called out in the question. I would rely on the requirements process to define such a requirement.

Question. What is your view of the need, if any, for the United States to resume testing of nuclear weapons in the foreseeable future?

Answer. From my pre-confirmation briefings, I understand that the current stockpile is well tested and well understood. Stockpile Stewardship is working today. Four annual certifications of the health and safety of the stockpile have been completed, signed by the Secretaries of Energy and Defense, and sent to the President. If for any reason in the future I believe that there is a need to test again, I will not hesitate to say that.

Question. Do you support the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty by the United States? Why or why not?

Answer. In my current position as Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, I have been careful not to take policy positions on this and similar issues in order to give the best, totally objective intelligence facts and analysis to policy makers.

Before defining my position on this matter, I want to come to my own conclusions on the progress we are making in stockpile stewardship, the prospects for significantly improving our ability to identify and correct stockpile problems, the certainty with which we will be able to continue to certify the stockpile and our confidence that we will be able to remanufacture weapons when required.

That said, I would have no difficulty in recommending to the President that we conduct tests if we discover problems in significant portions of the stockpile that we cannot deal with through the stewardship program.

Question. The Department of Energy is responsible for the production, assembly and maintenance of US nuclear weapons One of its future challenges will be pit production for refurbishing existing weapons in the active US stockpile

Do you believe the Department will have the requisite capacity andcapability for pit production to meet the requirements of the active stockpile?

Answer. I understand that the element for success are coming on-line for a limited capability at Los Alamos. Equipment from Rocky Flats has been moved to Los Alamos, upgraded and deployed. Five development pits have been produced, with two additional development pits expected this year. Process qualification plans have been completed and agreed to by designers and manufacturers for fabrication of a certifiable pit. That said, I understand that certification is proceeding slowly and there have been delays.

Question. If not, what additional steps would you recommend, if confirmed, to assure sufficient pit production capacity within the DOE complex?

Answer. If confirmed, I'll be looking at the pit manufacturing issues very closely with Defense Programs officials and laboratory management to determine whether additional steps are needed. The Foster panel makes specific recommendations in this regard and I will consider them very seriously.

Question. The Department of Energy maintains a stockpile of reserve or inactive nuclear warheads. Please describe the purpose or purposes of this inactive reserve stockpile and US plans for its future use, including the assumptions that were used to create it and scenarios under which its future composition could change

What are the requirements for this inactive reserve stockpile and what role does the Department of Energy play in this requirements process?

Answer. The geopolitical changes and U.S. nuclear initiatives in the 1990s resulted in a considerable drawdown in the current and projected nuclear weapons stockpile. I understand that the inactive reserve was conceived, in part, to help implement arms control agreements by providing a hedge against potential geopolitical changes and potential weapon reliability or safety issues. It is all the more valuable in a no-nuclear-testing and no-new-warhead production environment.

The annual Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan (NWSP) reflects a category of weapons designated as the Inactive Stockpile which are retained in a non-operational status for:

• reactivation to increase the operational capability of the active stockpile if required by national security considerations;

• replacement of active stockpile weapons should reliability or safety problems develop; and,

⚫ replacement of the active stockpile weapons consumed annually under our quality assurance and reliability testing program.

Every year, the DOE works jointly with the Department of Defense to formulate and update nuclear weapons requirements in the NWSP. The Nuclear Weapons Council approve the NWSP which is forward to the Secretaries of Energy and Defense for signature. The Secretaries forward the NWSP to the President for his approval through issuance of a Presidential Decision Directive.

Question. If confirmed, would you propose any changes to this process?

Answer. If confirmed, I plan to review with my senior managers the activities of the NNSA as they relate to the maintenance of the U.S. nuclear stockpile. Only after that review would I be in a position to propose any changes.

DEFENSE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION PROGRAMS

Question. A large portion of the programs in the Defense Nuclear Non-proliferation Program deal with reducing the threat of Russian weapons of mass destruction This year the administration proposed to expand its programs with Russia in new areas that are not necessarily primary threats to the United States.

What is your view of that proposed initiative?

Answer. While I have only begun to acquaint myself with the details of these initiatives, my understanding is that, if successfully and efficiently implemented, they would contribute significantly to reducing the threat of proliferation.

I have been briefed that this work would break new ground by extending our cooperative efforts with the Russians to include plutonium derived from spent fuel used by civilian nuclear power plants. This would address the threat posed by the continuing accumulation of 2 metric tons each year of highly attractive fissile material in Russia which is susceptible to theft and diversion. Other parts of this initiative take cooperative work already underway with Russia to new stages such as the expansion of our work at sensitive Russian Naval nuclear weapon sites and the accelerated closure of serial production facilities.

Question. What are your goals for these programs under your leadership? Answer. If confirmed, my goal would be to ensure that these nonproliferation programs are implemented in the most effective, efficient and successful manner possible to attack the very real threat posed by the worldwide spread of weapons of mass destruction. I would work hard to ensure that these programs receive the necessary support and leadership to accomplish their important missions.

Among my priorities would be securing and accounting for the large stocks of unsecured weapons-usable nuclear materials worldwide; preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction expertise; assisting the U.S. Government in combating the threat of weapons of mass destruction by developing capable and useful detection and monitoring technologies; and working with other countries to help ensure the safe operation and shut-down of Soviet-designed nuclear reactors.

As I become more involved with this entire effort, I will have more considered opinions and perhaps slightly different priorities. What will not change, however, is a commitment to managing and leading this effort to ensure the highest possible returns for the very substantial taxpayer investment.

Question. If you were to expand these programs, what areas would be expanded? What programs would be your major focus? What programs do you believe are less critical?

Answer. Frankly, I will need to be able to delve into these programs in more detail before I could give a considered answer to this question. Certainly there would be value in accelerating the downsizing and conversion of the Russian nuclear weapons complex and in taking advantage of new opportunities in the MPC&A program, and others. That said, I am unsure at this moment about where best to apply additional resources if they were available, or which programs, if any, could be scaled back.

Question. If confirmed, what changes would you make in dealing with the Russian Federation to ensure that these programs have greater access to the Russian nuclear weapons complex where U.S. taxpayers are spending millions of dollars?

Answer. I believe that significantly greater access is required. I understand that the NNSA is currently working at several levels to resolve the matter. I firmly believe that for all new contracts and assistance programs, access is necessary to verify what work needs to be done, and how the U.S. taxpayers' dollars are spent.

Question. This year the committee indicated its strong support for the non-proliferation and verification research and development work that the Defense Nuclear Non-proliferation Programs oversees.

Of these programs, what work do you consider to be the most critical and why? Answer. I believe one of the most critical parts of the nonproliferation research and development program is the effort to develop technologies to detect remotely the early stages of a proliferant nation's nuclear weapons program in order to provide decision makers the time and information to have a chance at curtailing such a pro

gram.

Also of great importance is improving the technologies to monitor for nuclear testing. While this has been a core area of the nonproliferation and verification R&D

program for many years, it continues to be vital to our ability to independently monitor for nuclear weapons testing, whether or not there is a CTBT.

Another area of importance is developing technologies needed for domestic preparedness against chemical or biological attacks. These technologies would allow first-responders and the medical community to mitigate the effects of a potential chemical or biological attack.

GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE REPORT ON DOE PROGRAMS IN RUSSIA

Question. The General Accounting Office recently issued a report at the request of this committee on the Material Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) program The report stated that for almost half a billion dollars invested, the MPC&A program has not made significant progress toward reducing the threat posed by unsecured weapons-usable nuclear materials in the former Soviet Union. Do you agree with this assessment?

Answer. I understand clearly the concerns and criticisms raised by the GAO Report and recognize that the efficiency and value returned for this substantial investment is a matter of great import and concern. However, I do not yet have my own assessment of the report. I have been briefed that in the opinion of the program managers the report does not take fully into account the "rapid security upgrades" that have already been applied to some 450 metric tons of weapons-usable material in Russia. I am told these upgrades, while not the full security package, make important, immediate improvements to security. It is certainly correct, as I understand it, that only 7 percent of the sites have the full system of MPC&A upgrades installed.

Question. If confirmed, what would you suggest can be done to improve the threat reduction results of this program?

Answer. If confirmed, I would have to assure myself that we have the processes in place to have clear, definable and measurable goals for each of our programs; that we have metrics in place to measure progress toward the goals; and that we understand the value we expect to receive for the investment we make.

I understand there are very important opportunities in securing Russian naval nuclear weapons storage facilities. that we may be able to accelerate.

Question. Similarly, we may be able to enhance security through improved materials consolidation and conversion, and we may be able to improve Russian training so they can better maintain security. We must break through with MinAton on access and responsiveness to secure all weapons-usable material.

If confirmed, I will involve myself deeply in these matters to make certain we focus on the efforts that will give the greatest payoff, insist on Russian responsiveness and cooperation, and work hard to improve the efficiency and value returned on our investments.

MAJOR CHALLENGES

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting the next Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration?

Answer. As commented on in an earlier question, perhaps the most important task ahead of the first Administrator of NNSA will be to rebuild the confidence and trust in the management and leadership of the nuclear security programs with the Congress, with DOD, and with the people who make up NNSA.

Beyond that, there are important specific issues the NNSA Administrator must come to grips with:

• getting the organization up and running with clear goals, objectives and common purposes

• putting the organization on a sound management, leadership and fiscal footing

• strengthening planning, budgeting and program management

developing performance metrics and understanding the value of specific programs and investments.

My sense now is that NNSA has more program and more mission than it has budget. Tough decisions will have to be made to balance current stockpile work with needed infrastructure work and with strengthening the underlying capabilities for long-term stockpile stewardship.

Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges? Answer. If confirmed, I will be very aggressive in getting the organization itself functioning and moving toward its missions as quickly as possible. (I know much has already been done to lay the foundation.) I plan to be visible and approachable at the many NNSA locations to learn, for myself, the issues, strengths and weak

nesses in the enterprise and to demonstrate my commitment to NNSA, its mission, and its people.

Perhaps the most important step to strengthen management and fiscal disciplines will be to complete the work on and implement a multi-year planning, programming, and budgeting system that really works. Only with such a system can we balance among competing requirements, enforce real planning and fiscal responsibilities, and identify clearly resource shortfalls and potential trade-offs.

Unfortunately, such a system will not be fully in place before we have to make tough choices on specific programs. I would plan to make these with full transparency to the seniors in the enterprise and with our partners, but I will make decisions.

QUALIFICATIONS

Question. What background and experiences do you have that you believe qualifies you for this position?

Answer. I have 32 years of active military service with a wide range of training, experiences, and responsibilities, most of which, would be directly applicable and help me perform effectively as the NNSA's first Administrator. I have run large, technically-oriented organizations, and helped set their long-range goals and visions. I have worked closely with numerous people and organizations that are now in the NNSA. I have hands-on R&D experience in and close relationships with the weapons laboratories and the production plants. I have helped design and test weapons and was an experimenter in underground nuclear tests. I think I have visited, at one time or another, every DP facility and have done business with many of them. I have commanded a nuclear unit, been deeply involved in arms control and nonproliferation, and served in the State Department and the National Security Coun

cil.

In the NSC, I helped establish the non-proliferation function, worked with the early cooperative threat reduction programs and the program to convert Russian weapons-grade uranium to reactor fuel. My experience with the Russians on a variety of arms control efforts adds to my qualifications, as do my current responsibilities in non-proliferation.

Perhaps most importantly, I am fully committed to NNSA as an organization, to its missions, and to the people-federal employees and contractors alike -who make up NNSA and accomplish its missions.

Question. Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of the Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration?

Answer. While I have considerable experience directly related to this position, I recognize that it is not all current and that I have a great deal to learn. If confirmed, I intend to immerse myself in the issues, consult closely with the real experts and leaders, spend as much time as possible in the field, and reach out to outside experts including former leaders of the Department, the laboratories, and the production plants. I also want to rebuild a close, continuing, and transparent relationship with the Department of Defense.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?

Answer. Yes.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR STROM THURMOND

Senator THURMOND. What impact will Russia's ratification of the START II Treaty and the further reduction in the number of deployed nuclear warheads proposed by START III have on the need for Tritium production?

General GORDON. I understand one of the reasons that Secretary Richardson chose the Tennessee Valley Authority's (TVA) Commercial Light Water Reactors (CLWR) as the primary source of new tritium production is the flexibility of that approach to meet current and future needs. Until the treaty enters into force, we are obligated by law to maintain forces at START I levels. Once START II or a START III treaty enters into force, stockpile reductions could impact the amount and timing of new tritium requirements past our 2005/6 START I need date.

Senator THURMOND. Will you propose any delay in the construction of Tritium facilities?

General GORDON. No. The only DOE facility being constructed is the new Tritium Extraction Facility at the Savannah River Site which is currently scheduled to be ready for operation in 2006. Given present requirements, there can be no delay in activities to design and construct the Tritium Extraction Facility. Therefore we must have this facility for tritium production readiness whether we are supporting a START I or START II stockpile. There should be no further delays.

Senator THURMOND. Over the past several years a number of significant reports have criticized the Department's lack of planning for a large scale Plutonium Pit manufacturing facility. This year, in response to the lack of attention by DOE, the Senate Armed Services Committee included $11 million for conceptual design of such a facility. What is your position on the development of a large scale Plutonium Pit facility?

General GORDON. I have been briefed on the DOE/DOD approach to a plutonium pit manufacturing facility that was approved by the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) in September 1998. This approach includes reestablishing the capability to fabricate certifiable pits at Los Alamos National Laboratory, and assessing new plutonium aging data to improve predictions of pit lifetimes. This approach will enable the DOE to better determine when the development of a large scale pit manufacturing facility is required. I am aware of the Foster Panel's recommendation in their November 1999 report to the Congress to "immediately begin the conceptual design of a pit production facility adequate to meet National security needs." I understand that while DOE is pursuing the NWC approach, options to improve readiness in planning the conceptual design of a pit production facility are being investigated by DOE Defense Programs.

If confirmed by the Senate, I will carefully review with Defense Programs, the proposed path forward on pit production, with particular emphasis on the Foster Panel's recommendations.

Senator THURMOND. As you are aware, I am very concerned over the manner in which the Department of Energy has handled the APT program. As such, I'd like to know how you plan to pursue development of the APT?

General GORDON. I understand that the Department's commitment in the Secretarial Record of Decision of May 1998 was to complete the Engineering Development and Demonstration (ED&D) and preliminary design of the APT program as a backup to the CLWR. I will pursue that commitment to the extent that funding for a backup capability is available. I also understand that an option to pursue the APT backup role with other accelerator development efforts to provide a longerlived, more robust backup capability is being evaluated as a potential alternative. I will carefully look into the entire matter of APT early in my service, should I be confirmed.

Senator THURMOND. The General Accounting Office has been critical of the implementation and oversight costs associated with the efforts to secure surplus plutonium in the former Soviet Union. Last October, I recommended that DOE use the existing expertise and oversight experience of the DOE field sites to get these costs under control. DOE officials have expressed great interest in my proposal. Unfortunately, I have not seen a corresponding financial commitment. Will you look into this matter for me?

General GORDON. First, let me assure you that I will look into this in more detail if confirmed. I have been briefed that DOE has been working hard to respond to, and is making progress towards, your proposal.

I understand that in the December 1999 financial plan, $500K was sent to the Savannah River Site (SRS) to secure their technical support in two key areas for the Material Consolidation and Conversion (MCC) project under the Material Pro