occasion Germany and Austria definitely took aggressiv action, without any previous consultation with the othe European Powers, in a way which unmistakably showe that the matter with which they were concerned wa not merely the local question in the Balkans, but th general issue between the alliances.

There is reason to believe that the real view taken b those of the highest authority in Russia after the Balka Wars was that it would be unnecessary and unwise t encourage Serbian aggression, for, as they saw it (an were they not right ?), the future belonged to her. Th time must come, sooner or later, when the growin feeling of Yugo-Slav solidarity would bear fruit. N good would come from hastening matters; they wer quite prepared to wait; they would wait till the deat of the Emperor Francis Joseph. It was quite obviou that whenever this event, which could not be lon delayed, took place, there would be fundamental change in Austria-Hungary; what form they would take no on could foresee. The accession of the Archduke Franci Joseph would almost certainly be followed by acut friction between Austria and Hungary; the dual syster would break down; and the forces of disruption were s strong that it might be anticipated that the Monarch] would break up. Hungary and Bohemia would asser their claims to independence; the Rumanians of Transyl vania would be attracted by the Kingdom; and the would come the time for the realisation of Serbian ambitions. All this must happen from causes over whic the Russian Government had no control. It would b the result of bad statesmanship in Austria. Whethe these great changes could take place without a Europear war was very doubtful; the collapse of Austria woul be a great blow to Germany. But, on the other hand it might have brought relief and led to a relaxation a the whole system of alliances.

There were of course real dangers arising not merely from Serbia, but from Russia herself. To deny thi would be childish. Many illustrations could be found in this volume. We have first the unstable internal con dition of Russia; and weakness at home is always cause of danger abroad. Secondly, we have the intens bitterness caused by Aehrenthal's action in 1908, and th

desire to reassert Russian prestige. Benckendorff in one despatch refers to this, and tries to meet the danger by arguing that Russia had in 1912 shown that her position was completely re-established, and that she had been able to stop illegitimate Austrian pretensions. Thirdly, there was always the question of the Straits. This became acute in the autumn of 1912, when there was a danger that the Bulgarians might enter Constantinople, and again in the winter of 1913-4. What the Russians apprehended was that Germany, while avowedly maintaining the status quo, would give it a completely different aspect by gaining full control over Turkey; so that, while nominally defending the sovereignty of the Sultan, Germany would really be making Turkey a client.

It is curious to note that in 1877 Lord Salisbury saw a similar danger if Russia, instead of pressing for the partition of Turkey, aimed at controlling her. It was this danger which led to the very acute crisis over the Liman von Sanders affair. Light is thrown upon this by a curious expression used by Baron von Wangenheim; in a conversation he compared it to the situation which preceded the Franco-Prussian war and the difficulties over the Hohenzollern candidature in Spain. Every one will remember what those were. Bismarck, by bringing forward the election of a Prince of Hohenzollern to the Spanish crown, had created a situation very dangerous to France. The view on which he acted was, however, that protest must be directed not to Prussia, for that would lead to war, but to Spain. In the same way the Germans, by getting Liman von Sanders appointed Commander of the Turkish army corps stationed in Constantinople, had created a situation which, as all the Entente Powers agreed, was quite illegitimate. On this there was no difference of opinion. They would not be able to regard the Sultan as an independent Power, and the position of their own ambassadors would be seriously compromised, if a German were in command of the troops stationed in the capital. There was from the beginning absolute unanimity that this could not be permitted, but also great difficulty in finding a method of preventing it. At first the Russians were inclined to suggest protest to Berlin; against this Sir Edward Grey from the beginning set his face. It would have

produced just the danger at which Wangenheim hinted. It was at Constantinople and not at Berlin that action must be taken. But even at Constantinople they had to move very carefully; and there were long discussions as to whether the protest should be a joint protest by the ambassadors of the three Powers, or in the form of identical notes presented by each of them separately. Throughout these discussions we find England, supported by France, doing all that she could to remove the difficulty without giving needless affront to Germany.

In conclusion, we must refer for a moment to the proposed Anglo-Russian naval agreement of 1914. This, as is well known, has occupied a great place in recent controversy. We now get an insight into what really happened. The Russians were not quite satisfied with their position in the Entente; they felt that the relations of England and France were closer, more harmonious, more intimate than those of England and Russia. They did not know exactly what agreements had been come to between the other two Powers, for they had never seen the text of the well-known correspondence of 1912 establishing a military agreement. What they really aimed at was a definite alliance with this country. Against this Count Benckendorff had always warned them; again and again, in very carefully worded despatches, he had explained that it was quite out of the question. They hoped, however, to be able to use Sir Edward Grey's visit to Paris in company with the King and Queen, in order to get some closer union.

Sir Edward Grey met this demand, when it was made, with characteristic frankness. The first thing to do was to calm what we may perhaps call the jealousy of the Russians by showing them precisely what were our written agreements with France; by this they would understand that there was nothing in the nature of an alliance. The communication of the military conversations at once aroused a desire in Russia that they should have something of the same kind. A military arrangement with Russia was obviously quite out of the question; they then asked for a naval arrangement in accordance with which plans should be made for cooperation between the two fleets in the case of war.

To

this Sir Edward Grey raised no' objection; and indeed there was none. But we may be allowed at this point to observe that any such naval arrangement must in fact have been of comparatively small importance. In the case of war with Germany, as events were to show, the Russian navy would clearly be shut up in the Baltic, & sea to which the British navy would not be able to penetrate. In the same way the Russian Black Sea fleet would be shut up. Where, then, would there be any real scope for effective co-operation? The situation was one quite different from that of France; the speedy despatch of British forces to the continent might, and probably would, make all the difference between success and failure.

It is clear, however, that the Russian Government, which does not seem quite to have appreciated the position, had very far-going plans; and, in particular, as we see from a despatch communicated to Count Benckendorff, the Russian Council of State was considering proposals for the landing of Russian troops in Pomerania, and hoping that the British Government would lend support to this, if not by the presence of a British fleet, at any rate by providing the necessary transports. The whole plan seems to have been singularly ill-devised. Even if the German fleet had been defeated and largely destroyed by the British fleet, a landing on the coast of Pomerania would still have remained an extremely risky and probably futile operation; and clearly it would have been quite out of the question for the British Government to consent to lock up any considerable amount of British shipping in the Baltic for such an object. The whole of this discussion of a naval agreement seems in fact to have had very little importance, and would really have had none had it not been that incorrect statements appeared in the public press. How these rumours got out is one of the matters on which we should be glad to have further light, but we cannot fail to connect it with the fact to which we have already referred, that the German Government was very well informed as to all

This proposal plays a large part in current propaganda. It is repreanted that it had been accepted by England (of which there is no evidence); and we are even told that the British transports were actually at Petrograd before the outbreak of war!

Vol. 287.-No. 470.

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that passed between Petrograd and London; and the fullest information seems to have been in the possession of a German paper, the 'Berliner Tageblatt.'

It seems to be supposed by many that there was something sinister and improper in these naval con versations. What justification is there for this? Is it not truer to say that it was the positive duty of the British Government to enter into some such arrange ment? The other view can only be taken by those who steadily refuse to recognise the danger to this country from the German naval preparations. At any rate, for the Germans to criticise adversely such an agreemen would be the height of hypocrisy. What was the situation? They were building an enormous fleet; and no one who knows anything about the Prussian Govern ment would suppose that they were spending thei money on a navy unless they intended to use it. At the same time their Allies, the Austrians, were building & large fleet for use in the Mediterranean; and a new naval agreement had recently been made between Germany and Austria. What did they expect this country to do? Did they anticipate that we should si silently with folded hands watching with intellectual appreciation and academic admiration the growth of one great fleet in the North Sea and another fleet in the Mediterranean? Did they suppose that the making of a naval agreement-which was kept profoundly secretwas the prerogative and privilege of the Triple Alliance? Was it to be anticipated that this country would no counter the menace, not only by increasing her own fleet, but also by arrangements under which she should depend upon the timely support of the fleets of friendly Powers if the occasion came to use them?

We have said enough to show the interest and importance of these documents; they throw a new and valuable light on the extraordinarily complex problem with which the statesmen of Europe were confronted The difficulty always was that each country had to prepare itself for the great war which at any momen might break out, while using every effort to avoid it The fundamental conditions were very unsatisfactory the complex system of alliances was something quite nev