Menelik had been set in motion. The long and dangerous dispute with Italy had not prevented considerable acquisitions of territory; for in 1892-4 the Emperor had possessed himself of the extensive district north of Lake Abaia inhabited by the Wallamu tribe. Now, in the autumn of 1897, four distinct expeditions were dispatched. The first expedition, according to French ideas,* had for its object the occupation of the Sudanese provinces, Gedaref, Gallabat, and Fazogli, but as a matter of fact contented itself with the capture of Metemma (Gallabat town) and the subjugation of the Beni Shangul, a negroid tribe on the western edge of Abyssinian plateau overlooking the valley of the White Nile. The second, after ruthlessly suppressing a revolt in Kaffa, subjugated the Gimirra and other neighbouring tribes. Then turning southwards, this army reached the river Kibish, flowing into Lake Rudolf, and annexed the territory to the north and north-east of the lake so far as the Boran Galla. The third expedition extended Menelik's dominions in a south-easterly direction towards the desert of the Ogaden.

French hopes, however, mainly centred on the success of the fourth expedition, whereby the French advisers of the Emperor intended to anticipate the British operations in the valley of the Upper Nile. Late in the autumn of 1897 Dejazmach Tesamma, accompanied by M. Fèvre, a Frenchman, and M. Potter, a Swiss, led out an army of 5000 men towards the White Nile, and by May 1898 had advanced as far as the junction of the Pibor with the Baro. There he detached a flying column of 1500 men, which with MM. Fèvre and Potter actually succeeded in reaching the White Nile at the point where it joins the Sobat. On an island in the middle of the river M. Fèvre hoisted the French flag on June 22, while the Abyssinians hoisted the Abyssinian flag on the right bank. The approach of the deadly rainy season and want of food forced them to retire, before Captain Marchand, who had started from the French Congo on his long march across Africa in June 1896, arrived at Fashoda (Kodok) (July 10, 1898). A steamer, sent upstream to reconnoitre, found the flags still flying on Sept. 1.

* Cp. Hanotaux, 1.c.

Though, from a French point of view, these extensive military operations were a failure-owing to the enforced withdrawal of Marchand from Fashoda after General Kitchener's victory at Omdurman (Sept. 2, 1898)-yet they enabled Menelik substantially to realise the scheme of conquest proposed to him by his French advisers in 1891, and thereby to include within his Empire the whole of the great Ethiopian plateau, of which his predecessors on the imperial throne had at most held only the northern half. His new boundaries were formally recognised in a series of treaties (19001908) with Italy, Great Britain, and the Sudanese Government. From being the southernmost town of the isolated and semi-independent kingdom of Shoa, Menelik had made Addis Abbaba into the centrally situated capital of a vast and united Abyssinian Empire with an area of 350,000 square miles-more than three times the size of the British Isles.

In 1897 France, Italy, and Russia appointed permanent ministers to represent their respective interestsan example followed next year by Great Britain. Henceforth Menelik's task was not to extend his already overgrown territory, but to prevent revolts and to consolidate the Empire that he had won; and at the same time to secure it against further European aggressions by carefully defining its frontiers-hence the series of conventions already alluded to-and by skilfully fomenting the jealousies of the rival European Powers represented at his court.

Menelik's government has been well described as 's military despotism tempered by distance.' The foundation of his power was the Shoan army, which he took care to keep, in numbers, arms, and equipment, far superior to the armies of any of his provinces. He himself directed the administration of Shoa and Ifat, and governed the newly-conquered Galla country and his other acquisitions through the military officers in charge of the garrisons of his own troops, whom he could appoint and dismiss at his pleasure. His faithful nephew, Ras Makonnen, he made governor of Harrar.

The old kingdoms of the north presented greater difficulties, though even here his predecessor John had already paved the way by crushing the turbulent

aristocracy. Menelik had merely to give the finishin; blow by abolishing, as opportunity offered, the hereditar governorships, and by appointing his own nomineesgenerally his kinsmen or connexions by marriage-i their place, often at the same time subdividing o otherwise altering the boundaries of the ancient prc vinces. The old chiefs had often assumed the title o Negus, as being next in rank to the Emperor, the Negu Nagasti; but Menelik, though he was obliged to tolerat his old and powerful rival, Tekla Haimanot, as Negus o Gojjam till the latter's death in 1901, never conferred on any governor of his own appointment a title so near t his own. His nominees bore the titles of Ras (com mander-in-chief of a provincial army) or Dejazmaci (general) or Fitaurari (commander of an advanced guard)—the title being personal to the holder and bearing no relation to the importance of his provinc or of the military force placed under his command. Hi son-in-law, Ras Mikael, was governor of the Woll country, including the district of Magdala. The Semyer province belonged to his Empress Taitu and was adminis tered by her representative. His brother-in-law, Ra Wolie, was in charge of Yeju and half of Lasta-th other half and the province of Waag being under Wagshum Gwangul, who had proved his fidelity by many years' devoted service.

The old kingdom of Tigre, steeped in imperial tradi tions and jealous of upstart Shoa, was, though never dangerous, always a nest of rebellion and intrigu throughout Menelik's reign. For the first ten years Ra Mangasha, the late Emperor's natural son, was allowed after he had been made to divorce his wife in favour o a niece of the Empress Taitu, to retain the government But when, in 1898, he ventured openly to revolt, he was soon forced to surrender and deported to Ankober-hi province being assigned first to Ras Makonnen and ther to Ras Wolie, the Empress' brother. In later years the native chiefs indulged in frequent outbreaks, but caused no serious trouble.

Thus, by 1900, Menelik had secured that the administra tion of all the provinces in his Empire should be in the hands of newly-appointed governors entirely dependent upon his pleasure and possessed of no local influence to

tempt them to revolt. They were, moreover, surrounded with minor officials, each anxious to step into the governor's shoes and always ready to report any indiscretion on his part to headquarters. One of the most effective checks was the annual visit which the governors were expected to pay to Addis Abbaba, leaving the administration of their provinces in the hands of their deputies or azajs. If a governor was at all suspect, it was Menelik's custom to detain him at his court for an indefinite period on various honourable pretexts, sometimes sending a reliable minor official to administer the province instead of the azaj.

What, however, robbed Menelik's system of administration of any possibility of efficiency was the fact that, though he had absolute power over his governors, he had no control over their subordinates. Each province was divided into districts and each district into groups of villages-every unit, from the district to the village, being under its appropriate official, who was only responsible to his immediate superior and no one else. The Emperor's orders, therefore-in order to be actually executed-had to filter down from the governor at the top to the village headman at the bottom, and in the process would be, more often than not, hopelessly blocked. The practical result is pithily expressed in the Abyssinian proverb: No dog knows his master's master.'

Inefficient though his system of administration undoubtedly was, yet substantially it fulfilled its purpose. Not only was his supremacy never seriously challenged during his lifetime, but the unity which he gave to his Empire, half of which consisted of recent annexations, was firmly enough rooted to withstand the shocks which So often threatened it during his illness and since his death. His foreign policy was consistently based on two principles-unswerving insistence upon his independent sovereignty, and the legal demarcation of all his territories, whether inherited or acquired. After his victory at Adowa in 1896, his sovereignty was never again called in question, though fears of European aggression, open or covert, made him slow and suspicious in dealing with the various foreign representatives resident at his court. In his negotiations with them he was indeed at a serious disadvantage; for, though on

two or three occasions he sent missions to Europe, h had no corresponding representatives of his OWI accredited to the Governments concerned, from whon to get first-hand information wherewith to check th ex parte statements of the Foreign Ministers at Addi Abbaba. On two occasions especially his suspicion were aroused. In 1902 he flatly refused to sign one o his many railway conventions with the French Govern ment, because he thought that it involved a surrender o Abyssinian territory; and again, in 1906, when in July the Tripartite Treaty between Great Britain, France and Italy-one of the first-fruits of the Entente Cordiale of 1904-was communicated to him for signature, for nearly six months he hesitated what to do, because although ostensibly it guaranteed the maintenance of the political and territorial status quo of Ethiopia and of the sovereign rights of the Emperor, yet he feared that some of its clauses, more especially those dealing with the construction of railways, threatened interference with his rights, and might even foreshadow a partition of his country into spheres of influence. Not till December did he return the evasive reply:

'We have received the arrangement made by the three Powers. We thank them for their communication and their desire to keep and maintain the independence of our Government. But let it be understood that this arrangement in no way limits what we consider our sovereign rights.'

In his frontier policy, though equally suspicious, he was on the whole eminently reasonable. He began by clearly stating his claims in 1891; by 1898 he had more or less effectively occupied the whole of the Abyssinian plateau except a small portion on the north, which was recognised as Italian in 1900. Otherwise his pretensions underwent but little modification except on the side of the Sudan, where, by the treaty of 1902 with Great Britain, he was content to have his frontier drawn along the Abyssinian foothills except for the excrescence into the plain between the rivers Baro and Akobo. This farsighted policy went a long way towards freeing Menelik from that frequent source of trouble to semi-civilised sovereigns whose territories march with those of more civilised governments-the occurrence of frontier-raids