CONTENTS Page Decker, Raymond, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management Team, U.S. General Accounting Office, accompanied by Stephen L. Caldwell, Assistant Director, U.S. General Accounting Office Gilmore, James S., III, chairman, Advisory Panel to Assess the Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass De- struction; Michael E. O'Hanlon, senior fellow, foreign policy studies, the Sydney Stein, Jr. Chair, the Brookings Institution; John Newhouse, senior fellow, Center for Defense Information; and Andrew F. Krepinevich, executive director, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by: Decker, Raymond, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management Team, Gilmore, James S., III, chairman, Advisory Panel to Assess the Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass De- 15 Krepinevich, Andrew F., executive director, Center for Strategic and 148 Kucinich, Hon. Dennis J., a Representative in Congress from the State 7 O'Hanlon, Michael E., senior fellow, foreign policy studies, the Sydney 102 3 COMBATING TERRORISM: A PROLIFERATION OF STRATEGIES MONDAY, MARCH 3, 2003 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, EMERGING THREATS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM, Washington, DC. The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 1 p.m., in room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher Shays (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. Present: Representatives Shays, Turner, Murphy, Janklow, Kucinich, and Bell. Staff present: Lawrence Halloran, staff director and counsel; R. Nicholas Palarino, Ph.D., senior policy advisor; Thomas Costa, professional staff member; Robert A. Briggs, clerk; Mackenzie Eaglen, fellow; David Rapallo, minority counsel; and Jean Gosa, minority assistant clerk. Mr. SHAYS. A quorum being present, the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations hearing entitled, "Combating Terrorism: A Proliferation of Strategies," is called to order. Almost 2 years before the attacks of September 11, 2001, the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, far more widely and succinctly known as the Gilmore Commission, concluded the United States lacked a coherent, functional national strategy to guide disparate counterterrorism efforts. In testimony before the subcommittee on March 26, 2001, the Commission's vice chairman said, "a truly comprehensive national strategy will contain a high-level statement of national objectives coupled logically to a statement of the means used to achieve these objectives." The Bush administration inherited a loose collection of Presidential directives and law enforcement planning documents used as a strategic framework, but that fragile construct collapsed with the World Trade Center on September 11th. The brutal nature of the terrorist threat shattered naive assumptions terrorists would be deterred by geographic, political, or moral borders. A new strategic paradigm was needed. Containment, deterrence, reaction and mutually assured destruction no longer served to protect the fundamental security interest of the American people. The threat demands detection, prevention, and a proactive, preemptive approach to self-defense. (1) To meet the demands of a new, more dangerous world, the executive branch has promulgated strategy statements articulating national goals for various aspects of the war on terrorism. Subordinate to the overarching national security and military strategies, other plans guide efforts to secure the homeland, combat terrorism abroad, integrate military response capabilities, combat weapons of mass destruction, stanch terrorist funding, secure cyberspace and protect critical national infrastructure. A strategy famine has given way to a variable feast of high-level statements of national objectives and tactics to defeat the multifaceted foe that is global terrorism. Today we ask how these strategies link to form the national comprehensive policy recommended by the Gilmore Commission. Are they dynamic to meet changing adaptable threats? Do they guide the application of finite resources to achieve critical objectives? And how do we know if they are working? Just as reorganizing the Federal Government to counterterrorism will take time, reorienting the U.S. long-term strategic mindset will require sustained effort and hard choices. Some fundamental elements of a fully integrated preparedness and response strategy are not yet evident. State officials and local first responders are still waiting to know how much will be expected of them in the event of a major incident. What capabilities in terms of training and equipment should be resident at the local level? When and how should Federal capabilities be brought to bear? To help us begin our consideration of these important questions today, we welcome two panels of distinguished witnesses, including former Governor James Gilmore, chairman of the advisory commission that has been and remains on the forefront of the national debate on combating terrorism. In future hearings, we will hear from administration representatives and others to address specific elements of the strategic bulwark against terrorism. We welcome all our witnesses and look forward to their testimony. At this point, the Chair would recognize the distinguished gentleman, our ranking member, Mr. Kucinich. [The prepared statement of Hon. Christopher Shays follows:] Almost two years before the attacks of September 11, 2001, the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction – far more widely and succinctly known as the Gilmore Commission - concluded the United States lacked a coherent, functional national strategy to guide disparate counterterrorism efforts. In testimony before this Subcommittee on March 26, 2001, the Commission's Vice Chairman said, "a truly comprehensive national strategy will contain a high-level statement of national objectives coupled logically to a statement of the means used to achieve these objectives." The Bush Administration inherited a loose collection of presidential directives and law enforcement planning documents used as a strategic framework. But that fragile construct collapsed with the World Trade Center on September 11th. The brutal nature of the terrorist threat shattered naïve assumptions terrorists would be deterred by geographic, political or moral borders. A new strategic paradigm was needed. Containment, deterrence reaction and mutually assured destruction no longer served to protect the fundamental security interests of the American people. The threat demands detection, prevention and a more proactive, preemptive approach to selfdefense. Page 1 of 2 |