but, when this is made known to us, it should teach us to acquiesce in, and be entirely resigned to the divine will.

(2.) When we cannot see the reason, or understand the meaning of the dispensations of divine providence, and are not able to pass a judgment concerning future events, whether relating unto ourselves, or others; and, when all things look with a very dismal aspect, as to what concerns the interest and church of God in the world, we must be content to wait till he is pleased to discover them to us; what he oftentimes does, we know not now, but shall know hereafter, as our Saviour said to one of his disciples, John xiii. 7. It is no wonder that we are at a loss, as to God's purposes, since secret things belong to him; and therefore all that we are to do, in such a case, is, to rest satisfied, that all these things shall, in the end, appear to have a tendency to advance his own perfections, and bring about the salvation of his people.

(3.) Since the purpose of God respects the means, as well as the end, this should put us upon the use of those proper means, in which we may hope to obtain grace and glory; and therefore this doctrine does not lead us to sloth, and indifference in religion; for that is to suppose, that the ends and means are separated in God's purpose: and when, through his blessing attending them, the ordinances, or means of grace, are made effectual for the working of faith, and all other graces, these being connected, in God's purpose, with glory, it ought to encourage our hope relating to the end of faith, even the salvation of our souls.

(4.) Let us take heed that we do not peremptorily, without ground conclude ourselves elected unto eternal life, on the one hand, or rejected on the other. To determine that we are chosen to salvation, before we are effectually called, is presumptuously to enter into God's secret counsels, which we cannot, at present, have a certain and determinate knowledge of; but to lay this as a foundation, as to what concerns the conduct of our lives, is oftentimes of a very pernicious tendency. If, as the result of this conclusion made, we take encouragement to go on in sin, this will cut the sinews of all religion, and expose us to blindness of mind, and hardness of heart, and a greater degree of impenitency and unbelief, as the consequence of this bold presumption and affront to the divine Majesty.

Neither, on the other hand, are we to conclude that we are not elected; for though we may be in suspense about the event of things, and not know whether we are elected or rejected, this is not inconsistent with our using endeavours to attain a good hope, through grace; yet to determine that we are not elected, is to conclude, against ourselves that all endeavours will be to no purpose; which we have no ground to do, since

it is one thing to conclude that we are in a state of unregeneracy, and another thing to determine that we are not elected. The consequence of our concluding that we are in an unconverted state, ought to be our praying, waiting, and hoping for the efficacy of divine grace, which extends itself to the chief of sinners, as a relief against despair, though such can have no ground to say, they are elected; therefore the safest way, and that which is most conducive to the ends of religion, is to be firmly persuaded, that though the final state of man be certainly determined by God, yet this is to be no rule for an unregenerate person to take his measures from, any more than if it were a matter of uncertainty, and, in all respects, undetermined by him.

(5.) Let us, according to the apostle's advice, Give diligence to make our calling and election sure, 2 Pet. i. 10. It is certainly a very great privilege for us, not barely to know, that some were chosen to eternal life, but to be able to conclude that we are of that happy number; and, in order hereunto, we must not expect to have an extraordinary revelation thereof, or to find ourselves described by name in scripture, as though this were the way to attain it; for the rule by which we are to judge of this matter, is, our enquiring whether we have those marks, or evidences thereof, which are contained therein; and therefore we are, by a diligent and impartial self-examination, to endeavour to know whether we are called, or enabled, to perform the obedience of faith, which God is said to elect his people to; or whether we are holy, and without blame, before him in love? whether we have the temper and disposition of the children of God, as an evidence of our being chosen to the adoption of children, and as such, are conformed to the image of Christ?

(6.) If we have ground to conclude that we are chosen to eternal life, this ought to be improved to the glory of God, and our own spiritual advantage; it ought to put us upon admiring and adoring the riches of discriminating grace, which is herein eminently illustrated; and such are under the highest obligation to walk humbly with God, as well as thankfully; for it is owing to his grace, not only that they are chosen to eternal life, but that they are enabled to discern their interest in this privilege. (a)

(a) "When we contend for this doctrine as a truth, it should be viewed in connexion with its real importance. These two objects are extremely different in things natural, civil, and religious. There are many things true in history, in philosophy, in politics, and even in theology, which no sober person deems important. There are other things hypothetically important, whether actually true or not. And of this kind is the subject before us. Such is the nature, the con. nexion, and consequences of it, that if it be true, it cannot fail of being of the first importance.

But how are we more particularly to estimate the importance of this subject? By the mfluence which the admission or the denial of it has on the very foundations of religion. For instance, if it be Nor true, either man himself or mere chance has the principal share in effecting our actual salvation, and investing us with eternal glory. Some indeed are so lost to modesty and self-knowledge, and so unacquainted with the leading truths of christianity, that they do not scruple to ascribe the eventual difference in our future state, whether good or bad, to man himself, but attended with some verbal, unmeaning compliment to divine mercy. Such persons should first learn the rudiments of christianity, before they have a right to expect any deference shewn to their opinions. On the other hand, if this BE true, its utility is plain; it will hide pride from man; it will exclude chance from having any share in our deliverance; it will exalt the grace of God; it will render salvation a certain, and not a precarious thing; and, in a word, it will secure to them who have the Spirit of Christ the greatest consolation.

This was the view which our episcopal reformers had of the doctrine, both as to its truth, and the importance of it. "Predestination to life" say they," is the everlasting purpose of God, whereby, before the foundations of the world were Jaid, he hath constantly decreed by his counsel, secret to us, to deliver from curse and damnation those whom he hath chosen in Christ out of mankind, and to bring them by Christ to everlasting salvation, as vessels made to honour.The godly consideration of Predestination and our election in Christ is full of sweet, pleasant, and unspeakable comfort to godly persons, and such as feel in themselves the working of the Spirit of Christ mortifying the works of the flesh, and their earthly members, and drawing up their minds to high and heavenly things; as well because it doth greatly establish and confirm their faith of eternal salvation, to be enjoyed through Christ, as because it doth fervently kindle their love towards God."-Another observation I would make is,

2. That it is highly proper, in order to investigate the present subject with success, to keep it perfectly distinct, and free from all impure mixtures. This is what some of our early reformers, and many of the modern defenders of this doctrine have not done. For want of this, many bitter enemies have opposed it. Dr. WHITBY, for instance, and most who have written on the same side of the question since his time, place predestination to death, or reprobation to misery, as the very foundation of Calvinism, and inseparable from predestination to life. But so far is predestination to death from being true, that nothing can be more untrue. It is but an arbitrary assumption; a foreign, impure mixture, having no foundation either in the real meaning of holy writ, or in the nature of things; except indeed we mean by it, what no one questions, a determination to punish the guilty.

• Predestination to Death or misery, as the end, and to sin as the means, I call “an impure mixture;" a mixture, because its connexion with Predestination to life is arbitrary and forced;-impure, because the supposition itself is a foul aspersion of the divine character. St. Augustine, Calvin, Perkins, Twisse, Rutherford, &c. &c. though highly valuable and excellent men, upon the whole, were not free from this impure mixture of doctrine. But of all modern authors, if we except the philosophical Necessarians, Hobbes, Collins, Hume, Hartley, Priestly, &c. Dr. Hopkins, of America seems the most open in his avowal of the sentiment, that sin and misery are decreed in the same manner as holiness and happiness, in order to produce the greatest general good. The substance of his reasoning is thus expressed by himself: "All future existences, events, and actions, must have a cause of their futurition, or there must be a reason why they are future, or certainly to take place, rather than not. This cause must be the divine decree determining their future existence, or it must be in the future existences themselves. But the "future existences could not be the cause of their own futurition; for this supposes them to ex"ist as a cause, and to have influence, before they have any existence, even from eternity.-The "cause therefore can be nothing but divine decree, determining their future existence, without which nothing could be future, consequently nothing could be known to be future."-See his System of doctrines, 2 vol. 8vo. especially Vol. i p 110-217.

On the sentiment itself, by whomsoever held, I would offer the following strictures: 1. It is a mere assumption, that sin, which the above proposition avowedly includes, has no possible cause of its futurition but either the divine decree, or the future existences themselves. For though God's decrees are the cause of our being, faculties, and volitions, none of these, nor any thing else that can be traced to divine causation, will constitute sin. Nor yet is it true that sin is the cause of itself; for then sin would be self-existent. It follows therefore that it must have another origin than either the divine decree or its own existence.

2. It is equally plain that the cause of sin is not itself morally evil; for this would involve a contradiction, making cause and effect to be the same thing. Nor yet can the cause be morally good. For as from truth nothing but truth can ligitimately proceed, so from good nothing but good can flow. Evil, indeed, is related to good, but not as cause and effect. Though evil could got follow were there no infinite good, no creature, no will, no freedom, yet something else must

But is not one man's misery as certain as another man's happiness? Yes, equally certain. What then; must they therefore be equally predestinated? No, But how can a thing be certain, if it be not predestinated? Have a little patience and I will tell you. The previous question is, Does God predestinate to sin as the means, and to death or misery as the end, in the same way as he predesti

be ought as the matrix, where the monster sin is generated and fostered, and which, morally considered, is neither good nor evil.-Therefore,

3. We assert, that the origin of moral evil is to be found in the union of two principles, neither of which considered alone partakes of a moral character. These two principles are Liberty and Passive Power. Liberty, it is manifest is morally neither good nor bad, but is a mere natural instrument, if I may so speak, and may be termed a natural good of which God is the author and decreer. On the contrary, Passive Power is a natural evil of which God is not the author or decreer, yet morally considered is not evil. But this term, being little understood, requires further explanation; at least it is incumbent on me to shew in what sense I use it. My design is not to vindicate the use of it by others, but I adopt it to convey a specific idea, for which I find no other word or phrase more appropriate. By Passive Power," then, I mean, That which is of unavoidable necessity found in every creature, as such, in direct opposition to the self-existence, independence, and all-sufficiency of God. In other words, it is that tendency to nihility, physically considered, and to defection, morally considered, which of absolute necessity belongs to every dependent or created nature. That there is such a principle is self-evident, nor is it probable that any reasonable being will ever controvert its existence. Now, it is demonstrable that this, from the definition, cannot be the object of divine decree, or of will; for it is stated to be of absolute or unavoidable necessity; besides, it is absurd to suppose that God has decreed, or produces, any thing the existence of which stands in direct contrariety to himself. That it is not a moral evil is plain, for the holiest creatures are subjects of it-God alone is exempt.

4. Let it be further observed, that the First Cause, being goodness itself, impels, whether de. cretively or efficiently, to good only; and of this character is even our being necessitated to exercise our volitions. Yet, when the exercise of liberty, in itself innocent, unites with passive power, the fruit or offspring of this union is moral evil. This, I am fully persuaded, is the true solution of this question, Whence cometh moral evil? If any person shall think proper candidly to assign his reasons to the contrary, due regard shall be paid to them.

5. If it be asked, where lies the difference between decreeing and permitting sin to take place? I answer, the difference is, that the one would be an act of injustice, the other is doing nothing. So that until it can be shewn that there is no difference between injustice and doing nothing, there is no force in the objection That to necessitate sin decretively would be an act of injus tice, and therefore incompatible with the divine character.is, I think. demonstrable; for, it would be to decree to destruction antecedently to desert-to anihilate the sinfulness of any act, making its evil nature to consist in its effects-and to destroy the immutable essences of good and evil. Whereas to permit, or to suffer to take place without prevention, is not to act not to decree. To "decree to permit." therefore, is a contradiction in terms,

6. But, it has been said, the event is the same to the sinner, whether he be hurried on to sin and misery by a decretive impulse, or these effects are not prevented when in the power of omnipotence to interpose. This objection would have some weight, if the happiness of the creature were the only, or even the principal end of God in creation. But this not being the case, its weight vanishes. To illustrate this we may suppose, that the event of a man's execution is well known to a judge; but, instead of proceeding on the principles of law and equity, and to effect conviction and condemnation according to legal evidence, he orders the man to be executed clandestinely without any equitable process, under pretence that it could make no difference to the sufferer, for the event of his execution was certain! Besides, the spirit of the objection reflects en God's actual dealings with his creatures, in every instance of their sufferings; because it is in the power of omnipotence to interpose. And in fact, it must be allowed, either that the hap piness of the creature is not the chief end of creation, or that the permission of sin is an act of injustice. But the case is plain, that his own glory is the chief end of creation and government, and that there is no injustice in the permission of sin.

7. It may be said, If the union of liberty with passive power be the origin of moral evil, and if the holiest creatures in heaven are both free and the subjects of passive power, how is it that they do not sin! If both are united in the same persons, does the one never terminate upon; or unite itself to the other? In answer to this enquiry, we must distinguish between having the princi ple, and being under its influence without controul. Though the spirits of the just, and holy angels, have in them the principle, as the condition of their created existence, yet it is counteracted by sovereign favour. They may say, as well as Paul, by the grace of God we are what we are. The object of divine support is the disposition, or the seat of moral action; this being made good, or pure, or holy, prior to all acts of the will, effectually counteracts the influence of passive power. The Liberty and choice of a heavenly being therefore, terminating on such a dis position, no acts but such as are holy can ensue. Hence,

8. If we would know how this is consistent with the actual fall of beings who were once in this condition, we must attend to another important consideration; which is, that when God at any time deals in mere equity with a moral agent, without the counteracting influence of sovereign favour, the inevitable consequence is, that his liberty, or free choice, will terminate upon his passive power. Hence the certainty of the futurition of moral evil, in all possible degrees and circumstances, without any decretive efficiency in its production,-If it be asked, why the exercise of equity is assigned as the occasion of this union, rather than sovereignty; or, why leaving a free agent to the influence of his passive power should not be considered a sovereign rather than an equitable act? The best answer to this enquiry, is a definition of the two terms. By equity then I mean the principle that gives to each his due; by sovereignty, a right to do whatsoever is not inconsistent with equity. And from this definition it must appear that there may be a twofold deviation from equity, viz. giving more than is due, or less than is due; more good and less evil, or more evil and less good than is equitable. The former of these, more good and less evil, must needs be for the advantage of the creature; and therefore it may be called a gracious deviation. Without it, there would be no room for either mercy or grace. The latter, more evil and less good than is due, is properly called injustice, and is such a deviation from equity as is

nates to holiness as the means, and eternal glory as the end? This we deny, as it would be infinitely unworthy of God, making him the author of sin, or doing evil that good may come. Some indeed have distinguished between being the author or the cause of sin, and being a sinner. But the distinction itself is not solid, nor could it fully satisfy those who have made it in clearing the divine character.*

not compatible with the divine character. Therefore, to do us good beyond our claim is an act of sovereignty; but to give us neither more nor less than is our due is to deal with as in pure equity..

9. Hence it follows, that when God deals with angels or men in sovereignty, according to the definitions, he does them good beyond their claim. But to make this to be the immediate conse of the sin of men and angels is absurd. On the other hand, it is incompatible with the divine character, as before observed, to give them less good and more evi! than is their due; and therefore this cannot be the cause of sin, as sure as God is incapable of exercising injustice.-Wherefore, it remains that then alone can moral agents fail into sin when dealt with in pure equity. In the act of defection, or becoming sinful, they are equally free from being impelled by injus tice, and upheld by sovereign favour.

COROLIARIES,

1. All the good and happiness in the universe of created beings are the fruit of Sovereignty and Decree.

2. All the moral evil and misery in the universe are the offspring of liberty, a natural good, terminating or acting upon, or united to passive power, a natural evil not count racted by sove reignly gracious acts on the disposition, or the seat of the moral principle, which may be called analogically the heart.

3. As every act and degree of liberty is perfectly fore-known to God as the effect of his own decree, and every hypothetical tendency of passive power, though itself not an object of decree, is equally fore-known, it follows, that every sin is as accurately fore.known as if decreed, and has an equally infallible ground of certain futurition.

⚫. It is allowed that there is a difference between the cause of sin, as a principle, and being a sinner; but when applied to an agent, to be the author or the cause of sin, and to be a sinner, is the same thing. Therefore, when applied to God, in no proper sense whatever can it be said that he is the author of sin. If by the author of sin is meant (says President Edwards) the pernit. ter, or a not hinderer of sin, and at the same time a disposer of the state of events in such a man. ner, for wise, holy, and most excellent ends and purposes, that sin infallibly follows: I say, if this be all that is meant by the author of sin, I do not deny that God is the author of sin, though 1 dislike and reject the phrase, as that which by use and custom is apt to carry another sense." Edwards on the Will, Part iv. Sect. xi.

But though this acute and excellent writer disavows the use of the phrase, he no where assigns the true ground why it should not be used. The truth is, he does not seem to have been aware of any alternative between the certain futurition of sin and its being decreed. And his only method of warding off the most ruinous consequences appears to have been adopted for want of a better, and not from the satisfactory nature of that method. His view, in brief, is this: God is a being of infinite goodness and wisdom; he can will nothing but good; the system he hath adopted is the best; now, says he, if the will be good, and the object of his will be, all things considered, good and best, then the choosing and willing it, is not willing evil. And if so, then his ordering according to that will is not doing evil"

It is very seldom that this eminent author fails in his reasoning; but here certainly he does fail. The phrases willing evil, and doing evil, are not used in the same sense in both parts of the premises, from whence the conclusion is inferred. A system, all things considered, being best, is no good reason why each individual part of it is good. And it may be forcibly retorted; a system which includes an infinite evil as a part of its institution cannot be from God. Nor can it be said that this is arguing against fact, without begging the question, that God has appointed the evil which is blended with the good.-On the subject itself let the following things be considered: 1. If choosing and willing a system in which sin is a decreed part is not willing evil, because the system is good and best, all things considered then it would inevitably follow, that sin, hecause such a part of that system is not an evil. But, it may be said, It is willing it for a good end, Does then a good end or intention destroy the nature of sin? Was the sin of Paul or any other saint anihilated because he sincerely aimed at the Glory of God? Or has any design, however.comprehensive, exalted or sincere, the least tendency to alter the nature of sin?

2. Allowing as incontrovertible that the present sytem of things is the best, all things considered, and that sin is actually blended with it, it does not thence follow that the sin itself is decreed, or is any part of divine appointment. For not to hinder sin, is extremely different from being the cause or author of it. The one is perfectly consistent with equity, the other would be an act of injustice.

3. It is a sentiment so repugnant to all analogical propriety, to do evil that good may come, that it cannot be supposed a man of Mr. Edward's piety would have adopted any thing like it, but from what appeared to him an inevitable necessity. And indeed whoever assumes the principle, that every event comes to pass from decretive necessity, sin not excepted, must of course be driven to his conclusion. But this valuable author had no need to recur to that opinion, in order to es tablish his theory of hypothetical necessity; for this will stand on a rock, immoveably, without such aid.

4. In reality, the certain futurition of good, and that of evil, arises from different, yea from diametrically opposite causes The one flows from the operative will of God, and is fore-known to be future bec use decreed, the other flows from a deficient or privative cause, passive power, when united to liberty, as before explained, which exists only in created beings, and in all these. as a contrast to self-existence, independence, and all-sufficiency. Yet this is the subject of hypothetical tendencies and results no less than the good to which it stands opposed, in all the bound. less varieties of its blendings; therefore no case can be so complicated, but to infinite prescience he event must appear with equal certainty as if decreed.