At this meeting of the International Law Association at Christiania in 1905, Mr. Douglas Owen, offered the following resolution which, after amendment, was adopted:

That in the opinion of this conference the time has come for protecting the world's mail and passenger steamers from belligerent seizure, and that with this object international legislation should be adopted to prevent the shipment and carriage of contraband of war by such vessels, and to render the same a punishable offense. (22d Report, p. 73.)

In seconding the resolution, Sir Walter Phillimore said:

I rise to second the proposal of Mr. Douglas Owen, because I agree on the whole with what he has proposed. Two things seem to me to be very obvious. The first thing is that it is quite impossible that all the mail steamers of the world, with their enormous cargoes and enormous interests at stake of private importance and public importance, and their large number of passengers, should be liable, as they are liable, to be visited and to be taken into a port of some belligerent nation, a port which may be 1,000 miles away, on suspicion that they are carrying contraband of war. It seems to me impossible that they should continue. It also seems to me impossible to deprive belligerents of their rights to stop contraband of war being carried by passenger mail steamers with valuable commercial cargoes. If mail steamers are carrying contraband of war, the belligerents have a right to prevent it, and therefore we must try to reconcile the two rights; that is to say, try to secure a belligerent from having contraband of war carried by passenger mail steamers, and try, on the other hand, to secure the neutral passengers on mail steamers from visit and detention and deviation into some port belonging to the captor. One way which Mr. Douglas Owen suggests is that the neutral nation should intervene and give, as it were, its word of honor that its passenger steamers would not convey contraband, and should enforce that by a Government inspection and by making it a criminal offense for such vessels to ship contraband. That is one way of doing it. Another way that has occurred to me is that without any such legislation a large steamship owner might put himself in communication with his own government, and might say: "I am ready to submit to any inspection which you like to make; I am willing to give bonds to pay if I fail, not only at the port of original dispatch, but at all ports at which my ships touch, if you will put your agents on board to inspect. On the other hand, I ask you to communicate with the two belligerents, and to obtain from them a letter or license for me that my ship, fulfilling those conditions, shall not be arrested in the course of the voyage, or, at any rate, not arrested on suspicion that it is not

fulfilling all the conditions, but has taken some goods on board for transit which it ought not to do." There is a third way in which it might be done, even perhaps more direct. The steamship company might put itself, through its manager, in communication direct with the two belligerents, and might say: "Send down to Southampton, or to the docks in London, or to New York, a Japanese agent from Japan and a Russian agent from Russia, or if you like, somebody you can trust-your consul or anybody else and I will ship under the supervision of any agent you like to appoint, and then I ask each of you in turn not to arrest me on the high seas." All these are various ways of meeting the end to be attained. Perhaps the most official way is that which is suggested by Mr. Douglas Owen. I feel convinced, having thought a good deal on this subject, that the time has come, not for diminishing the effective rights of belligerents, but for preventing the Prinz Heinrich, or one of the English mail steamers, or great American liners like the Paris, being diverted for 1,000 miles from her course, with all her passengers on board, on suspicion of having contraband of war. For these reasons I second Mr. Douglas Owen's proposal. (Applause.) (Ibid., p. 91.)

Rules of the Institute of International Law. The Institute of International Law in 1896 adopted the following rules in regard to transport service:

SEC. 6. Il est défendu d'attaquer ou empêcher le transport de diplomates ou courriers diplomatiques: 1a neutres, 2a accrédités auprès de gouvernements neutres; 3a naviguant sous pavillon neutre entre des ports neutres ou entre un port neutre et le port d'un belligérant.

Au contraire, le transport des diplomates d'un ennemi accrédités auprès de son allié est, sauf le trafic régulier et ordinaire, interdit; 1 sur les territoires et eaux des belligérants; 2a entre leurs possessions; 3a entre les belligérants alliés.

SEC. 7. Sont interdits les transports de troupes, militaires ou agents de guerre d'un ennemi; 1a dans les eaux des belligérants; 2 entre leurs autorités, ports, possessions, armées ou flottes; 3a lorsque le transport se fait pour le compte ou par l'ordre ou le mandat d'un ennemi, ou bien pour lui amener soit des agents avec une commission pour les opérations de la guerre, soit des militaires étant déjà à son service ou des troupes auxiliaires ou enrôlées contrairement à la neutralité, entre ports neutres, entre ceux d'un neutre et ceux d'un belligérant, d'un point neutre à l'armée ou la flotte d'un belligérant.

L'interdiction ne s'étend pas au transport de particuliers qui ne sont pas encore au service militaire d'un belligérant, lors même qu'ils auraient l'intention d'y entrer, ou qui font le trajet comme simples voyageurs sans connexité manifeste avec le service militaire.

SEC. 8. Entre deux autorités d'un ennemi, qui se trouvent sur quelque territoire ou navire lui appartenant ou occupé par lui, est interdit, sauf le trafic régulier et ordinaire, le transport de ses dépêches (communications officielles entre autorités officielles). L'interdiction ne s'étend pas aux transports soit entre ports neutres, soit en provenance ou à destination de quelque territoire ou autorité neutre. (15 Annuaire de l'Institut de Droit international, 1896, p. 231.)

Summary. In any rules which might be proposed it would seem proper

1. That a belligerent refraining from interference with a neutral or belligerent mail or passenger vessel which naturally might be of service to its opponent should have a right to demand that a reasonable assurance be given that such vessel should not be put to any war use if permitted to continue its regular traffic.

2. That neutrals should claim that regular mail and passenger service which in no way affects the conduct of hostilities should be free from interference.

3. That neutrals or belligerents to whom exemption from interference is conceded should be willing to take reasonable care in order that the concession be not abused. This can probably be done effectively by certification as to the character and guaranties as to use.

From regulations, opinions, precedents, and theories it would seem that the following rules should be established by international agreement:

Conclusion. (a) Neutral mail or passenger vessels, of regular lines established before and not in contemplation of the outbreak of hostilities, bound upon regular voyages and furnishing satisfactory government certification that they are mail or passenger vessels, and do not carry contraband, are exempt from interference except on ample grounds of suspicion of action not permitted to a neutral.

(b) Mail or passenger vessels of belligerents, of similar lines, upon regular voyages, plying to neutral ports should be exempt from interference under such restrictions as will prevent their use for war purposes.

(c) Mail or passenger vessels, similarly plying between belligerent ports, may, under such restrictions as the belligerents may agree upon, be exempt from interference.

TOPIC VI.

What regulations should be made in regard to subsidized, auxiliary, or volunteer vessels in time of war?

CONCLUSION.

1. When a subsidized, auxiliary, or volunteer vessel is used for military purposes it must be in command of a duly commissioned officer in the military service of the government.

2. When subsidized, auxiliary, or volunteer vessels, or vessels adapted for or liable to be incorporated into the military service of a belligerent, are in a neutral port in the character of commercial vessels at the outbreak of hostilities, the neutral may require that they immediately furnish satisfactory evidence whether they will assume a military or retain a commercial character.

3. Subsidized, auxiliary, or volunteer vessels, or vessels adapted for or liable to be incorporated into the military service of a belligerent, on entering a neutral port after the outbreak of hostilities, may be required by the neutral immediately to make known whether their character is military or commercial.

4. Until publicly changed in a home port, such vessels as have made known their character must retain as regards neutrals the character assumed in the neutral port.

5. The exercise of belligerent authority toward a neutral by subsidized, auxiliary, or volunteer vessels is sufficient to establish their military character.

ence.

DISCUSSION AND NOTES.

General. As a general proposition it may be maintained that a state should be allowed to use its resources to protect itself in time of war and to preserve its existOn land a militia is regarded as a perfectly legitimate aid to the regular army, and in extreme cases the levies en masse are recognized as legitimate hostile forces. It is not reasonable to suppose that the resources of the belligerent on the sea will not be summoned to aid in the preservation of state existence. These resources are liable to attack. They will so far as possible be called into

service. Horses, wagons, railroads, cars, telegraphs, etc., are called into service on land; corresponding agencies will be called into service on the sea.

The objection to the continuance of privateering was largely due to the lack of government control over those engaged in the practice. This control is easily exercised over those aiding in military operations on land because a representative of the government is usually at hand to direct the movements.

An equal degree of control may be exercised in the case of auxiliary, volunteer, and subsidized vessels maintained by a government, officered and manned by the paid servants of that government, and operated under its direction. The use of such vessels is a matter of great importance, and there seems to be no reasonable objection to their employment for any and all purposes of naval warfare, provided that the proper degree of government control is maintained.

By the first division of the declaration of Paris, 1856, which, however, is only binding on the states parties thereto, "privateering is and remains abolished." Some writers hold that the use of auxiliary vessels, to cruise against an enemy's commerce, amounts to a practical abrogation of this provision. For example, Funck-Brentano in 1894 maintained that the first article of the declaration of Paris is practically obsolete. Speaking of the TurcoRussian war of 1877 and the Russian volunteer navy he said:

Depuis, tous les autres États maritimes encouragent leurs grandes sociétés de navigation à construire des paquebots susceptibles d'être transformés en croiseurs en temps de guerre. C'est en fait l'abolition de l'article 1er de la déclaration de Paris, qui lui-même abolissait la course. Les noms seuls sont changés; la guerre maritime privée prendra le nom de guerre maritime publiqne, les corsaires s'appelleront des croiseurs, les lettres de marque seront remplacées par des patentes de commission et les capitaines corsaires deviendront des capitaines commissionnés. (1 Revue générale de droit international public, p. 328.)

To hold with Funk-Brentano, and those who take more or less the same view, is to lose sight of the essential characteristic of a privateer; to wit, a vessel not maintained