be traversed by ships requiring refit, but also on the fact that the safety of the base is largely dependent on that of the fleet. In these circumstances, unless a large margin of superiority is available, a temporary set-back, involving severe damage to half a dozen ships, might jeopardise the safety of the base and of the whole fleet. This is of course a mere truism of naval strategy, but tends to be lost sight of in the conditions prevailing in the late war, where the main fleets were working in close proximity to their great naval bases.

There is another important factor which weighs the balance in favour of the combatant working close to his own coasts, namely, that he can more easily bring up aircraft to support his fleet. It is true that a fleet can come provided with aircraft-carriers; but these vessels must always be huge and vulnerable, and cannot compete with a complete system of air-defence based on aerodomes. The advantage of air-power remains with the combatant fighting in the proximity of his own coasts; and it may be accepted that invasionary operations have become a thing of the past against the coast of a powerful enemy well equipped with aircraft and submarines. In fact, one tends to revert in the Pacific to somewhat the same relations as must have existed between England and Venice in the 16th century, when neither could attack the other because each was too far away. It is probable that Japan could never seriously injure the United States and that the United States could not defeat Japan.

The tendency, then, of naval and air strategy is to increase the ascendency of a fleet in the waters contiguous to its own bases. The difficulty of waging war in an enemy's waters has increased. It follows that there is a tendency for the control of particular maritime areas to fall into the hands of particular Powers, whose ascendency there can be challenged only by a greatly superior force. The United States tends to exercise an indisputable sway in Panama and the Gulf of Mexico; Great Britain guards the North Sea and the sea approaches to Europe; Japan controls the entry to the China seas. The question remains, how far these conditions tend towards the maintenance of peace. Very effectively, for on this basis it is possible to discover a

standard of armaments which precludes or hinders the possibility of offensive operations. If the principal Powers can agree to such a standard, then the possibility of war is diminished, for it is in the fear of invasion that its principal menace lies. But here one must emphasise the peculiar conditions of the British Empire. Offensive operations in a naval war must take the form either of invasion or an attack on trade. Great Britain is far more dependent on her trade than any other Power; and the Empire is dependent for its safety on its lines of communication by sea. The United States, as Mr Balfour observed, stand 'impregnable, solid, and selfsufficient'; and a defeat at sea could do them no irretrievable harm. Their great coal and industrial areas lie hundreds of miles inland, practically immune from attack. They are defended by mileage both on land and sea. Great Britain's position is very different. The very existence of the Empire is wrapped up in sea-power; and the safety of the great high-road to India and Australia is indispensable to its security.

But neither peace nor war can be won without a certain element of risk. We have to recognise, too, that a new horizon has risen in naval affairs. For over two centuries we have been the leading naval power, and have acquired the habit of acting as a general providence to the world. We can no longer afford to do so. We must adapt ourselves to different conditions, and the general nature of the proposals put forward by the United States appear to offer us a friendly lead.

In their original form they may be summarised as follows: *

() No further construction of capital ships† for a period of not less than 10 years.

(b) All capital ships under construction by the United States to be scrapped.

These comprise 6 post-Jutland battle-cruisers (the Constellation, Constitution, Lexington, Ranger, Saratoga, United States, all 8 16-inch guns), and 9 post Jutland battleships (Indiana, Iowa, Massachusetts, Montana, North Carolina, South Dakota, all 12 16-inch, and the

That is, the largest type of armoured ships, including both battleships and battle-cruisers.

West Virginia, Washington, and Colorado, 8 16-inch)a total of 15 capital ships with a total of 618,000 tons. (c) All older U.S. battleships up to, but not including, the Delaware and North Dakota to be scrapped, 15 in number with a total of 227,740 tons.

(d) Great Britain to stop the construction of the four Hoods* with a total of 172,000 tons.

(e) Great Britain also to scrap all older dreadnoughts up to, but not including, the King George V, comprising 19 ships with a total of 411,375 tons.

(f) Japan to abandon her building programme of 1920.† (g) Japan to scrap her capital ships under construction, viz. the Mutsu (8 16-inch), Tosa and Kago (10 16-inch) and the battle-cruisers Akagi and Amagi (8 16-inch) building, and to stop the construction of the battle-cruisers Atago and Takao (8 16-inch) about to be laid down, a total of 7 capital ships with a total of 289,100 tons.

(h) Japan also to scrap all battleships up to, but not including, the Settsu, viz. 10 ships of 159,828 tons.

The above proposals meant the complete suspension of all building programmes. The total tonnage to be scrapped by the United States was 847,740, by Great Britain 583,375, and by Japan 448,928 tons. This would leave Great Britain with 22 capital ships (604,450 tons), the U.S. with 18 (500,650 tons), and Japan with 10 (299,700 tons), as follows:

Great Britain-Royal Sovereign, Royal Oak, Resolution, Ramillies, Revenge, Queen Elizabeth, Warspite, Valiant, Barham, Malaga (all 8 15-inch).

Benbow, Emperor of India, Iron Duke, Marlborough, Erin, King George, Centurion, Ajax (all 10 13.5-inch).

Hood (8 15-inch), Renown,‡ Repulse ‡ (6 15-inch), Tiger (8 13.5-inch). United States-Maryland (8 16-inch), California, Tennessee, Idaho, Mississippi, New Mexico, Arizona, Pennsylvania (all 12 14-inch), Oklahoma, Nevada, Texas, New York (all 10 14-inch), Arkansas, Wyoming (12 12-inch), Utah, Florida, North Dakota, Delaware (all 10 12-inch). Japan-Nagato (8 16-inch), Hiuga, Ise, Yamashiro, Fuso (all 12 14-inch), Settsu (12 12-inch), Kirishima,‡ Haruna,‡ Hiyei,‡ Kongo (all 8 14-inch).

* Sanctioned in naval estimates, 1921-22.

†This provided for an establishment of sixteen capital ships to be reached by 1928, including eight battleships and four battle-cruisers.

Battle-cruisers.

Japan's anxiety to retain the battleship Mutsu (8 16-inch), now approaching completion, led, however, to a modification of the above. Japan is to retain the Mutsu, and scrap the Settsu. Great Britain is to build two new capital ships, and scrap the King George, Erin, Centurion, and Ajax. The United States is to complete the Washington and Colorado (8 16-inch), and scrap the North Dakota and Delaware. The fleets thus become: for Great Britain 20 ships of 582,020 tons, for the United States 18 ships of 525,850 tons, and for Japan 10 ships of 313,300 tons.

The effect of these proposals with their modifications on the strength of the fleet is shown below.

STRENGTH OF FLEETS IN 1924.

(Figures in brackets are strengths which would be reached under present building programmes. Capital ships with 16-inch or 15-inch guns have been classified as 1st class, with 14-inch or 13-5-inch as 2nd class, with 12-inch as 3rd class. B. battleship, B.C. = battle-cruiser; 1, 2, 3= 1st, 2nd, and 3rd class).

=

Great Britain.
United States

Japan

16 or 15-inch.

14 or 13/5-inch.

116 (132)

48 (144)

24 (152)

124

16 (48)

80

12-inch.

0 (76)=164 44 (80) = 192

= 96

It will be seen that in terms of numbers the largest sacrifices are made by the United States, who are scrapping thirteen first-class capital ships to Great Britain's two and Japan's six. It would be difficult to maintain that these proposals tend to jeopardise the safety of the Empire; and they may be accepted with equanimity. The drastic proposal to suspend all capitalship construction for ten years has been modified. It would have redounded to the United States' disadvantage, for at the end of that time a larger proportion of British ships would have become due for replacement under the age-limit clause.

The second part of the proposals dealt with the replacement of the above strength and embodied the 5-5-3 formula. They may be summarised as follows:

(a) The first replacement of capital ships not to be laid down till 10 years from the date of agreement.

(b) The replacement to be limited to 500,000 tons for the U.S.,

500,000 tons for Great Britain, and 300,000 tons for Japan. : (c) Subject to the 10 years' limitation, capital ships to be replaced when 20 years old, and keels not to be laid till 17 years have elapsed.

(d) No capital ship to exceed 35,000 tons.†

In the light of what has been said on the influence of distance on naval strategy, the formula may be regarded as a defensive one so far as capital ships are concerned. It at least safeguards the coasts of any of the Powers concerned from invasion, thereby removing the principal menace of war.

But Great Britain, on account of her long stretches of sea communication, is more exposed to an attack on her trade than any other Power; and in her case the question of cruisers and submarines as the principal instruments of such attack is a matter of equal if not of greater importance. These are grouped under the head of auxiliary craft, which include (a) surface combatants, viz. cruisers, flotilla leaders, and destroyers, (b) submarines, (c) aeroplane-cruisers. All auxiliary service vessels, such as fuel ships, supply ships, tenders, repair ships, tugs, mine-sweepers are exempt from the agreement. The tonnage of surface craft allowed for cruisers, flotilla leaders, and destroyers is for Great Britain 450,000 tons, the United States 450,000 tons, and Japan 270,000 tons (a formula of 4.5-4.5-2.7); but no immediate obligation is laid on any Power whose total tonnage exceeds this amount on Nov. 11, 1921, to scrap any of its vessels at once. Only when it begins to replace them must the whole be reduced to the prescribed limits; and it is permissible for all such craft laid down by Nov. 11 to be carried to completion. The age-limit for cruisers is seventeen years and for destroyers twelve years.

Increased to 525,000, 525,000, and 315,000 respectively.

The equivalent United States displacement is 37,000 tons. The Hood is approximately 41,620 tons, the Constellation, 43,500, the Royal, 40,600.