'It is absolutely necessary that the responsibility for the attack should rest with our opponents. . . . In the eyes of public opinion in England, and consequently in the eyes of the English Government, the aggressor will in the present state of feeling here be in the wrong.'

He

deduces from this that Russia herself must scrupulously avoid pressing points in which her interests alone were concerned, as for instance the Straits or Asia Minor; and we always find that, when any serious difficulty arose, Sir Edward Grey insisted that an attempt should be made to solve it, not by isolated action on the part of the Entente, but by bringing Germany in. He always set his face against the isolation of Germany, and steadily refused to participate in anything which might be interpreted as an attempt to separate Germany and Austria. As Benckendorff writes on Feb. 8, 1912:

'Germany has misinterpreted the so-called aggressive object of the policy of the Entente. The proverbial "iron ring rests on an error. So far as I know, the Russian Government has not attempted to oppose the justified interests of Germany if they do not trespass on our interests. On the other side Sir Edward Grey, both publicly and in conversation with me, has always denied that he wished to isolate Germany. Every attempt, he has repeated to me, to destroy the Triple Alliance would be a blunder. In his opinion the isolation of Germany would be a real danger to peace. It is none the less true that, on every occasion when the German Government wished to establish interests where there were existing interests of other Powers, it has found itself opposed, not by one Power or another, but by a group of Powers. If this group is dissolved, the whole situation will be changed. Germany could then choose; and, thanks to her geographical position and her innate power, this would in reality mean the predominance of Germany.'

German writers who have tried to discredit the essentially defensive nature of the Entente, have generally referred to reports as to the conversations which took place at Reval in 1908. It has constantly been repeated by men who can speak with high authority, that on this occasion an agreement was made between England and Russia that they should go to war with Germany in 1916. We are now able for the first time to trace these reports

to their source. Iswolsky, in a letter of June 18, 1908, tells Benckendorff what had happened:

'Summing up Hardinge's different explanations, I must
above all press the point that no attempt was made on his
side to leave the ground of concrete arrangement and draw
us into general political combinations. Sir Charles maintained
that the London Cabinet completely shared our view that
the interview at Reval need not cause any kind of anxiety
in other States; so far as Germany is concerned, the British
Government'genuinely desires to maintain the best relations,
and does not think that in the immediate future these
relations will become accentuated for any reason.
"None

the less," said Sir Charles Hardinge to me, 66 we cannot refuse
to recognise that, if Germany continues her naval armaments
with the same accelerated speed, in seven or eight years a
very anxious and acute situation may arise in Europe; then
undoubtedly Russia will become the arbiter of the situation;
and for this reason, in the interests of peace and for the
maintenance of the balance of power, we desire that Russia
shall be as strong as possible by land and sea.'
This was
not merely Sir Charles Hardinge's personal opinion, but the
definite political conviction of the Cabinet.'

There is no reason to doubt the accuracy of this report. During a discussion of the naval and military position of Russia, Sir Charles Hardinge quite naturally said that the proposed increase of the Russian navy would be useful, and it might in some years help to keep the peace. It is quite clear what was in his mind. This interview took place just at the time when the naval rivalry between this country and Germany was at its height. In eight or ten years the German fleet would be near its completion, and would have attained such dimensions as to be a serious menace to this country; Germany would have sixty battleships and cruisers. Every one could see that, if Germany succeeded in building a fleet so big as to be able seriously to challenge British naval supremacy, then her policy would be based upon the possession of this fleet; she would put forward demands which she would otherwise not have dared to propose, demands which this country could not accept; and in this case war would almost inevitably follow. The best means, in fact the only means, of ultimately avoiding war, was to prevent Germany obtaining a

predominance at sea equal to her predominance on

land.

By themselves, then, these observations would call for little comment; they were only the recognition of the essential object of the Entente with Russia. Let us recollect that the meeting took place at a time when the relations of Russia to the Central Powers were on the whole friendly; it was before Aehrenthal, by his disloyal action later in the year, brought about an estrangement which was never really appeased. They have, however, a further history. Very shortly after the date at which this meeting took place, the very incorrect statements to which we have already referred began to appear in the German press. The simple and obvious fact, that a strong Russia would in some years be useful as a check to the growing naval strength of Germany, was perverted, and, we can hardly avoid saying, deliberately perverted, into the statement that England and Russia proposed to attack Germany in 1916. Very obviously there had been a leakage. It seemed at first as if this had taken place in Petrograd; from what we now know, it appears almost certain that, while the German Government were in possession of the true facts, they allowed these incorrect statements to be put about by men such as Count Reventlow.

It would be absurd to attempt in a short article any detailed investigation of the great mass of material dealing as it does with all the questions which came before the Foreign Offices during the five eventful years before the war, not only as to the direct relations between the Great Powers, but on matters such as the Baghdad Railway, British and Russian activities in Persia, and the relations of Russia and Japan. It will be more useful and more instructive to confine ourselves to a single topic; and we will take that which for many reasons is the most important, the position of Russia in the Balkans.

The conception which is often put before us is that of a Russia constantly working by intrigues and exhortations to stir up the Balkan States, and particularly Serbia, to provocative policy, which must inevitably lead, first to war with Austria, and secondly, to

S

e

European war. It is a picture which well fits in to the general idea that has prevailed as to the character of Russian policy and diplomacy; and it is easy, if we accept this, to build up a complete theory of the S nature of the Entente and the origin of the war. Before accepting this, it would, however, be well to inquire what e evidence there is for it. It is not sufficient, as most writers do, simply to refer vaguely to the activities of M. Hartwig, the Russian minister at Belgrade. These references are always vague; and no tangible evidence is brought forward as to the responsibility which is supposed to attach to him. Even if M. Hartwig were all that we are told that he was, it would not necessarily follow that he had the confidence, or was acting under the instructions of, his own Government. Russia is not the only country in the world which has from time to time been incommoded by the excessive zeal of subordinate officials.

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As a matter of fact, the more evidence is forthcoming, the less does it appear to justify these representations. The facts seem to have been very different. It is indeed true that Serbian ambitions, especially those of the Radical party in Serbia, which had been in power since the assassination of King Alexander, were a great danger to European peace. The evidence we have in this volume is not that they were encouraged by Russia, but that the Russian Government did all in its power to keep them quiet. This, however, was not easy. The Serbians were really masters of the situation. They knew perfectly well that, if they chose to drive matters to an issue and to force a war with Austria-Hungary, even if in doing so they were acting contrary to the desires of the Russian Government, that Government would eventually be forced to interfere in order to support them, or at any rate to protect them from the consequences of their own action. No Russian Government could have stood impassively by and watched the Austrian armies overrun Serbia and make her a client state. A wave of passionate indignation Would have arisen throughout the whole Russian Empire, which must necessarily have carried the Government with it. Moreover, from 1908 onwards, it was the definite purpose of the Austrian Government

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to take the first favourable opportunity of forcing a war upon, and destroying, Serbia. For these reasons advice and remonstrances given by Russia to Serbia had to be very carefully worded; as Sazonoff says in 1914: 'It is difficult to bring influence to bear upon an excited nation, especially when one is not sure of success.' If they went too far, if they seemed to imply in any way that the Russian Government was giving up its interest in Serbia, then the Serbians would have broken loose and played the final card which they always had in their hands, or Austria would have struck.

What, therefore, the Russians had to do was, when any one of the constantly recurring crises arose, to do their utmost to keep Serbia quiet, while at the same time convincing her that she still had Russian sympathy and support, and would be protected against an unprovoked Austrian attack. Throughout the whole of the. prolonged annexation crisis (1908-9), this was the policy which Russia pursued, and again at the time of the formation of the Balkan League (1912). It was often said that this League was formed by the Balkan States under the patronage and on the instigation of Russia, as a weapon against Austria-Hungary. It is quite clear that Russia, naturally enough, welcomed anything which would bring to an end the mutual jealousies and animosities between Bulgaria and Serbia, and lead to an alliance of these States as a counterpoise to that between Austria and Rumania; but it is also equally clear that the final formation of the League was the spontaneous act of the Balkan States themselves, and, in particular, that Russia was not directly responsible for those clauses of the League which implied immediate outbreak of war, though she was informed of them. On this matter the correspondence, which is supported by other evidence, is conclusive. We find, for instance, at the beginning of July 1912, Sazonoff telegraphing to Hartwig:

'I must ask you to continue to keep a watch on the development of the war feeling in Sofia. It appears, however, desirable to make the Bulgarians understand that, according to our very secret information, the possibility of immediate peace negotiations between Italy and Turkey is not excluded. These circumstances would deprive the Bulgarian advance of its practical basis and would change the present situation