which concerns the Roumanian attitude towards the Bulgarian population in the Dobrudja; but neither this nor the allotment of the southern part of that province to Roumania seems likely to be the cause of any serious development in the immediate future. So far as Hungary is concerned, almost everything depends, and must depend, upon the course shaped by events in, and connected with, the new western provinces of Roumania. As to Russia, and considering that the Bolshevist programme seems to include the attempted reconquest of all the territories formerly belonging to that country, there is naturally an ever-present risk that Roumania may be singled out in this connexion. The army of King Ferdinand is reported to be well under the control of its officers, and whilst the people, who are mainly peasants, are believed not to have been widely impregnated by Communism, this Bolshevist danger is naturally strengthened by the conditions to which I have referred. It is here, I think, that one of the real perils lies; for, with home and foreign affairs everywhere more closely connected than heretofore, it is impossible to foresee the national or international developments which might follow a crossing of the Bessarabian frontier by the forces of the enemy.

The position of, and in, Bulgaria is in many ways more changed by the war than has been that of any other Balkan country. Reduced in size from an area of about 43,300 square miles to one of about 37,400 square miles, the Treaties of Neuilly and of Sèvres, together with an unpublished Treaty * signed with Greece at the latter place, will probably make Bulgaria the smallest country in the Near East except Albania. In spite of this, the dogged, stolid, persevering nature of the people is answerable for the fact that, whilst everybody is depressed, no

*This Treaty was signed by Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan on the one hand, and by Greece on the other, on Aug. 10, 1920. Consisting of sixteen articles, its most important features are that it cedes to Greece the territories renounced by Bulgaria under Article 48 of the Treaty of Neuilly, and that it lays down certain provisions as to the economic outlets of Bulgaria to the Ægean. The port of Dédéagatch is declared of international interest, and if Bulgaria makes the demand to the Council of the League of Nations, an International Commission is to be appointed to insure the proper carrying out of the arrangements made in regard to Dédéagatch and the approaches thereto.

さ

feeling of despair exists. Indeed, it is here that I found the position to be unique, for there is not a single other Balkan Kingdom which could have suffered the disaster of 1913, still less that which has recently occurred, without a revolution. Instead, however, of any signs of revolution, the administration, the public services, and the daily life of the inhabitants are working uncommonly well, and this because the Bulgarian realises that the best policy is reconstruction, which is now in progress in all departments and throughout the country.

From the political standpoint there is a new atmosphere. In the place of an autocratic ruler and a puppet Government, there are now the youthful Tsar Boris and the Peasant régime of M. Stambolisky. Beset by innumerable difficulties and left entirely alone so far as family advisers are concerned, His Majesty, who is twenty-seven years of age, is playing the part of a constitutional ruler in the best sense of these words. He is au courant with everything that is going on, he is quickly getting to know personally a vast number of his people, and he is identifying himself with the spirit and interests of a country in which he was born and brought up. These facts, coupled with a policy of non-interference with the constitutional rights of the Government, are rapidly converting what at one time seemed to be a tottering kingship into a national institution, which institution appears destined even to become popular with the masses of the people. Thus, when I saw him in December, M. Stambolisky expressed the opinion that, were Bulgaria to be called upon to elect a President, her choice would fall upon Boris, which opinion, on being repeated during the Peasant Conference held at Sofia in February, called forth cheers from the representatives of that Party. Moreover, running parallel to this new position of the Monarchy, and forming part of the change due to the abdication of King Ferdinand, is the power now possessed by the Bulgarians to choose their own Government, a power not vested in them before the war. Thus, instead of Ministers and Parliaments being manoeuvred and dismissed at the will of one man, we now have the Peasant Government of M. Stambolisky, who has introduced legislation so drastic and far-reaching as to test his

influence, even in a democratic country like Bulgaria. In spite, however, of the very strong hostility of the other political groups and of their criticism of his prolonged European tour, this legislation, which includes a statute instituting compulsory labour, has in no way robbed the Premier of the confidence of his own Party. Indeed, when M. Stambolisky and his colleagues formally resigned in February and during the Peasant Conference which represented the organised Peasant Party at Sofia, they were immediately re-elected to office, notwithstanding the fact that the Opposition had raised a doubt as to what would be the standpoint assumed by that gathering.

With regard to the future, there are two questions of great significance. It is essential, primarily, whether he be in power or in opposition, that M. Stambolisky should realise the necessity for moderation, temperateness, and good judgment; and that, bearing in mind the recent trend of historical events in Greece, he should never lose sight of the facts that a one-man régime is a dangerous expedient, and that experienced and balanced politicians have their ways of bringing about the fall of leaders to whom they are opposed. In the second place, if we ignore, as I must here ignore, the difficulty in which Bulgaria is placed by her obligation to recruit the army by voluntary enlistment, and the fairness or unfairness of the solutions maintained or adopted in regard to Macedonia and the Dobrudja, there are still the questions of Western Thrace and of Bulgarian commercial access to the Egean. The position in regard to these questions is remarkable; for whilst, under the Treaty of Neuilly, Bulgaria definitely agreed to her frontiers with Roumania and Jugo-Slavia, she renounced her Egean coastal strip of territory in favour of the principal Allied and Associated Powers (including the United States), whose settlement as to this territory she undertook to accept. This area was subsequently handed over to Greece by the abovementioned unpublished Treaty or by the Treaty of Sèvres, to neither of which documents America was or is a party.

Whatever be the Allied decision upon the larger and broader aspects of this question, a Bulgarian access to

the Egean, guaranteed by the Treaty of Neuilly, has been again recognised. Nevertheless, to those who know the Balkans, it must be obvious that, as the pre-war outlet possessed by Serbia at Salonica was unsatisfactory to that country, so will be the Bulgarian exit upon the Ægean unless, and at least until, that exit is really and directly maintained under Allied control. Such control is, however, foreseen in the above-named unpublished Treaty, for by Article 16, Bulgaria has the right to demand from the Council of the League of Nations the appointment of an International Commission responsible for the proper execution of the arrangements about Dédéagatch. This demand may, or may not, have been made; but in any case I believe that Bulgaria is still compelled to export and import her goods only by way of her Black Sea and Danubian ports. Such a restriction, which hampers the trade of that country, is also disadvantageous to Western Europe, for it delays the arrival and increases the cost of the Bulgarian cereals of which we are in need. Consequently, unless there is to be territorial revision in regard to Western Thrace, especially as Bulgaria has now become a member of the League, it is to be hoped that an early opportunity will be taken to facilitate her trade by its natural route down the Maritza Valley, and that something will be done to give her that free use of a port which has been promised. The adoption of such measures will not only be in accordance with justice, but it will tend to increase the chances of Balkan peace.

*

The position in Turkey and in Greece, and the final attitude of the Powers towards the Treaty of Sèvres, are so obscure that it is useless here to dogmatise upon these questions. Indeed, although at one time it seemed possible that the Near Eastern Conference, which met in London on Feb. 21, would be able to come to an immediate and definite decision upon these all-important subjects, things are changing so rapidly from day to day, that I shall only attempt briefly to allude to the situations which I found existing in Constantinople, in the Smyrna area, and in Athens, pointing out in as few