense.

During fiscal year 2001, we completed testing and we finalized selection on an approved suite of sensors and equipment to be installed at Russian weapon storage sites. We shipped six sets of Quick Fix fences and sensors to various sites in northern Russia. We funded and verified installation of such kinds of equipment at numerous other sites, contracted for additional guard equipment, training, and facilities, and delivered certified computers to help in

security measures, preferably those that can be provided without extensive training of guard forces, is a good interim solution pending the eventual dismantlement of nuclear weapons stocks, and we may look to do more of this kind of work.

Because time is short, I will turn briefly to Ukraine and a few other countries. I am pleased to report that our Strategic Nuclear Arms Elimination program in Ukraine has eliminated all of the START-accountable nuclear delivery system launchers, and we are dismantling other WMD delivery systems and infrastructure.

Similarly, we have completely eliminated all weapons of mass destruction from Kazakhstan.

On the biological weapons front, we believe that it is important to continue cooperation with the biological weapons designers and engineers in the former Soviet Union. This practice is enabling us to identify many research institutes that house dangerous pathogens and production-capable facilities.

The Biological Weapons Proliferation Prevention program of the CTR program is consolidating and securing dangerous pathogen collections. We are dismantling former Soviet BW research and production facilities, and as I described earlier, we are targeting research to enhance U.S. biodefense capabilities against dangerous pathogens, some of the work we actually are doing with the CDC and other research institutes.

In our view, the Biological Weapons Proliferation Prevention aspect of the CTR program is of exceptional and increasing importance. We also attach great importance to the comparable programs maintained by other agencies such as the Department of State's ISTC program and the Department of Energy's programs.

We have two objectives for the BWPP, the consolidation and elimination of pathogenic stocks, to prevent them from falling into the wrong hands, and collaborative research and development with foreign scientists who can assist the United States in better protecting the American people and the global community from these diseases. In this vein, the Department of Defense believes that the Joint Statement on Bioterrorism reached between President Bush and Russian President Putin creates an important opportunity for closer collaboration.

On the chemical weapons front, we also are concerned with the threat of chemical weapons proliferation, and we are troubled by inadequate security and safety measures currently being maintained on stocks of chemical agent and we have a program that is addressing this concern.

In Uzbekistan, we are dismantling the former Soviet chemical weapons research, development, and testing facilities, and there are numerous other activities that I could get in, time permitting, but I have already greatly exceeded my time, Mr. Chairman.

So let me just summarize by saying that we believe the CTR program has played a crucial role in the Department of Defense's efforts and the U.S. Government's larger efforts to prevent proliferation. Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine have all acceded to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and have rid themselves of their nuclear capability. The DOD portion of the CTR program was es

The Congress, the Executive Branch, and the American people can and should be proud of the Cooperative Threat Program's accomplishments to date, and I appreciate the opportunity to testify before this committee.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Billingslea, for your statement.

Mr. Baker, you may give your statement at this time.

TESTIMONY OF KENNETH E. BAKER,1 PRINCIPAL ASSISTANT DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR FOR DEFENSE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINIS

TRATION

Mr. BAKER. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to be here today to talk about the Department of Energy's nuclear nonproliferation programs.

With your permission, I will make a few opening comments and submit a longer one for the record.

Senator AKAKA. We would appreciate that.

Mr. BAKER. I want to thank the Subcommittee and, indeed, all the Members of the Senate for their strong interest and support of the U.S. nonproliferation programs. Congress' demonstrated commitment to these programs has sent a strong signal that it knows the mission is critical and enduring and has helped the National Nuclear Security Administration to plan effectively and to work even harder after September 11.

In the aftermath of September 11, the attacks against the United States, the work of the National Nuclear Security Administration within the Department of Energy has taken on higher visibility and greater importance. Almost a year ago, in January 2001, the bipartisan report by Baker-Cutler mentioned by Senator Cleland concluded the most urgent unmet national security threat to the United States today. This is the danger of weapons of mass destruction and weapons-usable materials falling in the hands of terrorists or hostile states and used against American citizens at home.

All of us have seen the reports that Osama bin Laden has attempted to acquire weapons of mass destruction, and that he has called the attainment of such weapons a religious duty. In a nutshell, that face of the threat is confronting us today. Let me assure you, all of the people in the National Nuclear Security Administration are committed to supporting with all available resources, this country's work, and accelerate our efforts to eliminate this threat from the face of the earth.

If I may make a few general comments on the draft legislation and more later that you are considering. The NNSA wants to ensure to you that the interagency coordination is as good as it can be in programs, and they are effective against the nonproliferation agenda. We have already been successful in many of these areas, and I will discuss a few of these in my following testimony.

Even before September 11, reducing the potential for diversion of Russian nuclear warheads and materials has been a critical priority for the United States. It is essential that such warheads and

materials be kept out of the hands of the so-called rogue states as well as terrorist organizations.

The National Nuclear Security Administration is working with Russia to attack this problem on many fronts. For example, to improve security at sites that have weapons-usable materials, improve Russia's export control systems, and train Russian experts to take greater responsibility to ensuring security and protecting weapons of mass destruction materials.

The United States has already completed rapid security upgrades for thousands of Russian Navy warheads, and security of over 220 metric tons of Russian fissile material has been secured, enough to make roughly 20,000 nuclear devices.

Last year, Russia and the United States agreed to dispose of 68 metric tons of surplus weapons-grade plutonium, 34 metric tons in each country. The administration is currently examining alternatives to reduce the cost of this program and to make it more sustainable to Russia. A final decision is expected in about 2 months. And under the HEU purchase agreement, the United States has removed more than 130 metric tons of HEU from Russia's military programs. The United States is working with Russia to improve its ability to detect and interdict nuclear materials at border checkpoints and at airports. Some borders are thousands of miles long and pose difficult challenges, but we are tackling that problem.

The NNSA is working intensively to reduce the risk of Russia's highly trained nuclear scientists and engineers already mentioned, also, the ones that are unemployed or under-employed and would be tempted to sell their expertise to the highest bidder. The United States is taking steps to help Russia transform its closed nuclear cities by developing civilian employment opportunities for displaced workers. These objectives are pursued principally through what we call the National Nuclear Security Administration's Russia Transition Assistance Efforts, which encompass the initiatives for proliferation prevention in a program called Nuclear Cities Initiatives. To give you a couple examples of what the initiatives for proliferation prevention system has done, we work very closely with State Department to make sure that we secure jobs for Russians in basic technology work. Currently, programs in particular on the IPP have been effectively demonstrated. We have private and public partnerships in pursuing the nonproliferation objectives. IPP has developed partnerships with former weapons scientists and technicians in over 160 institutions in the former Soviet Union.

While IPP had only $24.5 million to invest in projects during the past year, it also has required commercial partners at least to match IPP's investment projects. These matching funds requirement assisted IPP and Russian partners in identification of technologies that offer the greatest commercial promise by requiring U.S. industry to make financial commitments to development of technology at the project's initiation.

The NNSA believes that the formula that we have developed for converting former weapons scientists to commercial enterprises have been successful.

A few examples. Several energy-related technologies have been

to enhance coal and oil recovery. This technology could result in revenues exceeding $2 billion in the next 10 years.

We are seeing the successful commercialization of a wheelchair seat cushion that will prevent pressure ulcers, responsible for causing tens of thousands of deaths in the United States every year, saving Medicare $3 billion in annual costs.

The Nuclear Cities Initiative's first major commercial effort facilitates the production of kidney dialysis equipment by a joint venture established between Fresenius Medical Care Center of Lexington, Massachusetts, and the Avangard nuclear weapons assembly plant in Sarov, Russia. This has been a very successful program that will put a thousand people to work.

A year ago, virtually no westerners has ever been allowed to set foot into the Avangard facility. Now they are part of the joint venture that will use resources, buildings, and personnel that previously produced nuclear weapons to manufacture life-saving medical devices. This is truly swords in the plowshares.

Looking ahead, as we look ahead, the National Nuclear Security Administration considers new priorities. We are accelerating, an important word. The Secretary just said yesterday in Russia, we will accelerate these programs. There are on going efforts. The National Security Administration is taking advantage of a recently signed DOE Ministry of Atomic Energy access agreement and focusing on sites in Russia that hold large quantities of fissile materials. Working with the Russian Navy, we are securing approximately 4,000 nuclear weapons and have completed the Second Line of Defense program, and this now is being expanded into 12 sites. Today, the NNSA will work even harder to get the 12 up to even higher numbers.

Research and development is critical to the National Security Administration's mission. NNSA works with numerous other government agencies to develop technologies that will help detect nuclear, chemical, and biological proliferation and terrorism, and, hence, the United States' ability to address nuclear smuggling and assist local responders to respond to terrorist threat.

I would like to close by talking about the formal draft legislation. Although the administration has not taken formal position on draft legislation you are considering, NNSA respectively believes that it is not necessary. Too many layers of management can hurt, not help, effect the implementation of these programs.

The NSC's Proliferation Strategy Policy Committee chaired by Dr. Robert Joseph, Assistant to the President, provides a vehicle for interagency coordination, as it cooperates and provides over sight over nonproliferation assistance programs to Russia and the other states of the former Soviet Union. Chaired by the NSC, the Committee consists of Assistant Secretaries of Defense, from State, from DOE, from intelligence, and from the Office of the Vice President and other agencies as appropriate for the issue.

This group meets frequently to coordinate critical nonproliferation areas. Just yesterday, we had two meetings discussing nonproliferation issues.

As you know, the NSC is completing a comprehensive review of all U.S. nonproliferation programs. I applaud this review, which I