In My Opinion... NUCLEAR-POWERED DETERRENCE LIEUTENANT COLONEL DONALD F. MARTIN HERE is lack of agreement among the military as to the importance of Taircraft nuclear propulsion (ANP). If ANP is of extreme importance, then it follows that such importance can be clearly established and evaluated. Aircraft nuclear propulsion will provide a weapon system of practically unlimited endurance or range. Air forces have always sought to extend the range of their aircraft. Many air campaigns of World War II were compromised by limited range. Although the effort to increase range has been continuous, all aircraft flying today are still limited in range by their fuel capacity. Added range has been purchased at the price of increasing aircraft size and thereby fuel capacity. We have also resorted to an expensive and complex air-refueling force whose sole contribution to our strategic offensive capability is to extend the range of our nuclear-armed bomber force. ANP will eventually end our quest for increased range by supplying virtually limitless fuel. The application of nuclear propulsion to manned aircraft means that a single weapon system will possess: • very low vulnerability to surface attack; • residual strategic offensive capability after an aggressor's initial nuclear attack; and • ability to perform postattack reconnaissance to ensure precise application of our residual capability. Thus, in effect, ANP will provide the means for locating and destroying the enemy's remaining military capability after a missile barrage. Our remaining weapons can, after reconnaissance, be applied against the enemy's surviv ing weapons that could strike our country. We do not have to use our remaining weapons against the aggressor's cities and people whose destruction cannot influence the outcome of the war. ANP and the ALBM When a nuclear-powered aircraft is equipped with the air-launched ballistic missile (ALBM), a weapon system is created that combines the advantages of the manned airborne aircraft with the superior ability of the ballistic missile to penetrate to the target. In general characteristics a first-generation Camal (continuously air borne missile launcher and low-level penetration bomber) might well be subsonic with a maximum operating ceiling of 40 to 50 thousand feet. Because of nuclear power, it could also cruise indefinitely at low altitudes. Some people who are otherwise enthusiastic about Camal are troubled by such an aircraft's subsonic speed. In a combination with the ALBM, the importance of the aircraft's speed is reduced because the ALBM does not now have a penetration problem nor is it likely to encounter one for quite some time. ANP and deterrence Since our national policy is to deter war, how will ANP contribute to more effective deterrence? During the period of expanding sac capability and U.S. nuclear-bomb monopoly, deterrence approached the absolute. Our margin of deterrence has been steadily lessening since the Soviet Union achieved a significant and ever-increasing nuclear-weapon capability. Within the very near future a condition of parity in strategic nuclear-offensive capability will exist between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. This means that if a nation commits aggression and starts a war, that nation cannot prevent the U.S. from launching a significant retaliatory blow. Under this nuclear parity, deterrence will exist only if the U.S. has an actual, credible ability to survive a nuclear attack with sufficient residual capability to end the war in our favor. The key is residual capability, which poses the question of vulnerability of U.S. strategic forces. Today the Polaris-launching submarine promises to be an effective strategic weapon system. It is easy to visualize how difficult it would be for the enemy to destroy our Polaris submarines hidden under the seas. This concealed deployment and other advantages are to be found-in some cases more abundantly-in a nuclear-powered aircraft missile launcher: invulnerability to enemy missile pinpointing, instant readiness for attack, and practically unlimited range from nuclear propulsion. The mobile Minuteman missile, using our railroads to vary its launching site, will also be largely invulnerable to attack. A nuclear-powered aircraft missile launcher adds to the impressive capability of Polaris and Minuteman the means for much wider dispersion "on station," since it operates in the air. Communications, a problem for submarines, is not a problem for Camal. ANP will also provide something of the utmost importance that is lacking in both Polaris and Minuteman-that is, detailed postattack reconnaissance of bomb damage, which is positively essential for subsequent effective counterforce attacks. The relative invulnerability of these land-, sea-, and air-based systems will give us a diversified residual capability regardless of the magnitude or effectiveness of an enemy attack upon our surface installations. The surviving hardened, fixed missile sites would also become a part of our residual capability. If we assume that our nation and the aggressor nation have achieved a similar state of technology, the factor of vulnerability (as modified by quan tity) will determine how much remains of our strategic force after a nuclear ballistic-missile exchange. Airborne aircraft are practically invulnerable pro vided they stay beyond range of the enemy's radar and air defense weapons. Since invulnerability is attained merely by being airborne, subsonic flight is adequate. An altitude ceiling should not concern us unduly. As radar operates on line of sight, aircraft can avoid detection and proceed much closer to an enemy's territory by flying at low altitudes. if deterrence should fail A concept has been advanced that envisages a number of nuclear-powered aircraft missile launchers cruising subsonically at, say, 20,000 feet above land, sea, or arctic regions. A ballistic-missile nuclear exchange between fixed ground targets can have no effect upon the operational capability of the airborne aircraft. This independence of action is enhanced if the airborne force has its own airborne command post. Such a post must be capable of assimilating intelligence, programing restrikes, and transmitting a restrike program to the remaining land, sea, and air missile units for their use. Even the loss of the airborne force's air base with all its complex ground environment will not detract from the immediate offensive capability of this force. Camal would probably not be assigned an active role until a day or two after initial attack against known, fixed bases. There is no valid reason for expending ALBM's against preselected fixed targets that can be destroyed equally well by less flexible ICBM's and IRBM's. The inherent flexibility and mobility of ALBM's become predominant after an initial nuclear exchange. Then is the time to use our invulnerable residual force to destroy the enemy's remaining capability. By waiting until after the initial exchange, we capitalize on Camal's reserve missiles and ensure acceptable attrition on its vital reconnaissance missions. Since reload of Camals will be difficult, we must expend our ALBM's with utmost effectiveness. They must be used to do those jobs that no other missile can do. The main objective during the first few hours of global war is to inflict as much destruction as possible on the enemy's offensive capability while preserving sufficient residual capability of our own to ensure, beyond question, that we will ultimately bring about the conclusion of the war on terms favorable to us. The all-important residual capability will be composed of surviving hardened missile sites, unused Polaris missiles aboard submarines, mobile Minutemen, and airborne Camals. reconnaissance by Camal Postattack reconnaissance is vital. We should not be misled into believing that a secure, invulnerable, residual capability alone constitutes effective deterrence. It does not go far enough. The ability to destroy cities and people is an unlikely deterrent if it is known by both sides that we can not ultimately prevail. After an attack we might have a sizable number of nuclear weapons still intact under the seas, on land, and in the air; but unless the location of the enemy's surviving force is known, our weapons would be expended blindly against previously determined targets-or not expended at all. The prac tical military value of our remaining weapons without postattack reconnaissance is greatly reduced. There exists, then, the vital task of reconnaissance. Some preliminary reconnaissance can be provided by our bomber aircraft, which must be airborne as soon after the war starts as possible. Since their fuel is limited, we can safely assume that within 12 hours after the war has started our bombers will be withdrawing from the enemy's territory. During that first 12-hour period our bombers will provide us with fragmentary reconnaissance-fragmentary because the rapidly changing situation will prevent systematic reconnaissance. It is obvious that only a large and wellequipped airfield can "turn around" a B-52 for a restrike or reconnaissance mission. And it is doubtful that many large airfields will remain operational --in any event we cannot plan on their use. Our bomber force, then, will give us some measure of reconnaissance during the first few hours of the war only. When their fuel is exhausted, even our fragmentary reconnaissance will cease. The Camal, on the other hand, having unlimited fuel, can provide the precise postattack reconnaissance we need to locate targets for our residual force. Subsonic speed during the reconnaissance mission is permissible ⚫ because of the widespread destruction of the enemy's defense force by our ICBM'S, IRBM's, and bombers. ⚫ because some ALBM's can be expended against surviving air defense targets during penetration, and ⚫ because of the capability for low-level penetration provided by limitless nuclear fuel. At least one half of the initial number of airborne missiles could be retained until reconnaissance has been completed and a counter-force restrike plan devised. Maintenance of a deliverable reserve is essential to conclusion of the war. If the Polaris submarines and mobile Minuteman units have a reload capability, these reloaded missiles also could be effectively brought to bear on the enemy with the help of Camal reconnaissance. Such a reconnaissance would eliminate reliance on vastly inferior and essentially blind preselected targeting. reconnaissance by earth satellite Since reconnaissance is so essential to applying our residual capability precisely, effectively, and in exactly the right amount, we must discuss the value of earth satellites as reconnaissance vehicles. Prior to initiation of war, satellites will provide invaluable intelligence. But satellites travel in a highly predictable orbit, and after several circuits of the earth their precise location at any given instant can be computed with a remarkable degree of accuracy. Development of an antisatellite missile will be a much easier task than development of an antimissile missile. If we plan to use satellites for reconnaissance after hostilities commence, we must launch new satellites from relatively invulnerable launching and monitoring sites or develop a maneuverable satellite. The difficulties and expense of the first alternative are apparent. As to the second, the energy requirements for significant and repeated altera tion of a satellite's orbit are of an order considerably beyond today's technology. The guidance and programing for a maneuverable satellite will also present extreme difficulties. Camal force structure What could be the approximate size of an effective Camal force? The yardsticks used are admittedly general. The first consideration is the number of ALBM's we desire to have airborne every minute of every day of the year -say, 200 missiles. Next let us assume that each Camal will carry five missiles. Then I think we would require 40 operational aircraft airborne at all times. If we assume a utilization rate of 67 per cent (not at all unreasonable for this type aircraft), then our operational force must total 60 aircraft. To this figure we must add 17 aircraft for training purposes and an estimated 10 per cent or 8 aircraft for major modification, depot overhaul, etc. Our tɔtal requirement is now 85 aircraft, exclusive of aircraft for research and development. The total aircraft buy would be perhaps 100 units and be spread over several years. Camal crews. How many crews would be required? The combat-alert sortie length could perhaps be as much as seven days (168 hours), with each crew performing one alert sortie every two months. We would then need about eight crews for each of the 40 airborne aircraft or 320 crews. Adding 15 per cent to our required crew strength for leave and duty not involving flying, and approximately 10 per cent for a normal crew upgrading load, means an additional 80 crews. This brings the total to 400 crews needed to keep 40 aircraft continuously airborne in combat-ready status. Because of the long period of time airborne on combat alert, the crew will be large, similar to what we today call "augmented." But we cannot know how much it will be augmented until we run actual tests simulating a seven-day flight. Perhaps in excess of two individuals, on the average, will be required for each crew position. This figure of 2+ is too high in terms of the aircraft commander; it may be too low for individuals whose duties require extreme concentration or who must pay close attention to detail while on duty. Camal bases. Because ANP provides unlimited fuel and because the aircraft is airborne for a long period, Camal will need very few air bases. Two zi bases, perhaps one in the Northeast and one in the Northwest, could handle the 85 aircraft and generate 500 sorties per month. With only two air bases, savings in real estate, facilities, runways, highly skilled maintenance personnel, and expensive ground environment are apparent. The air bases should be located on the seacoast in order to minimize flight time over populated areas. Dr. Miles C. Leverett, Manager of the Development Laboratories of the Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion Department of the General Electric Company, has found that, assuming no fission product release, the principal radioactive exhaust material from nuclear-powered aircraft would be argon-41. A radioactive form of an inert gas that is one of the minor components of air, argon-41 emits gamma rays that are potentially |