August 1914 there was a discussion at the German Embassy, in which Enver took part, as to the conclusion of a secret Turco-German Alliance, and as to the employment of the German Mission in case Turkey entered the war. Liman von Sanders at once referred to the provision for his retirement in case Germany became engaged in war, and he requested the Emperor for that recall. In reply, and be it remembered during the Turkish neutrality, he was twice told that his service would be counted as though he were in the field with the German Army. Again, the Chief of the Military Mission confirms what Mr Morgenthau* has already said: namely, that the Germans never made any secret of the fact that the so-called purchase of the 'Goeben' and the 'Breslau' was a mere farce. Lastly, and here the inference adduced by the author seems open to doubt, we are told that as the naval attack against Russia, which carried Turkey into the war, took place under the Turkish flag, it is probable that Djemal Pasha had given his consent to this undertaking. That politician had expressed himself to Halidé Edib as strongly opposed to war only a few weeks earlier, and, in my opinion, the most likely and real explanation of this all-important event still is that Enver and Talaat were determined to wait no longer, and that they agreed with, or were persuaded by, Wangenheim (the German Ambassador) to launch an attack upon Russia without the approval of the Minister directly responsible.

Coming to the actual events of the war, General Liman von Sanders clearly shows that, whilst a decisive Allied success could not have been won at the Dardanelles unless the landing of a large force was coincident with or antecedent to the passage of a fleet, such a landing, undertaken without the warning given by our preliminary bombardment, would have achieved the desired result. In general the enemy was so lacking in all the requirements of modern war as to prove that the Turks, like other Eastern peoples, can really carry on hostilities under conditions quite impossible in the West. Turkish efficiency was at a very low standard, corruption was rife from end to end of the country, and on one occasion

Secrets of the Bosphorus,' by Ambassador Morgenthau. Hutchinson.

Liman von Sanders actually received a present of six bottles of wine requisitioned by a high official from a friendly gift addressed to him. Furthermore, although the operations in the East were practically directed from the Great General Headquarters, the Kaiser seems often to have been badly informed about conditions prevailing there, and the Intelligence Department at Constantinople knew so little of what was going on that, during the critical days of the final retreat in Syria, Liman von Sanders actually received a telegram asking whether he would be willing to offer a prize for a sack-race to be held in the then Ottoman Capital! The Germans were in real if not nominal control of the Ottoman forces, but the Turks were invariably jealous and no gratitude was shown by Enver and his compatriots.

On the other side of the world's picture and for nearly three years after Turkey threw in her lot with the Central Powers, the Allies clearly favoured a destructive line of policy for Turkey, this policy being indicated by a whole series of statements and agreements between the Western belligerents and Russia. With the fall of Tzardom and the entry of the United States into the war in the spring of 1917, however, there occurred a distinct modification in the atmosphere-a modification suggesting that for the concluding year of the war the maintenance of a more or less powerful Turkey was under contemplation. Thus early in 1918 Mr Lloyd George declared that we were not seeking to deprive that country of her capital or of her rich lands in Asia Minor and Thrace, and Mr Wilson launched his 'Fourteen Points' under which the Turkish portions of the Empire were to be assured a secure sovereignty. A little later, in March 1918, the New Russian Government, having repudiated the imperialistic aims of its predecessors, made the independent Treaty of Brest-Litovsk under which she returned the districts of Kars, Ardahan, and Batoum taken from Turkey in 1878. Lastly, whereas the terms of the Armistice, concluded at Mudros on October 1918, amounted to an unconditional surrender, they contained nothing which really foresaw or prejudiced the eventual peace.

It is advisable here to take a glance at the situation existing at the time of the Allied occupation of Con

stantinople, of the Straits, and of certain other parts of the Ottoman Empire. The Turks, who had been engaged in almost continuous war for about seven years, were more than anxious for peace. Germany and the Committee were very seriously discredited, and most of the leading Young Turks had been or were being compelled to fly the country. At the same time the Turkish fear of Russia had greatly decreased, the prestige of that country having materially improved, largely as a result of the above-mentioned cession of territory. The Allies, particularly Great Britain, with whom there had always been a traditional friendship, were also far from unpopular in the Ottoman Empire. These circumstances, coupled with the complete disappearance of German influence and with the understanding that the army was to be demobolised, gave to the victorious Powers the opportunity of imposing almost any form of peace which appealed to them. That opportunity was lost, and for some time the Peace Conference devoted little real attention to the Eastern Question. Not so, however, with M. Venizelos, whose opportunity came at the end of April 1919, when it was decided at Versailles to permit, to encourage, or to propose the Greek occupation of Smyrna. That occupation, no doubt sanctioned in order to prevent Great Britain and France from being obliged to fulfil their promises to Italy in regard to Western Anatolia, took place on May 15. It constituted the basis of practically all the subsequent trouble, and was the direct cause of the establishment and development of Turkish Nationalism as we know it to-day.

The international and local developments bound up with the Turkish struggle for independence, which lasted from May 1919 until the conclusion of the Mudania Convention in October 1922, are difficult to describe briefly. Here, however, Mr Grinnell Mears' book is of great assistance and value; and here it is advisable to divide the period in question into two parts, the first of which extends to and somewhat beyond the signature of the Treaty of Sèvres in August 1920. During this stage, it is clear that the Allies, particularly Great Britain, had reverted to their policy outlined during the earlier phases of the war, and favoured what

practically amounted to a 'bag and baggage' policy, so far as Constantinople, the Straits, and Smyrna were concerned. The victorious Powers controlled the puppet Government of the Sultan, and the movement in Asia Minor was treated as a passing insurrection. Informal conversations took place and semi-official statements were made, but until April 1920 no definite and comprehensive decisions were taken. In that month, however, the Conference of San Remo agreed that large areas, including the Smyrna Zone and Eastern Thrace, were to go to Greece, and determined that the Straits should be internationalised. These decisions provoked further Nationalist Opposition; the Allies decided to employ Greece as an agent for putting the terms of their Treaty into operation, and, having already been allowed to occupy Western and Eastern Thrace, the Hellenic Army made a further deep advance in Anatolia during the summer of 1920. In August the Allied and Constantinople Governments signed the Treaty of Sèvres-a Treaty stillborn as a result of the attitude of Mustapha Kemal and his colleagues.

As already stated, the Greek landing and the feared Turkish loss of Smyrna were principally responsible for the formation or more correctly for the rapid growth of the Nationalist movement. Earlier in 1919 a number of local committees had been established; but it was not until the arrival of Mustapha Kemal Pasha in Anatolia that these Committees took practical shape. In May, that leader, who enjoyed the advantages of being a known opponent of the pro-German policy of the Young Turks and of having won a great military reputation during the war, was appointed by the Constantinople Government as Inspector-General of the Turkish forces in north-eastern Asia Minor. But instead of carrying out this duty, which he naturally never intended to perform, Mustapha Kemal immediately assumed the Nationalist Leadership. The delivery of arms to the Allies at once came to an end, the local militias were transformed into more regular troops, and two Congresses, which claimed the independence of Turkey within the Armistice line, were held. For the moment no official breach took place with Constantinople. At the end of 1919 there was a general

election, favoured by the Nationalists, and the new Parliament, which met at Constantinople, approved the terms of the now famous National Pact in the following January. Shortly afterwards the Allies undertook a more comprehensive occupation of the capital, very unwisely they arrested and exiled a number of leading Turks, said to be supporters of the Nationalists, and they brought about the dissolution of the newly-elected Chamber. About the same time, too, the Sheik-ul-Islam and the Grand Vizier denounced Mustapha Kemal and his companions, and a Nationalist Assembly, formed partly of deputies who had escaped from Constantinople, and partly of local nominees, met at Angora. That event, coupled with Mustapha Kemal's open disavowal of the authority of the Sultan and with his immediate election to the Presidency of the Chamber, signified the formal breach between Angora and Constantinople, and marked the establishment of the Nationalist régime as the sole Turkish force of any real importance.

By the end of 1920, when M. Venizelos had been defeated at the polls, and when the Nationalist strength was growing to be recognised, the situation entered upon its second stage. That stage was marked by an ever-increasing discord between the Allies in regard to their Eastern policy and by steadily improving relations between Angora and Moscow. The Western Powers, and particularly France, at once showed their unwillingness to lend to King Constantine the required support, deciding instead to amend if not to destroy the Treaty of Sèvres. The London Conference of February and March 1921, attended by the Greeks and by delegates from Constantinople and Angora, came to nothing. Throughout the summer of that year there was almost continuous Turco-Hellenic fighting, and, in September, the battle of the Sakkaria River, in which Mustapha Kemal himself took the command, saw the end of the Greek successes in Anatolia. About this time, too, the power and the prestige of that leader were greatly increased by the withdrawal of Italy from Adalia and by two agreements of far-reaching importance. In March the Nationalists signed a Treaty with Moscow under which they secured the recognition of their

For details, see Survey of International Affairs, 1920-1923.'