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words as possible the meaning of these positions and their effect upon the future trend of political events in this part of the world.
To begin with, in theory there are, or were, two Turkeys-Constantinople, and the greater part of Anatolia. The former area, the one with which I am now directly concerned, extends only just beyond the Chatalja Lines and in Asia roughly up to Ismid. As defined by the Treaty of Sèvres, Turkey in Europe thus includes merely European Constantinople and its immediate precincts, which have an area of about 1500 square miles and
a population of approximately 1,200,000 souls. On the other hand, whilst almost the whole of Anatolia, to the east of a line drawn more or less south approximately from Broussa to the Mediterranean, forms nominally a second Turkey under the Nationalists, the Hellenic Army is in occupation of a large zone over and above the Smyrna area allotted to Greece under the Treaty. The whole country is, therefore, in chaos and, so to speak, in the melting-pot; for whereas the Constantinople Government has signed, and could be compelled to stand by, the Treaty of Sèvres, most of, if not all, its members, together with practically the entire Turkish population, are in sympathy with, and prepared to support, Mustapha Kemal Pasha and the Angora party. This state of things, which was clearly demonstrated by the attitude adopted by the two Delegations who attended the London Conference, means that we can now take Turkey as being represented by one policy—the policy of so-called
There are two distinct aspects of the Treaty of Sèvres which are worthy of consideration--the fairness and the wisdom of originating that document and the honesty or the desirability of revising it. Knowing well the difficulties and the dangers besetting any solution of the Ottoman problem, and realising that there are two sides to any question, I feel decidedly that this international instrument was both unjust and ill-advised. Whilst an enemy may not be entitled to be dealt with on the basis of equity, the Treaty was unjust because it does not fulfil the policy defined by Mr Lloyd George and implied by Mr Wilson; because there is good reason Vol. 235.-No. 467.
to suppose that it does not realise the principle of nationalities; and because it places both Constantinople and Smyrna in positions which are not natural from the economic standpoint. Equally well, considering the present political situation in Europe, and taking into account the difficulties of a far-reaching campaign in Asiatic Turkey, the Treaty of Sèvres was ill-advised, because of the obstacles to be overcome in, and the expense of, its enforcement, because of its effect throughout the Moslem East, and because it could not tend to the establishment and maintenance of good relations between Turkey and Greece. These considerations, which should have been given the fullest weight more than two years ago, before the Greeks were allowed to land at Smyrna in May 1919, and even up to the time of the presentation of the Treaty in May 1920, are not equally applicable to-day. This is the case since, in the existing circumstances, and considering events which have taken place in connexion with the Treaty, its far-reaching revision or redrafting would now be almost as impracticable and unjust as was its original inception. The demands made by the Turks, gratified by diplomatic victory, would be entirely incapable of satisfaction, the withdrawal of the Hellenic armies from districts where they are firmly established, might well require the administration of pressure so firm and so concrete as to have its percussions elsewhere, and the work done by the Greeks in Asia Minor and to a lesser extent in Thrace gives them a claim which they did not possess at the time of the Armistice. Considering the sacrifi they have made, that claim would, in any case, be a real one; but its magnitude is enhanced by two distinct conditions. The Hellenic advance made in Asia Minor last summer and at the instigation of the Allies, was probably the means of saving Constantinople and the Dardanelles from falling into the hands of the Nationalists. And whilst M. Venizelos himself does not attempt to deny the terrible nature of the events which took place at Smyrna at the time of the original Greek landing, I feel sure, from personal observation in that town, in Broussa, in the area lying between these places, and in Adrianople, that the conduct of the Greek Army has been on the whole excellent, and that the administration instituted
by M. Sterghiades * and M. Saktouris † left but little to criticise. In what at one time appeared to be a deadlock, therefore, all that can be added is that every care should be taken to safeguard the lives and interests of the nonTurkish populations left or given back to Turkey, and that those answerable for the framing of this disputatious document are, and must, remain responsible, either for its enforcement or its modification, and thus for the early settlement of a question the prolongation of which is disastrous to all concerned.
With regard to the present situation of, and in, Greece, the complications surrounding the Treaty of Sèvres and the uncertainty concerning what may be the ultimate results of the election of last November, render it impossible to enter into details here. It may, however, be said that, whether or not the Treaty of Sèvres now be subjected to modifications, the war will have changed the position of Greece from that of a Balkan State of secondary importance into that of a Mediterranean Power whose influence must be far-reaching. Thus, even if the present arrangements as to the future of Smyrna be modified, nothing seems likely to prevent the Hellenic people from securing a wide extension of territory in Europe, and from obtaining, firstly, the Ægean Islands, formerly in dispute with Turkey, and, secondly, the Dodekanese Islands, now in the occupation of Italy. Likewise, although the change may be primarily a legal one, Greece has gained a great moral advantage by the abrogation of the special rights of control and supervision which formed the legitimate excuse for Allied intervention in Hellenic affairs during the war.
* M. Sterghiades was appointed by M. Venizelos to the post of Greek High Commissioner at Smyrna in May 1919. As the result of the exhortations of M. Venizelos, he remained in the same post after the advent to power of the Royalist régime at Athens, and, so far as is known to the present writer, he is still at Smyrna.
+ M. Saktouris, who was appointed Greek High Commissioner of Thrace by M. Venizelos when the Greeks took over that area in July 1920, was replaced after the election of November last.
| By an arrangement made between Italy and Greece, in August 1920, the Dodekanese Islands which are ceded by Turkey to Italy under the Treaty of Sèvres, with the exception of Rhodes, are to be transferred to Greece. The people of Rhodes are to be provided with an autonomy by Italy, and, after fifteen years have expired, if and when Great Britain gives Cyprus to Greece, then a plebiscite shall be held to decide as to whether Rhodes shall also be handed over to that country.
The place of these rights has now been taken by the Greek obligation for the protection of minorities. *
Coming to the election of November last and to its results, there are only two points which I wish to make. The defeat of M. Venizelos was influenced not by foreign but by home policy. Thus, whereas there may be those who fear the burdens now undertaken in Europe and Asia, the developments connected with the London Conference prove that the Hellenic people were not critical of the ex-Premier as a consequence of the gains which he had secured for them, and that they were unwilling to sacrifice any territory which has now passed into Greek hands. Also, whatever may have been the attitude of King Constantine and of his supporters during the war, now that the Central Powers are beaten, there is no longer any question of their advocating a policy of friendship for Germany, which country is cordially disliked by the vast majority of Hellenes. Consequently, for this reason, and since it was obviously impossible for the victorious Powers to stand between the Greek people and the ideal for which they voted, the only course was to accept the new situation, however disappointing it might be. With respect to the future, and whereas such an acceptance forms the limit of our obligations, it is to be hoped that the relations between the Allies and Greece may soon become normal, even if not cordial, and that the two great sections of the Hellenic people may be able to reconcile their differences before those differences have reacted to the widespread disadvantage of a State which at one time seemed destined to occupy an entirely new position in the Balkans, in Europe, and in the world in general.
Albania, now the smallest Unit in the Peninsula, is the only country which remained neutral during the
* A Treaty dealing with these questions was signed between Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan on the one hand, and by Greece on the other, at Sèvres on Aug. 10, 1920. According to it, Great Britain and France renounce the special rights of supervision and control in relation to Greece, which formerly devolved upon them under various Treaties and Conventions made between 1830 and 1864, and Greece confirms certain rights given to the population of her territories, and extends these rights to the peoples of the areas now added to that Kingdom. Treaty Series 1920, No. 13, Cmd. 960.