designing cause. The most sagacious animals have not the least conception of any wise and powerful cause or agent, who made the world, though the mighty evidences of his eternal power and Godhead lie as clearly before their eyes, as ours. The reason is, they are totally incapable of having the perception of cause and effect; for if they had this capacity, they could reason from effect to cause, and learn the existence of the Deity. When the horse or the ox finds a fat pasture, which af fords him delicious food, he has no thought or perception of its being the effect of his master's cultivation. Hence we must conclude, that the perception of cause and effect is peculiar to men, and is owing to a peculiar power, faculty, or capacity of their minds, which raises them far higher in the scale of being than any of the irrational creation, which are never capable of obtaining the knowledge of God, or of religion.

4. Men have the power or capacity of distinguishing between truth and error, which is another property of human nature. We have the power of distinguishing between reality and fiction. We know intuitively, that the objects around us are realities, and not mere phantoms or appearances. We know that we have seen the sun, moon, and stars; the earth, and what grows and moves upon it; we know that we have seen mankind, who are active, intelligent beings; we know, I. say, we have seen all these objects, and that they are absolute realities, and are no fictions of the imagination. This perception of reality, in distinction from fiction, is derived from a distinct power or faculty of the human mind. It is a capacity of having an intuitive view of truth, without a train of reasoning or reflection. If we were not endued with this sense of truth, no arguments could convince us of the real existence of any external objects. But it may be questioned, whether the animal creation have any such perception of truth and reality as we have; or whether they know that the objects with which they are conversant, have a real existence. It is not likely that they have an idea of the reality of their own existence, or of the real existence of anything else. They appear to be as destitute of the knowledge of reality as deranged persons often are. Though such persons perceive objects as clearly as others, and often reason about them with great accuracy and acuteness; yet they have no idea of the distinction between reality and fiction. They take their own imaginations to be substantial realities. They verily think they have the proper exercise of their rational powers, and know not that they are under the entire dominion of an unregulated imagination. But when they come to themselves, they know that they are in their right

mind, and often know that they have been otherwise. This power of distinguishing reality from fietion, is a proper check to the power of imagination, without which it would run wild, and involve us in error, delusion, and misery.

5. Men have a capacity of uniting in affection with all intelligent beings and sensitive natures, which is one of the superior properties of the human species. Animals are capable of exercising love, pity, and compassion towards one another, but are totally incapable of extending their mutual, sympathetic feelings any further. But mankind are capable of extending their benevolent affections to all intelligent beings, and to all intelligent and unintelligent creatures. They can unite in affection with God, with Christ, with angels, with saints, and extend their benevolent regard to all their fellow-creatures. "A righteous man regardeth the life of his beast," and can pity its distress, or rejoice in its happiness. In a word, men are capable of universal benevolence, and of uniting in affection with all holy beings; and of course, capable of participating in all the happiness in the universe, so far as it comes within the circle of their knowledge. This high prerogative of men places them near the highest orders of beings, and fits them for the everlasting enjoyment of all good. I must add,

6. Men have the faculty of distinguishing between right and wrong, or moral good and moral evil. This faculty is sometimes called the moral sense, but more generally conscience. It is distinct from perception, reason, imagination, or any other faculty of the mind. It is that which is conversant about moral objects only; and with respect to them, it speaks with authority. It commands; it forbids; it promises; it threatens ; it punishes and rewards. It directs what ought to be done, and what ought not to be done. It accuses men when they do wrong; and approves of them when they do right. It calls men to account for all their conduct, and will judge them without leave. It pronounces judgment with a positive and decisive tone, and forbids all appeal. Though all the other faculties of the soul should rise up against it, it is able to silence them all, and reduce them to submission. It is the vicegerent of God in the soul; and speaks and acts with divine authority. This faculty is absolutely essential to moral agency, without which no creature is capable of moral action. If animals were possessed of every other intellectual faculty while devoid of this, they could not be moral agents, nor subjects of moral government. And that they are really devoid of this moral faculty, there is no ground to doubt. Though they have natural affection for their offspring, watch over them, protect

them, and supply their wants; yet they have no idea of duty', or a sense of moral obligation to do what their instinct prompts them to do. The human race have the like care and affection for their children, and not only so, but have a sense of duty and obligation. They feel that they ought to love their children, that they ought to protect them, that they ought to provide for them, and that they ought to treat them kindly, tenderly, and faithfully in all respects. Though the ant provides in summer for winter, yet she feels no moral obligation to do it; but men feel that they ought, that it is their duty, that they are under moral obligation, to provide in summer for winter, and that if they should neglect it, it would be a moral evil, and deserve punishment. The reason is, they have a moral sense, or conscience, which plainly tells them their duty. It is this faculty of conscience, that constitutes them moral agents and subjects of moral government. Thus it appears, that the power of reason, the power of the imagination, the power of discerning cause and effect, the power of distinguishing truth from error, the power of extending benevolent affection toward God and all his intelligent and unintelligent creatures, and the power of perceiving the difference between moral good and evil, comprise all the intellectual faculties, which form that rationality in men, that renders them moral agents, and places them at the head of this lower creation.

Now, to confirm the distinction that has been made between mankind and all the irrational tribes, I will suggest the following considerations.

In the first place, we may account for all that we see in animals, which bears any resemblance of rationality, without supposing them to be possessed of any of the six faculties, which have been mentioned as peculiar to men. Their perception, volition, memory, appetites and passions, are sufficient to account for all we find them capable of doing, without one rational faculty, and therefore there is no ground to think that they possess anything which is the same as reason in men.

In the second place, if they really possessed any rational powers or faculties, we might expect they would be capable of cultivation and improvement, like the human powers and faculties. But this we find to be contrary to universal observation and experience. They cannot be taught to speak, or to learn any art or science.

In the third place, animals appear to have no occasion for any portion of rationality, in order to perpetuate their race, or to protect their lives, or to promote any happiness which they

are capable of enjoying. And hence we may conclude, that their Creator has not given them any rational faculty.

In the fourth place, the scripture represents them as totally devoid of all such rational powers as belong to men. The horse and the mule are said to have no understanding. And this is asserted of the ostrich in the thirty-ninth chapter of Job. "Gavest thou the goodly wings unto the peacocks? or wings and feathers unto the ostrich? Which leaveth her eggs in the earth, and warmeth them in the dust, and forgetteth that the foot may crush them, or that the wild beast may break them. She is hardened against her young ones, as though they were not hers her labor is in vain without fear; because God hath deprived her of wisdom, neither hath he imparted to her understanding."

Lastly. The scripture tells us, that "the spirit of man goeth upward, and the spirit of the beast goeth downward to the earth," at death. These expressions plainly intimate, that the spirits of beasts perish with their bodies, and in this respect widely differ from the spirits of men, which survive their bodies and exist forever. But if beasts were endowed with the same faculties in kind, that men are, they would be moral agents and accountable for all their actions. And if this were the case, we cannot suppose that God would annihilate them at death. These considerations may put it beyond doubt, that men are endowed with those principles of rationality, which`constitute them moral agents and accountable creatures, which distinguish them from all the lower creation, and which qualify them to have dominion over the beasts of the field, and every living creature that lives and moves on the earth, in the air, or in the sea.

IMPROVEMENT.

1. Are men endowed with perception, reason, memory, and the other powers and faculties which have been mentioned? Hence we learn the foundation of moral obligation. This is a subject which has been much controverted, and concerning which various opinions have been entertained. Nor is the point yet settled to the satisfaction of all. The question is often put, Why ought we to love and obey God? Why ought we to love our fellow-men? Why ought we to speak the truth? Some would say, We ought to do all those things because God has commanded us to do them. But this answer is not satisfactory; for there is a previous question. Why ought we to

obey the command of God? Merely God's commanding a thing does not make it right, and his merely forbidding a thing does not make it wrong. Right and wrong are founded in the nature of things, and not in the mere will or pleasure of any being in the universe. If God should command us to hate him, we should not be under moral obligation to hate him; or if he should command us to hate our fellow-men, we should not be under moral obligation to hate them; or if he should command us to speak that which is false, with a design to deceive and injure any man, we should not be under moral obligation to obey such a command. God appeals to men to judge with respect to the rectitude of his conduct, and the righteousness of his commands and prohibitions. "O inhabitants of Jerusalem, and men of Judah, judge, I pray you, betwixt me and my vineyard." "Yet ye say, The way of the Lord is not equal. Hear now, O house of Israel, Is not my way equal? Are not your ways unequal?" The question still returns, What is the foundation of ought and ought not, or of moral obligation? Our subject gives a short, plain, and full answer to all these queries. We ought to do some things, and ought not to do others, because we are Men, possessed of rational and moral powers, by which we are capable of knowing what is right and wrong in the nature of things. If we were not men and possessed of mental powers and faculties, which render us capable of knowing what is right and what is wrong in its own nature, no moral obligation could take hold of us, or bind us in the least degree. But the bare knowledge of what is right binds us to do it, and the bare knowledge of what is wrong binds us to avoid it. If it should be asked, why could not God make it right for us to do what is wrong in the nature of things, or make it wrong for us to do what is right in the nature of things, the reason in both cases is, because we are men, and know what is right and what is wrong in the nature of things; and so long as we know this distinction between right and wrong, our knowledge lays us under moral and immutable obligation to do what is right and avoid what is wrong, independently of the will or law of God to the contrary. Moral obligation, as we have said, does not result from the bare will of any being whatever, but from the nature of moral beings, and their mutual relations to one another, which they are capable of knowing. God has power to govern us, as we govern the horse and mule, with bit and bridle; but not by moral laws, were we not moral agents, and capable of knowing the difference between moral good and evil. Hence it appears that all moral obligation is founded in the nature of things, and cannot