the South of Ireland, public opinion would not have suffered them to pursue such a policy to its legitimate conclusion. The politicians would have been so harassed by irresponsible critics that they would not have allowed the soldiers to do their business without interference. Those who blame Mr Lloyd George for entering into conference with the delegates of Sinn Fein, too often forget that the country would not have supported him last summer had he asked for an army and a free hand to put down Sinn Fein by force.

The

And there is a third consideration. It is significant that those members of Parliament who have clamoured most loudly for the application of a policy of force to rebel Cork or rebel Dublin, live in England or in Ulster. There were 350,000 Unionists living in Southern Ireland last year. Had a state of war been declared, it would have been impossible for British troops to have discriminated between loyalist and Sinn Feiner while military operations were being carried on. occupation of a country by a hostile military force means the devastation, and the ruin, of the inhabitants of that country. And Irish loyalists knew this very well. They believed, from past experience, that Britain would never carry through a war of reconquest to the end; and they were certain that war in the South and West of Ireland would mean ruin to them, swift and certain, for the Sinn Feiners would treat them as sympathising with the great enemy, Britain, and the British troops would not be able to distinguish them from their neighbours.

The wild words spoken in Parliament by some of those who prefer war to peace, in present Irish conditions, and who declare that conference with rebels is a cowardly surrender, are spoken in a place of security. Such utterances remind one of the old story of the Irish absentee landlord who wrote to his tenants from London to say that, if they thought they could intimidate him, by shooting his agent, they were greatly mistaken. It is very easy to be brave at the expense of other people. And the magnitude of the danger to which Southern loyalists were exposed all through last year may perhaps be estimated by the cry of relief with which they hailed the announcement that terms of peace had at last been Vol. 287.-No. 470.

signed. If the British Government had declared war last July, as many people thought they ought to do, they would have sacrificed all the loyalists in Munster and Connaught, not to speak of a large part of Leinster.

So much may be said, and ought to be said, in support of the decision reached by the Cabinet to abandon the half-hearted policy of a pretence of war in order to compel the Irish to accept an Act of Parlia ment which nobody desired. It was plain last summer that Sir Hamar Greenwood's optimistic assurances in the House of Commons were not based on good information; and it was by no means certain that military operations were being carried on with intelligence or with success. The Cabinet had been left by former Governments the damnosa hereditas of a policy of halfmeasures, of alternate sentimentality and bluff; and they were not exclusively, or chiefly, to blame for the situation in which they found themselves. The most fatal decision in recent Irish history was Mr Asquith's decision to withdraw Sir John Maxwell from Ireland in June 1916, just when that able general had succeeded in convincing Irishmen that a policy of rebellion was hopeless. Ever since that time, Irishmen, on both sides, have believed that England would never see the thing through'; and Irish sedition has flourished exceedingly in the strength of that belief. It was not easy, for the reasons we have given, for Mr Lloyd George to put forth the full power of England, and to demonstrate that Ireland was foolish indeed to challenge her to the test of arms. But it was unfortunate that his decision to treat with representatives of Sinn Fein was announced at a time when Sinn Fein believed itself to have been successful in the guerilla warfare which had been sustained for some months.

Irishmen will not believe it for years to come, but it is none the less true that the initiation of conferences with Sinn Fein last July was a great act of magnanimity on the part of Great Britain. It was an acknowledgment, indeed, that the Black and Tan' policy was a mistake, because it was not thorough enough; but it was at least as much the expression of a genuine desire on the part of England to prevent further bloodshed, and to check the destruction of Irish property by Irishmen

hey

and

et to

Parlia

Ima

ces i

Forms

Ear

• a

the

themselves, which was a daily feature of the newspaper reports. And nothing could have so fully demonstrated to the world the sincerity of the Prime Minister's wish to be fair, even generous, to Ireland than this expression of good will at a moment of passionate strife and clamorous agitation.

It was well known in Ireland in July that not all those who had declared themselves as Republicans desired a Republic in their hearts; and it was believed by many who had access to the inner counsels of Sinn Fein, that a majority of Dail Eireann would accept a large measure of Home Rule within the Empire, and had no objection at all to the sovereignty of the King. Accordingly, private conversations-only private in the sense that they were not officially recognised-between the leaders of the Southern loyalists and the leaders of Sinn Fein were held at the beginning of July; and as a result of these pourparlers, Mr Lloyd George made proposals for an Irish settlement on July 20, having previously had an interview with Mr de Valera.· A 'truce' had been proclaimed between British troops and the 'Irish Republican Army,' which was hailed with the hi deepest satisfaction by all men of good will. But the

ith

din

eda

side

in

or th

for

correspondence that ensued was tedious, and did not lead to any practical result for some months, Mr de Valera urging the sovereign independence of Ireland and claiming that he and his faction represented an Irish Republic, while Mr Lloyd George, of course, pointed out the imsi possibility of yielding to any such claims.

e

he te

but i

imit

Here, perhaps, it is worth while to say something about the antecedents of the Irish leaders. Mr de Valera is a Spanish-American, not yet 40 years of age, whose father, Vivian de Valera, was an actor in New York. His mother was an Irishwoman by descent; and he was brought up in Ireland, being educated at Roman Catholic institutions and obtaining his degree of B.A. at the Royal University of Ireland. He had thoughts of an academic career, and entered Trinity College, Dublin, in 1905, in order to present himself at the examination for a Mathematical Scholarship. But his failure was so complete that immediately after the scholarship examination he abandoned the idea of distinguishing himself

in the world of learning, and turned to Irish politics supporting himself in a small way as a teacher o mathematics. He took a prominent part in the unhappy and fatuous Irish rebellion of 1916, and was sentenced t death by court martial. But he was reprieved and, in accordance with the mistaken sentimentality of the British Government of the day, he was set free. Arrested again for sedition in 1918, he escaped from prison in 1919 Since then he has been the principal figure in Irishë revolutionary movements, and was elected Presidenta of the self-constituted Irish Republic. A dreamer, aneg a disappointed fanatic, with an aptitude for burning an wild speech, it was soon recognised by his colleagues o the Irish Republican Government' that he was a mai of very little capacity for affairs. But he was a figure head who suited them, for had he not been sentenced t death by Britain? And so it came to pass that this mai of mixed race, neither Spaniard nor American nor Irish man, was accepted by three millions of a people no wholly destitute of humour as their chosen leader.

'

Mr Arthur Griffith is a man of a very different type The son of an Irish compositor, he was at one tim printer's reader for a Dublin newspaper. The ablest o all the Sinn Fein leaders, he has the reputation of being a man whose word can be trusted, and whose capacity for statesmanship is recognised by his associates. Silen and shrewd, he is weighty in counsel, though he has non of the gifts of eloquent speech which fascinate Irish crowds. Mr Michael Collins was a post-office clerk in London at the beginning of the war; he engaged in th Rebellion of 1916, and was released after a short term o imprisonment. He is regarded as the Commander-in Chief' of the Irish Republican Army, and in that capacity must be held responsible for the many lives that wer lost during the troubles of last winter. He is not much over 30 years of age, and is said to have impressed the British Ministers who conferred with him as entirely sincere. An Englishman, Mr E. Childers, who acted a a Secretary to the delegation, is quite irreconcileable hating Great Britain with all the bitterness of & renegade. Of the Irish delegates who met the Prime Minister and his colleagues at Downing Street, Mr Griffith and Mr Collins were, undoubtedly, the ablest,

er d

8pp

ed

adi

and the most anxious to reach a 'settlement' with Great Britain. With their companions they were appointed by Mr de Valera 'as envoys plenipotentiary from the elected Government of the Republic of Ireland to negotiate and conclude on behalf of Ireland' with the representatives of His Majesty a treaty of settlement. The terms of their commission are important, in view of the 19 sequel.

Teste

As we have said, the conferences were productive of no definite result (except that during the negotiations British Ministers learnt something of the Irish temper, and presumably that Irishmen began to understand that England was quite sincere in her overtures of compromise), until Oct. 20, when Mr de Valera sent to the Pope a telegram, which stated in offensive terms that Ireland owed no allegiance to the King, and that it was an 'independent' country. This brought matters to a head; and the Irish delegates were speedily informed that the Peace Conference could not proceed on any such assumption. General Smuts had warned de Valera in August that an Irish Republic was an impossible dream, and that Ireland would be well advised to accept the status, in some form, of a Dominion; but it became apparent that de Valera was not to be persuaded. His 'plenipotentiaries,' however, had grasped the facts of the situation, and after some demur expressed themselves as willing to accept a generous offer of Dominion Home Rule, provided that All Ireland were included, and that Ulster took her place in an Irish Parliament. It would appear from the speech made by the Minister of War (Sir L. Worthington Evans) at the Liverpool Conference of Unionists on Nov. 17, that the Irish delegates had been already told that Britain would require a declaration of loyalty to the King, and that Ireland must accept inclusion in the British Empire and submit to British control of Irish harbours. This, then, was the position by the middle of November: the Irish delegates, acting as plenipotentiaries, were treating with the British Cabinet on the terms indicated, and the next move was with Ulster.

term

der

pac

Before we proceed further with this tangled story, it as to be said that the 'truce' which had been accepted by both sides in July was being very imperfectly

reet