either with the idea of capture-in which case it would have become the primary objective, for only overwhelming numerical superiority justifies an attempt to do two big things at once in war-or with the object of keeping its garrison busy while the Bulgarian main field army sought battle with the main field army of the Turks. Now the capture of a first-class fortress may take a long time, as General Nogi, for instance, learnt in August 1904, when he tried to rush Port Arthur, and failed, with a loss of 14,000 men; and time was in favour of the Turks. Savoff therefore decided to attack Adrianople with the idea of containing, not capturing it; and the next question for the main army was whether to advance on the east or the west of the fortress, since to advance in strength upon both sides would have meant dissemination of force and therefore unsound strategy. The east offered greater advantages than the west, for on the east there was more scope for manoeuvre; while the Turks would probably be forced to fight parallel to their line of communication, or in other words with their main line of supply, the railway, running away to a flank and unprotected, instead of to the rear and so covered by the head. Moreover, Constantinople would be more directly threatened; and, the general slope of the country being from north to south, physical obstacles would less obstruct the Bulgarian advance, and would afford fewer facilities for delaying action on the part of the Turks. Savoff therefore selected the eastern route; and the first objective then became Kirk Kilisseh. Elaborate pre

cautions were, however, taken to conceal this decision as long as possible; and this was done with such success that certain foreign correspondents were actually induced to believe that the campaign was preceded by a sudden change of plan. The world at large and probably also the Turks were, in fact, kept in complete ignorance as to the main line of advance until that advance had actually developed.

The 1st and 2nd armies concentrated close upon the frontier, the former with its centre about Kizil Agatch, the latter about Hermanli; the 3rd was kept well back east of Jamboli, and its concentration was carefully covered by the whole cavalry division holding the frontier between the outposts of the 1st army and the

sea.

Deception was further increased by the way in which the divisions were allotted to the armies. For the normal peace organisation of the Bulgarian army is in nine divisions, each expanding in war to the strength of an ordinary army-corps, that is, to between 32,000 and 35,000 men. These nine divisions would naturally form three armies, and be grouped according to their peace 'inspection' system. Actually the peace grouping was altered; an additional or 10th division was raised, later also an 11th; and the three armies contained at first eight divisions instead of nine, the 1st army being composed of only two; while by leaving the 7th division south of Sofia, and by collecting the 2nd division along the Rhodope south of Philippopolis, the general situation was obscured, and an impression created that of the armies two and not three were threatening Thrace. Of the three armies, the 2nd was thus furthest to the west, the 3rd to the east, and the 1st in the middle.

The concentrations were completed in seventeen days -earlier than was expected-and on Oct. 18 the 1st and 2nd armies crossed the frontier, meeting with some minor opposition; while the 3rd army completed only one march toward the south and then halted for a day -all part of this programme of deception. On Oct. 21 the 3rd army also crossed the frontier in three columns, its centre passing through Kaibilar; and the following afternoon a Turkish force was encountered by the leading divisions-the wings being somewhat advanced --some fifteen miles north-west of Kirk Kilisseh. Fighting continued until the evening of the 23rd, by which time the Turks were driven back to the line of the Kirk Kilisseh forts. The advance of the Bulgarians was then deliberately checked to enable the fighting line to be reorganised before attacking what was known to be an extremely strong position. During the night, however, the Turks stampeded to the rear. Exactly what caused this unexpected panic remains more or less a mystery; but the rout was not checked till the fugitives reached the entrenched position which was being prepared by the main Turkish army between Lule Burgas and Bunar Hissar. The strength of the Turks in this encounter was estimated at between 70,000 and 80,000 men; and the Bulgarians deployed against them not more than five

brigades, or roughly 50,000. There was no pursuit. By the evening of Oct. 24 the 3rd Bulgarian army occupied a line about five miles south of Kirk Kilisseh, and there halted for three days, while the investment of Adrianople was completed by the 1st and 2nd armies.

On Oct. 28 the 3rd army advanced again; and that afternoon its left division opened the great battle of Lule Burgas by attacking the Turkish right in the vicinity of Bunar Hissar. This battle lasted for practically six days. The Turks were estimated to be 120,000 strong, well placed and well entrenched; some 30 miles to their rear, round about Chorlu, were believed to be other bodies amounting to 50,000, but these took no part in the action. From the 29th onwards rain fell in torrents, making two streams impassable, and adding greatly to the difficulties of attack, so that for the first three days the Bulgarian 3rd army made but little progress. Reinforced, however, on the left by a brigade detached from the 2nd army investing Adrianople (which came straight out of action in front of that fortress and marched round the rear of the 3rd army by Kirk Kilisseh), and on the right by the leading division of the 1st army, the Bulgarians eventually pierced the Turkish centre, next drove back their left and lastly their right, till by the evening of Nov. 2 the Turkish débâcle was complete. A body of Turkish reinforcements about 5000 strong landed at Midia during the battle, but only reached Vize after the right had broken; and these, too, were swept away in the rout. Again there was no pursuit. The Bulgarian cavalry division was well placed to strike in upon the Turkish lines of retreat from a point about Muradli, but the horses were unable to advance through the mud at a faster pace than a walk, whilst guns and vehicles of all sorts were axle-deep and could be barely moved at all.

On Nov. 5, after a three days' rest, the Bulgarian 1st and 3rd armies started again toward Constantinople, marching in four main columns. Up to the Chatalja lines the advance was unopposed. There was skirmishing between the respective advanced and rear guards but no serious engagement, nothing to justify the appalling casualties which the Turks seemed to be suffering during their retreat. In one place where the line of march

crossed a stream, the invaders came upon a large number of carts, wagons, motors, etc., deserted by the living, but encumbered by a multitude of dead, lying in the vehicles, in the river, or in the mud along its banks. The Bulgarian staff were puzzled; they supposed at first that the Turks had been fighting amongst themselves, or that the deaths were due to starvation and exposure. The bodies were not examined. Not for several days was it realised that cholera was the cause of death; and by that time the seeds of mischief had been widely sown. The bulk of the Bulgarian armies reached positions facing the Chatalja lines by Nov. 14, the last few marches being so strenuous that the troops reached the worst-infected area in an exhausted condition, and therefore prone to disease. In less than one week the cholera casualties among the Bulgarians exceeded those of all their previous battles. Arguing stoically that, however bad the plight of his own troops, that of the Turks must be worse, Demetrieff decided on Nov. 17 to attack-in strength upon the Derkos flank, elsewhere as a demonstration. The attack failed; but how near to success the Bulgarians were upon their left will be realised when details are some day published. A few days later negotiations for an armistice commenced.

Meanwhile the Bulgarian 7th and 2nd divisions had occupied all the territory lying between the main areas of the Macedonian and Thracian campaigns, their operations culminating in the capture near Dedeagatch on Nov. 26 of Yaver Pasha with close upon 12,000 men. Thus, after little more than one month's fighting, there remained in the hands of the Turks in Europe only three isolated towns, Adrianople, Scutari and Janina-whose fall is merely a matter of time-the peninsula of Gallipoli, and the capital itself, with the land inside the Chatalja lines. Such are the military events whose results are now being discussed by the peace delegates in London. If the machinations of the Committee and the reviving confidence of the Turkish troops lead to a continuation of the struggle, the problem of how to break down the final resistance of the Turks will be not the least formidable or the least interesting of the military problems raised in the course of the war.

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Art. 13. THE CRISIS IN THE NEAR EAST.

1. Macedonia and the Reforms. By P. Draganof. London: Bulgarian Diplomatic Agency, 1907.

2. The Southern Slav Question. By R. W. Seton Watson. London: Constable, 1911.

3. Deutschland und der nächste Krieg. By Friedrich v. Bernhardi. Stuttgart and Berlin: Cotta, 1912. English translation by A. H. Powles. London: Arnold, 1912. THE origins of the Balkan League, which has revolutionised the conditions of South-Eastern Europe, are as yet known to very few. The secret has been well kept; and it must be sufficient to say that the League is not a thing of yesterday. It is the outcome of causes which date from far back; but the propositions with regard to reforms in European Turkey, made by Count Berchtold, the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, in August last, may be taken as a convenient starting-point for tracing the series of events which led immediately to the Balkan War. Few people, probably least of all the Minister himself, can have seen that the introduction of those benevolent clauses, which collectively were christened by the grandiose name of progressive decentralisation,' was playing into the hands of the Allied Governments. The ludicrous side of the situation was intensified by the remembrance of the dictum laid down a few years before by another Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, 'There is no Albanian Question,' since it was precisely the excessive mothering of the Albanians by Count Berchtold which gave the Balkan States a new opportunity of airing their grievances with every show of reason. Moreover, it was the question of Albania again which created so serious a development in international complications towards the end of last November.

It is true that even in mid-August the 'Times' foreshadowed difficulties in the path of Count Berchtold's 'progressive decentralisation.' 'This phrase,' it said, 'portentous enough on paper, fails to satisfy the essentially practical mind of the Bulgarians'; but this solitary note of warning was lost in the general chorus of congratulation bestowed on all sides on the new pro