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fined, said in a communication to Congress, referring to the position of the Spanish Government as stated in the note to the American minister at Madrid:

It will be perceived therefrom that the Government of Spain, having cognizance of the joint resolution of the United States Congress, and in view of the things which the President is thereby required and authorized to do, responds by treating the reasonable demands of this Government as measures of hostility, following with that instant and complete severance of relations by its action which by the usage of nations accompanies an existent state of war between sovereign powers.

The position of Spain being thus made known and the demands of the United States being denied with a complete rupture of intercourse by the act of Spain, I have been constrained, in exercise of the power and authority conferred upon me by the joint resolution aforesaid, to proclaim under date of April 22, 1898, a blockade of certain ports of the north coast of Cuba, lying between Cardenas and Bahia Honda and of the port of Cienfuegos on the south coast of Cuba; and further, in exercise of my constitutional powers and using the authority conferred upon me by the act of Congress approved April 22, 1898, to issue my proclamation, dated April 23, 1898, calling forth volunteers in order to carry into effect the said resolution of April 20, 1898. Copies of these proclamations are hereto appended.

In view of the measures so taken, and, with a view to the adoption of such other measures as may be necessary to enable me to carry out the expressed will of the Congress of the United States in the premises, I now recommend to your honorable body the adoption of a joint resolution declaring that a state of war exists between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Spain, and I urge speedy action thereon, to the end that the definition of the international status of the United States as a belligerent power may be made known, and the assertion of all its rights and the maintenance of all its duties in the conduct of a public war may be assured. (Foreign Relations U. S., 1898, p. 771.)

From this it is plain that the status was not defined and assured until after the declaration, though the declaration issued on the 25th of April was held to define the status existing as regards the belligerent rights of the United States subsequent to the 20th of April. Under such conditions complications naturally arise not only as regards relations of belligerents but also as regards neutrals.

Under the provisions of The Hague convention there is required before commencement of hostilities a “pre

vious and explicit warning, in the form either of a declaration of war giving reasons or of an ultimatum with a conditional declaration of war."

In 1898 Congress did not formally declare war until after the opening of hostilities, for a blockade was declared on April 22, 1898. This act of Congress was unquestionably legal under the Constitution of the United States, though it would not now be regarded as in accord with the convention relative to the opening of hostilities. Even if Congress had not declared war at all, it would certainly have existed after the Spanish decree of April 23. Whether without declaration war would have existed on April 21 is open to question. Whether the signing of the convention relative to the opening of hostilities has in any way limited the powers of Congress under the Constitution is a question that might be raised. However, as the United States has become a party to this convention, it is, as regards foreign states signatories to the convention, bound by its provisions. A failure to observe the provisions of the convention would render the United States liable.

Further, it is sufficient to say that in a change so far reaching in its effects as a change from state of peace to a state of war, it is only reasonable that the time of the change should be unequivocally known both to the opposing belligerent and to neutrals.

The ultimatum of the South African Republic, 1899.— At the time of the strained relations between the South African Republic and Great Britain, in 1899, the Republic issued an ultimatum showing that it regarded concentration of forces near its borders as an act of war. After relating many grounds for action, the ultimatum

says:

Her Majesty's unlawful intervention in the internal affairs of this Republic in conflict with the convention of London, 1884, caused by the extraordinary strengthening of troops in the neighborhood of the borders of this Republic, has thus caused an intolerable condition of things to arise whereto this Government feels itself obliged, in the interest not only of this Republic, but also of all South Africa, to make an end as soon as possible, and feels itself cailed upon and obliged to press earnestly and with

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emphasis for an immediate termination of this state of things and to request Her Majesty's Government to give it the assur

ance

(a) That all points of mutual difference shall be regulated by the friendly course of arbitration or by whatever amicable way may be agreed upon by this Government with Her Majesty's Government.

(b) That the troops on the borders of this Republic shall be instantly withdrawn.

(c) That all reinforcements of troops which have arrived in South Africa since the 1st June, 1899, shall be removed from South Africa within a reasonable time, to be agreed upon with this Government, and with a mutual assurance and guarantee on the part of this Government that no attack upon or hostilities against any portion of the possessions of the British Government shall be made by the Republic during further negotiations within a period of time to be subsequently agreed upon between the Governments, and this Government will, on compliance therewith, be prepared to withdraw the armed burghers of this Republic from the borders.

(d) That Her Majesty's troops which are now on the high seas shall not be landed in any port of South Africa.

This Government must press for an immediate and affirmative answer to these four questions, and earnestly requests Her Majesty's Government to return such an answer before or upon Wednesday, the 11th October, 1899, not later than 5 o'clock p. m., and it desires further to add that in the event of unexpectedly no satisfactory answer being received by it within that interval it will with great regret be compelled to regard the action of Her Majesty's Government as a formal declaration of war, and will not hold itself responsible for the consequences thereof, and that in the event of any further movements of troops taking place within the above-mentioned time in the nearer directions of our borders this Government will be compelled to regard that also as a formal declaration of war.

The reply of Great Britain was short and war was held to exist at once:

Her Majesty's Government have received with great regret the peremptory demands of the Government of the South African Republic conveyed in your telegram of 9th October, No. 3. You will inform the Government of the South African Republic, in reply, that the conditions demanded by the Government of the South African Republic are such as Her Majesty's Government deem it impossible to discuss.

Russo-Japanese War, 1904.-The Japanese declaration of war against Russia was published on February 10,

1904. The Russian reply was published on the same date. The Ekaterinoslav and Mukden, Russian steamships, were captured with their cargoes on February 6. Other steamships were captured on February 7. On February 8 the Japanese torpedo boats attacked the Russian fleet at Port Arthur. On the 9th other engagements took place and captures were made. Therefore the war was in full progress before any declaration was issued by either Japan or Russia. A decision of the Japanese court in the case of the Ekaterinoslav was to the effect that war existed from the time of the sailing of the Japanese fleet from Sasebo at 7 a. m. on February 6. Thus the RussoJapanese war began about four days before the declaration was made, and it was legal war from that time. The war commenced when the Japanese fleet left Sasebo with an intention of attacking the Russian fleet."

There was much discussion of these acts, and Russia entered a strong protest, and the Japanese Government replied. It is certain that it was not generally known that war had commenced when the fleet sailed on February 6, and it was not even known that the fleet had sailed. An element of uncertainty therefore existed.

Turco-Italian War, 1911.-It was announced in Rome late in September, 1911, that the Italian chargé d'affaires at Constantinople had been authorized to present an ultimatum to the Turkish Government, stating the grievances and demands of Italy. This communication was of the nature of an ultimatum with a conditional declaration of war. As both Italy and Turkey had participated in the conference at The Hague in 1907, these States were naturally familiar with the convention relative to the opening of hostilities. There was, therefore, an attempt on the part of Italy to conform to the provisions of the convention. This is shown in the ultimatum:

During a long series of years the Government of Italy never ceased to make representations to the Porte upon the absolute necessity of correcting the state of disorder to which the Government of Turkey had abandoned Tripoli and Cyrene. These regions should be admitted to the benefits of the progress realized by other parts of the Mediterranean and Africa.

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This transformation which is imposed by the general exigencies of civilization constitutes for Italy a vital interest of the first order by reason of the slight distance separating these countries from the coasts of Italy. Notwithstanding the attitude taken by the Government of Italy, which has always accorded its loyal support to the Imperial Government in the different political questions of recent times; notwithstanding the moderation and patience shown by the Government of Italy; its views concerning Tripoli have been badly received by the Imperial Government, but more than that, all enterprises on the part of Italians in the regions mentioned have been systematically opposed and unjustifiably crushed.

The Imperial Government, which to the present time has shown constant hostility toward all legitimate Italian activity in Tripoli and Cyrene, quite recently, at the eleventh hour, proposes to the Royal Government to come to an understanding, declaring itself disposed to grant any economic concession compatible with treaties in force and with the higher dignity and interests of Turks; but the Royal Government does not now feel itself in a position to enter such negotiations, the uselessness of which has been demonstrated by past experience and which far from constituting a guarantee for the future, would be themselves permanent causes of disagreement and conflict.

The Royal Government has received from its consular agents in Tripoli and Cyrene information that the situation is extremely grave because of the agitation prevailing against Italian subjects, and which is evidently incited by officers and other functionaries of authority.

This agitation constitutes an imminent danger, not only to Italian subjects, but to foreigners of all nationalities, which requires them, for their own security, to embark and leave Tripoli without delay.

The arrival at Tripoli of Ottoman military transports, which the Royal Government has not failed to observe, appears preliminary to serious events, aggravates the situation, and imposes on the Royal Government the obligation absolutely to prepare for the dangers which will result.

The Italian Government, having the intention henceforth to protect its interests and its dignity, has decided to proceed to the military occupation of Tripoli and Cyrene.

This solution is the only one that will give Italy power to itself decide and itself attend to that which the Imperial Government does not do.

The Royal Government demands that the Imperial Government shall give order that the actual Ottoman representative shall not oppose the measure which will, in consequence, be necessary to effect this solution without difficulty. An ultimate agreement will