soul is in your business) and obliged by all your communications. I see you feel how much my heart is set on getting at these fellows, whom I have hunted so long; but don't, my dear Blackwood, be angry with any one; it was only a laudable anxiety in Admiral Louis, and nothing like complaining.

The Portuguese is a rogue, but I have desired the bullocks to be bought, and threatened him the next time. Defiance has joined. Royal Sovereign has signalized'. If there are letters you shall have them; but I fear the Cutter will never beat up to you. I wish I may be able to keep the Pickle with you; she will be very handy to protect your Boats, &c., in the night. Believe me ever yours faithfully,

NELSON AND Bronte. P.S.-Sir John Duckworth comes out in the London, Sir Robert Barlow in Barfleur, vice Geo. Martin, very ill, but this is all; therefore you will give due weight to the report. The Canal of St. Pedro is a good speculation for Boats in the night. Several Ships and Brigs are coming from Tariffa.

TO VICE-ADMIRAL COLLINGWOOD.

[Autograph in the possession of the Hon. Mrs. Newnham Collingwood.] Victory, October 8th, 1805.

My dear Coll.,

3

Bayntun seems come out loaded: he will move about till he has supplied the wants of his friends. He will tell you all the Gibraltar news. I have nothing worth sending from thence by the Naiad, and not a word by Leviathan. Eurydice has captured a very fine Privateer of two 24-pounders, and taken some Craft, but in doing it Eurydice got on shore,

1 The Royal Sovereign, which was intended for Vice-Admiral Collingwood's Flag, joined the Fleet from England on that day.

2 The Battle was fought before either of those Officers arrived.

3

Captain Henry William Bayntun, of the Leviathan: he died an Admiral of the Blue, and a Knight Grand Cross of the Bath, in December 1840.

The Eurydice, Captain William Hoste. His official report of these captures, dated on the 7th of October, is in the "London Gazette" of the 9th November, 1805.

and was got off principally by the exertion of our friend Captain Thomas"; but as Etna has lost all her anchors but one, she is going to see the Gun-vessel into Gibraltar, and get others. I hope we shall soon lose this nasty Levanter, and get smooth water to clear the Transports. Patienza!

Ever yours faithfully,

NELSON AND Bronte.

I have mislaid Mr. Setero's letter, but I send you the invoice of the Malabar".

MEMORANDUM.

[Autograph draught in the possession of Vice-Admiral Sir George Mundy, K.C.B., except the words in Italics, which were added by Mr. Scott, Lord Nelson's Secretary; and the Original, issued to Captain Hope, of the Defence, now in the possession of his son, Captain Hope, R.N.]

(Secret.)

Memorandum.

Victory, off Cadiz, 9th October, 1805.

Thinking it almost impossible to bring a Fleet of forty Sail of the Line into a Line of Battle in variable winds, thick weather, and other circumstances which must occur, without such a loss of time that the opportunity would probably be lost of bringing the Enemy to Battle in such a manner as to make the business decisive, I have therefore made up my mind to keep the Fleet in that position of sailing (with the exception of the First and Second in Command) that the Order of Sailing is to be the Order of Battle, placing the Fleet in two Lines of sixteen Ships each, with an Advanced Squadron of eight of the fastest sailing Two-decked Ships, which will always make, if wanted, a Line of twenty-four Sail, on whichever Line the Commander-in-Chief may direct. The Second in Command will', after my intentions are made known to him, have the entire direction of his Line to make the attack upon the Enemy, and to follow up the blow until they are captured or destroyed.

Now a Rear-Admiral of the White. He was for many years Lord Collingwood's Flag-Captain, and was honoured with his Admiral's esteem and regard. The letter and the invoice alluded to, were sent to Lord Nelson by ViceAdmiral Collingwood on the 7th.

7 Lord Nelson originally wrote here, but deleted, "in fact command his Line

and'

If the Enemy's Fleet should be seen to windward in Line of Battle, and that the two Lines and the Advanced Squadron can fetch them3, they will probably be so extended that their Van could not succour their Rear.

I should therefore probably make' the Second in Command's signal to lead through, about their twelfth Ship from their Rear, (or wherever he' could fetch, if not able to get so far advanced); my Line would lead through about their Centre, and the Advanced Squadron to cut two or three or four Ships a-head of their Centre, so as to ensure getting at their Commander-in-Chief, on whom every effort must be made to capture.

The whole impression of the British Fleet must be to overpower from two or three Ships a-head of their Commanderin-Chief, supposed to be in the Centre, to the Rear of their Fleet. I will suppose twenty Sail of the Enemy's Line to be untouched, it must be some time before they could perform a manœuvre to bring their force compact to attack any part of the British Fleet engaged, or to succour their own Ships, which indeed would be impossible without mixing with the Ships engaged'.

Something must be left to chance; nothing is sure in a Sea Fight beyond all others. Shot will carry away the masts and yards of friends as well as foes; but I look with confidence to a Victory before the Van of the Enemy could succour their Rear3, and then that the British Fleet would most of them be ready to receive their twenty Sail of the Line, or to pursue them, should they endeavour to make off.

If the Van of the Enemy tacks, the Captured Ships must run to leeward of the British Fleet; if the Enemy wears, the British must place themselves between the Enemy and the

8 Lord Nelson originally wrote here, but deleted ("I shall suppose them forty-six Sail in the Line of Battle.")

Originally "Your," but deleted.

1 Originally "You," but deleted.

2 In the upper margin of the paper Lord Nelson wrote, and Mr. Scott added to it a reference, as marked in the text," the Enemy's Fleet is supposed to consist of 46 Sail of the Line, British Fleet of 40. If either is less, only a proportionate number of Enemy's Ships are to be cut off; B. to be superior to the E. cut off."

3 Originally "friends."

Captured, and disabled British Ships; and should the Enemy close, I have no fears as to the result.

The Second in Command will in all possible things direct the movements of his Line, by keeping them as compact as the nature of the circumstances will admit. Captains are to look to their particular Line as their rallying point. But, in case Signals can neither be seen or perfectly understood, no Captain can do very wrong if he places his Ship alongside that of an Enemy.

Of the intended attack from to windward, the Enemy in Line of Battle ready to receive an attack,

E

B

The divisions of the British Fleet will be brought nearly within gun shot of the Enemy's Centre. The signal will most probably then be made for the Lee Line to bear up. together, to set all their sails, even steering sails, in order to get as quickly as possible to the Enemy's Line, and to cut through, beginning from the 12 Ship from the Enemy's Rear. Some Ships may not get through their exact place, but they will always be at hand to assist their friends; and if any are thrown round the Rear of the Enemy, they will effectually complete the business of twelve Sail of the Enemy.

Should the Enemy wear together, or bear up and sail large, still the twelve Ships composing, in the first position, the Enemy's Rear, are to be the object of attack of the Lee Line, unless otherwise directed from the Commander-inChief, which is scarcely to be expected, as the entire management of the Lee Line, after the intentions of the Commander-in-Chief, is [are] signified, is intended to be left to the judgment of the Admiral commanding that Line.

The remainder of the Enemy's Fleet, 34 Sail, are to be left to the management of the Commander-in-Chief,

In the upper margin of the paper, and referred to by Lord Nelson as in the text,-"Vide instructions for Signal, yellow with blue fly, Page 17, Eighth flag, Signal Book, with reference to Appendix."

who will endeavour to take care that the movements of the Second in Command are as little interrupted as is possible.

NELSON AND BRONTE".

TO ABBÉ CAMPBELL, NAPLES.

[Autograph in the possession of Mr. William Long.]

My dear Abbé,

Victory, October 9th, 1805.

Many, many thanks for your kind letter, which unfortunately did not find me at Merton, but off Cadiz, watching these fellows as a cat would a mouse. I was just twenty-five days from the Victory, and expected to have laid my wearied bones quiet for the winter; but I ought, perhaps, to be proud of the general call which has made me to go forth.

I thank you for your news from Naples in the great line. Do not tell those little arrangements which raise a smile, or give a pang. I have had very kind letters from both the good King and Queen. I beg that you will remember me most kindly to the Marquis Circello, and apprise him of my sincere esteem; and believe me ever, my dear Abbé,

Most faithfully yours,

NELSON AND Bronte.

I have letters from dear Lady Hamilton of September 20th. I am sure you will forgive her writing, when you consider all she suffered upon my tour to the West Indies. Dr. Scott desires his best respects, and my brother hopes I shall meet the Enemy's Fleet, that some how or other he be a Lord.

may

5 The Signature does not occur to the draught, but was affixed to the originals issued to the Admirals and Captains of the Fleet. To the Copy signed by Lord Nelson, and delivered to Captain George Hope of the Defence, was added—“ N. B. When the Defence quits the Fleet for England you are to return this Secret Memorandum to the Victory." Captain Hope wrote on that Paper :-" It was agreeable to these Instructions that Lord Nelson attacked the Combined Fleets of France and Spain, off Cape Trafalgar, on the 21st of October, 1805, they having thirty-three Sail of the Line, and we twenty-seven."