3. To use their influence for the purpose of effectually estab lishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China;

4. To refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly States, and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such States.

These statements have a familiar ring, and most of them will be found embodied in Agreements, exchanges of Notes, and other documents which the Powers have concluded at various times, either with China, or more generally, between themselves with regard to China Several of the expressions have lost much of their original meaning in the Far East, and it will require something more than their repetition in a Treaty to convince people there that the professions of faith which they represent are likely to be translated into practice with greater success in the future than they have been in the past. But there are several important differences which distinguish this Treaty from those that preceded it. Nearly all the previous Agreements were made about China without China being a party to them, and often for ulterior reasons not connected with China. No appeal was ever made by China to Treaties of this kind, which she keenly resented; and in practice they became dead letters or were used by the Nations who made them to cloak their own designs.

China has now for the first time been associated with the Powers in the enunciation of this self-denying Ordinance, and will be able to appeal to them against any breach of its terms; while they in turn will be in a position to call her to account for any failure to carry out her part of the contract.

Another fundamental difference between this and all previous Agreements is that the Treaty groups together and consolidates in a unified form the substance of the various engagements which the Powers had entered into between themselves, and for the first time it makes them collectively responsible for the fulfilment of these undertakings. The Treaty is further supplemented by two Resolutions which add immensely to its value, and

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will be noticed in connexion with the succeeding Articles, which we now proceed to examine.

Article III deals with the question of the Open Door, or equality of opportunity, and makes a valiant attempt to give a practical application to the term. The Powers agree that they will not support their nationals in seeking :

(a) Any arrangement which might purport to establish in favour of their interests any general superiority of rights with respect to commercial or economic development in any designated region of China;

(b) Any such monopoly or preference as would deprive the nationals of any other Power of the right of undertaking any legitimate trade or industry in China, or of participating with the Chinese Government, or with any local authority, in any category of public enterprise, or which by reason of its scope, duration, or geographical extent is calculated to frustrate the practical application of the principle of equal opportunity;

and China undertakes to adhere to the above principles in dealing with applications for economic rights. Article IV virtually abolishes spheres of influence, and Article V contains an elaborate provision against discrimination of any kind on railways.

So far as words go, the provisions are all that could be desired, and, if loyally enforced, should do much to revitalise a somewhat discredited doctrine and prevent for the future the questionable transactions which have made Peking finance a byword. The machinery for their enforcement is furnished by the two Resolutions to which reference has already been made. The first stipulates that full publicity is hereafter to be given to all matters affecting the political and other international obligations of China and of the Powers in relation to China, and makes detailed arrangements for having all existing commitments and all future Agreements and Contracts filed with the Secretariat-General. The Chinese Government is similarly obliged to notify all engagements into which it may enter. The position is further strengthened by the establishment of a Board of Reference to which questions as to the execution of these arrangements are to be referred.

The Powers have tacitly acknowledged the mistakes

of the past and have imposed upon themselves and upon China severe restrictions for the future. They have wisely had recourse to publicity as the only means of coping with Chinese corruption and foreign exploitation. Politicians in Peking will no longer be able to mortgage the assets of the country, or to grant the same concession to two or three parties; and foreign promoters will no longer receive support in foisting upon China Western novelties for which the country has no use. Nothing has been more disquieting in the recent history of China than the light-hearted way in which the Government has contracted loans for unproductive and wholly useless purposes. That it was not always so, the following incident will show. In 1895, when the Japanese indemnity was being discussed, Prince Kung called one day at the British Legation, and on being told confidentially the probable amount of the Japanese claim, he simply collapsed, and asked leave to retire into an adjoining room to recover from the shock. During the great European War the Government at Peking contracted loans amounting in the aggregate to the war indemnity paid to Japan, and squandered every farthing of it in maintaining military forces which are a standing menace to the peace of the country.

The next Treaty which requires a word of notice is that relating to the Chinese Customs Tariff. For many years the Chinese Tariff has been fixed by Treaty on the basis of a 5 per cent. ad valorem duty on imports and exports alike. The arrangement is admittedly a onesided one, which must in course of time undergo modification. The Chinese Delegation put forward a demand for Tariff autonomy; but in the present disturbed state of the country, a concession of that kind would have proved a very doubtful blessing. The import Tariff had been converted into schedules of specific duties, and owing to fluctuations in prices had fallen considerably below the ad valorem amount fixed by Treaty. The Conference agreed that a revision should take place at once to raise the specific duties to an effective 5 per cent. basis.

It was when this point was passed that difficulties were experienced in dealing with this complex question. By Treaties concluded in 1902 and 1903 the British,

American, and Japanese Governments had undertaken to increase the Customs duties to 12 per cent. in return for the abolition of likin and other inland dues. These dues have constituted a vexatious burden upon trade for many years, and both Chinese and foreigners have always regarded their abolition as an essential prerequisite to commercial expansion.

To have granted an increase of Customs duties irrespective of the reduction of the inland dues would have been a retrograde measure which would have militated against the attainment of the object contemplated in the Treaties. Recognising the impossibility of settling the question in Washington, the Conference decided upon the appointment of a Commission, to sit in the I near future in China, whose main duties will be to prepare for the abolition of likin, and arrange, as an interim measure, for the levying of a surtax that will raise the import duty to 7 per cent. ad valorem, with an increase to 10 per cent. on articles of luxury.

Incidentally, the Conference did a very useful piece of work by abolishing the differentiation between the duties on sea-borne and land-borne traffic, which represented roughly a rebate of one-third in favour of the latter. With the advent of railways there was no longer any justification for this inequality, which was originally intended to offset the cost of transportation by land. The alteration will principally affect Japanese goods entering China by rail, which form more than half of the whole amount of overland traffic.

The Commission has a delicate and difficult task before it. It will have to decide what is to be done with the proceeds of the increased Customs duties; and any measures taken for the modification of the likin dues will have to be considered in consultation with the provinces, which will naturally require to be compensated for the loss of revenue. The provinces have received far too little consideration in the past. Many of our Treaty arrangements and all the numerous Loan agreements negotiated by foreign financial agencies have tended to favour Peking at the expense of the provinces, and to divert to the use of the Central Government revenues which should have been retained to meet the cost of provincial administration. The result has been Vol. 288.-No. 472.

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a counter-movement on the part of the provinces which has developed into a demand for almost complete fiscal autonomy.

As to the disposal of the increased Customs revenue, it will be necessary to exercise the utmost care to ensure that it does not go to the support of any of the rival factions now striving for political mastery of the country. The best course would probably be to earmark it for railway construction. The most crying need at the moment is the completion of the railway from Canton to Hankow, to connect the north and south and promote political unity.

It is to be hoped that the Commission will have the courage to resist the pressure, which is certain to be brought to bear, to devote a portion of the money to meet the service of unsecured loans. To make use of Customs funds to confer an ex post facto security upon wholly irregular transactions, which were entered into with a full knowledge of the risks they entailed, would encourage a repetition of the very malpractices it was one of the main objects of the Washington Conference to eliminate.

The last and far the most important of the four Treaties negotiated at Washington embodied the terms of settlement of the Shantung question. It represented at least 80 per cent. of the problems affecting China, and upon its successful issue the whole work of the Conference depended; for without it China would not have signed the Washington Agreements and the Senate of the United States would not have ratified them. The history of the Shantung question is fairly familiar to most readers. It had its origin in the Imperialistic designs of Russia and Germany. The two Emperors came to a tacit understanding to help themselves to desirable points of vantage on the coast of China. Russia selected Port Arthur and Dalny, and Germany obtained a lease of Kiaochow, with railway and other concessions.

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ad Japan took the leased territory from Germany by force of arms; and in 1915, as a result of the Twenty-one Demands, China undertook to consent to any settlement Japan might make later with Germany. The Paris Peace Conference transferred to Japan all German rights and interests in Shantung. China refused

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