formation and growth of an autonomous Armenia on her borders. Neither do they allow for the cardinal fact that her sphere of interest and share of the future spoils of Asiatic Turkey includes the very country inhabited by Armenians and Kurds, and that, having secured for her protégés the desired reforms, she would linger on in the position of irresponsible guardian in order to apply, circumscribe and utilise them.

Among the Syrians a like reform movement, fostered by well-meaning French patriots, has been making headway of late. The starting point is the existence of grievances now become irksome; its immediate goal is the establishment of local government; and its final upshot would be separation from Turkey. The eminent leader of the Syrians, Senator Boustany, is a trusty friend of the Turks, and therefore not a separatist. But when a national movement has once begun it is impossible to say when and where it will end, and hopeless to attempt to set paper limits to its advance. The bulk of the population of Syria is Mussulman, and out of two and a quarter million inhabitants in the four provinces, Beyrout, Aleppo, Jerusalem and Damascus, only about 350,000 are Christians. Now autonomy in a country in which Moslems would rule a large minority of highly cultured Christians might be permissible as a survival, but it is not conceivable as a new formation to-day. Hence the only practical result which this home-rule agitation could attain is the hastening of the process of absorption by the Great Powers. For Syria, like Armenia and Southern Arabia, is earmarked by European nations, with this difference, that while Armenia is claimed by Russia only, there will be a scramble for Syria among several competing States.

Thus, while it is obvious that genuine grievances must be everywhere redressed, it is doubtful whether any of the peoples of Asiatic Turkey can pass from their present to some sounder and more independent phase of national vitality without jeopardising the State to which it is their misfortune to belong. And yet there is unhappily little likelihood that they will subordinate their national aspirations and impulses to the interests of a community to whose welfare they are indifferent. It is this kind of passive resistance rather than subversion from without

which seems to us the most formidable danger now threatening the decrepit organism. Most of the ethnic elements of the Ottoman Empire in Asia have assumed specified shapes of marked distinctness and permanence which render it impossible for them to blend and difficult to unite, even for the good of the larger community. For, mutually antagonistic, they have struggled and won their way into individuality or semi-independence by distinguishing themselves from the dominant race and emphasising their own cultural or military superiority. All of these units-the Arabs of Syria, the people of Lebanon, the men of the Yemen, the Kurds and the Armenians-form types which persist with tenacity and repel instead of attracting the others. Each is selfcentred, absorbed in the pursuit of its own interests, jealous of its neighbours, apprehensive of encroachments on its privileges. The abortive attempts to introduce among them parliamentary government modified by theocratic theories has not contributed to do away with the mutual animosities of these peoples. On the contrary, their glorious memories of yore blend with the impulses and efforts of modern life and widen the chasms that divide them. Although situated within the Turkish Empire, they represent powers really external to the life of the Turkish race. Repelling the rude attempts hitherto made at imperial unity, resisting identity of legislation, and repudiating community of interests, they are merely actors in transient episodes of the national drama. The Arabs of Syria, for instance, reflecting the influence of England and France, have acquired characteristics which differ from those of their neighbours. The people of Yemen, Moslem in faith, warlike by nature, jealous of their independence, bear a very different impress. It is these antagonistic elements that make it difficult to achieve national coherence and almost impossible to secure political stability. And yet unless one of these two aims be attained, the transition from Moslem Theocracy to a Constitutional Monarchy will be effectually thwarted, and the Empire of Turkey in Asia cannot endure.

Casting a final, rapid glance at the crisis, its solution and probable sequel, one cannot help seeing that the old Eastern problems which Europe dreaded to tackle are

entirely overshadowed by the new ones which the outcome of the war has thrust into the foreground. The effect of the victories of the Balkan Allies on the international situation, therefore, can hardly be regarded as an alleviation. The peace it has given to the peoples of Europe is precarious, while the preparations for war which it renders necessary are more costly and irksome than ever before. Great Britain's general aim amid these conflicting efforts and interests is the preservation of peace by maintaining as even a balance between the antagonistic forces as circumstances will permit. Hence hard and fast alliances-grown almost impossible nowadays, except in a case like that of Germany and Austria -are to be eschewed in view of the complexity of the interests of our friends and of the many powerful and varying currents that sway them. At the same time careful preparation, without haste or rest, for the unavoidable partition of Turkey, combined with honest endeavour to put it off as long as possible, are among the obvious duties of the responsible leaders of the nation. And in particular the utmost attention should be devoted to those indispensable modifications, national, international and territorial, which Egypt seems destined gradually to undergo, as well as to the dovetailing of the parts into the whole.

PENGE PUBLIC LIBRARY.

PENGE PUBLIC LIBRARY

INDEX

TO THE

TWO HUNDRED AND EIGHTEENTH VOLUME OF THE
QUARTERLY REVIEW.

[Titles of Articles are printed in heavier type. The names of authors of
articles are printed in italics.]

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