hazardous but have a halflife of only 110 minutes. The possibility of damage being done by argon-41 released from a plane at high altitude is nil. According to Dr. Leverett, nitrogen, the chief ingredient of air, might be transformed occasionally into radioactive nitrogen-16, but after a few seconds this would decay into ordinary atmospheric nitrogen.

A force of the size depicted represents a large dollar investment. However, its low vulnerability and the enemy's certain knowledge that we possess the means to utilize effectively our residual capability would certainly add immeasurably to our deterrence.

A strategic offensive force with a credible residual capability would constitute-even under the most adverse conditions-an effective deterrent for years to come. The nuclear-powered ALBM-carrying aircraft contributes to this deterrent in two unique ways:

It would extend the area of our strategic force's invulnerability from the land and seas into the air.

• It would provide vital photo, visual, and electronic reconnaissance to ensure proper application of all our remaining weapons.

With a possible loss of missile superiority by the U.S. already predicted, the potentialities of a nuclear-powered aircraft missile launcher become extremely important. Authorities resist it with the argument that the first Camal would be big and slow by B-58 or B-70 standards. If we wait, they say, we will surely have a much higher-performance vehicle because of our advancing technology.

failure of U.S. to have operational Camal force first

What could happen if a potential aggressor nation possesses a first-generation Camal in operational numbers before we do? In addition to the tremendous prestige factor, there are even more important considerations. Visualize a massive enemy nuclear attack against the free world. Our zı and overseas missile and bomber bases are brought under attack simultaneously. The enemy's long-range air force follows the missile attack. Our BMEWS and Midas provide the alarm of ballistic missile attack by which we ready our own ballistic missiles and actually launch our SAC alert force. The alert force is on its way to targets in enemy territory. These aircraft may be launched without Executive decision, since they operate under conditions of "positive control." Executive decision to fire our ballistic missiles will probably be made only after enemy missiles strike U.S. targets. This is understandable because of our extreme reluctance to strike at an aggressor with any chance of error. Then, and only then, preselected enemy targets would be struck by our surviving land- and sea-launched missiles. After several exchanges we would still have usable weapons under the seas and on land, but the problem would be knowing what enemy targets remain unhit.

After the enemy's long-range air force withdraws and with our air defenses greatly disrupted, to say the least, the aggressor's nuclear-powered aircraft can perform bomb damage assessment and photo and electronic reconnaissance of the U.S.

Let us assume that Westover, Hunter, and Travis Air Force Bases received only near misses during the initial exchange, as did several other strategic-force bases and fixed missile sites. Dobbins, Malmstrom, and several other air defense installations are still operational. With this type of intelligence, effective enemy restrike against fixed sites is now possible. Usable U.S. airfields and missile sites are brought under the enemy's restrike attack. Systematic destruction of our residual fixed-site capability is now inevitable.

Against this, lacking detailed reconnaissance, we would have to rely on preselected targeting. Our remaining operational missiles in and on the earth and under the seas would be impotent against the enemy's surviving military targets. How could we continue to apply intelligently our weapons against a military force that is destroying us when we have no idea how effective our own weapons have been or what portion of his force still survives? Would we continue to apply our residual capability indiscriminately until it was exhausted? The threat of indiscriminate application of nuclear weapons has some deterrent value; however, it can only lose a conflict against an enemy who has a postattack reconnaissance capability.

The enemy could resort to ultimatums of unconditional surrender and threaten systematic destruction of our population centers while we would be unable to apply effectively our residual weapons against his offensive force.

IN THE final analysis, it appears that only the measured, precise application of our residual force against the enemy's extant force would ensure conclusion of any future global war in our favor. ANP will provide such a capability. The nation which still has deliverable weapons and the will to apply them when the other nation's weapons have been exhausted or destroyed will ultimately prevail.

It is rather difficult to explain a lethargic attitude toward development of aircraft nuclear propulsion. It should be a matter of grave national

concern.

Headquarters United States Air Force

The Fallacy of the Concept

of Minimum Deterrence

BRIGADIER GENERAL ROBERT C. RICHARDSON III

A

NEW concept of deterrence has recently appeared. Known as "minimum deterrence," this concept offers a panacea for the grave economic and strategic problems of our time. Like most panaceas it is easily stated, for it is based on generalizations and oversimplification.

The concept of minimum deterrence holds that a large counter-force capability is not necessary in our strategic offensive forces and, in fact, is ineffective as a deterrent to general war. This premise is based on two assumptions:

• First, that our strategic offensive forces will be used only in response to an enemy attack; and

• Second, that the enemy will have flushed his offensive forces in the initial attack and hence our counter-force systems will go against empty air bases and missile sites.

As a corollary to this second assumption, the concept of minimum deterrence states that a large counter-force capability which is not usable against the enemy's strategic offensive forces is excessive to our needs-that it can kill many times the number of enemy targets which will be available after the enemy's initial attack.

Proponents of minimum deterrence have maintained that an adequate deterrent posture can be had with a small, secure, strategic force capable of annihilating area targets. In other words, the idea of minimum deterrence is based on maintaining a Free World strategic offensive capability that is composed of bombers and missiles in numbers adequate to destroy an enemy's major centers of population but not adequate, either quantitatively or quali tatively, to destroy his dispersed and hardened offensive forces. The threat to an enemy's centers of population and industry is presented as adequate to prevent him from initiating general war. Nothing is said about deterring lesser acts of aggression.

This attempt to reduce the present strategic counter-force capability by settling for the less costly job of "city busting" is clearly motivated by budgetary considerations. Some proponents of minimum deterrence seem to fear that one full conversion of the strategic offensive forces from existing weapon systems to advanced bombers and intercontinental missiles that are adequate

to deal with the current target system would mean reductions in other forces and capabilities.

Others would like to see the primary strategic target system changed from counter-force targets to cities, since area targets better fit the relative inaccuracies, slow reaction times, and quantitative limitations of some missile systems.

Finally there are some who recognize that a minimum-deterrent posture will provide little deterrence to aggression in peripheral areas and so would maximize justification for building up limited-war forces.

Let us examine minimum deterrence as a strategy for security of the Free World. Is it the most effective means of deterring the Communist bloc from initiating general war? Could it defeat aggressor forces if deterrence should fail? Could it provide effective deterrence to limited war? Would it, in fact, be cheaper than a deterrent based on counter-force capabilities? Unless these questions can be answered affirmatively, the endorsement of a minimum-deterrent concept could have serious consequences for the United States and its Free World partners.

what is deterrence?

Of all the threats we face today, it seems incontestable that general war is the most serious. General war is clearly more likely in the future than it has been to date. This stems from the great increase in the Soviets' relative general-war capability. The ensuing possibilities are that the Soviets might rationalize a valid "win" strategy which would warrant premeditated initiation of general war, or that their improved general-war posture might lead them to taking greater risks in cold- or limited-war aggressions, any of which could progress to general war.

Defeat in a general war would end the independent existence of this nation-probably of the Free World. Only the cumulative effects of defeat in several limited wars could have a like effect. A national policy dedicated to deterrence of war, or to victory if deterrence should fail, must therefore be concerned first with the problem of general war and secondly with lesser

Born of budget considerations and fostered by "small war" protagonists, the concept of "minimum deterrence" is now contesting for national acceptance. Its supporters argue that, since the United States will not strike first, we need only enough retaliatory force to destroy the enemy's area targets. These targets, the reasoning runs, will be all that are militarily worthwhile, since the enemy's missile and bomber forces will already be airborne. To Brigadier General Robert C. Richardson III, Chief of the Long-Range Objectives Group, DSC/Plans and Programs, Headquarters USAF, this means a deterrent force capable only of extracting from the enemy a high cost for his victory rather than one that confronts him with a credible threat of defeat. General Richardson analyzes the concept of minimum deterrence, finds it fallacious, and points out the consequences if it were adopted.

wars. An ideal solution would be a security system that could deter effectively all types of war.

Deterrence is basically a cold-war goal. Obviously if there is a war, deterrence has failed. Deterrence seeks primarily to influence the enemy's intentions. Since we can never know with absolute certainty what the enemy's intentions are or how our actions have affected them, deterrence of an enemy whose military forces are of the same order of magnitude as ours can never be certain. But differently constituted military forces will have varying degrees of deterrent effectiveness.

Military forces that will extract from an enemy a high price for victory do constitute a deterrent. Their degree of effectiveness depends on the enemy's willingness to pay. On the other hand, military forces that confront the enemy with a credible threat of defeat under any circumstances provide a much higher degree of deterrence.

This second type of deterrent force is designed to support completely the only sound military and national policy-that of winning a war should deterrence fail. A force which can do no more than make the enemy pay a high price for victory is clearly not fully responsive to the best interests of the Free World.

It might be said, then, that deterrence is achieved by a combination of military and nonmilitary measures, actions, and capabilities designed to dissuade a potential enemy from deliberately initiating war by convincing him that the cost and the risks involved outweigh his chances of gain. A force adequate to deter under some circumstances is not necessarily a force adequate to achieve victory. But a force adequate to achieve victory under any likely circumstances is also a deterrent force to the highest achievable degree.

relationship to stalemate concept

The advocates of minimum deterrence argue that a force adequate to destroy 100 or more cities will deter an enemy from initiating general war. Since both the Communists and the Free World have forces adequate for destruction of cities on this relatively modest scale, it is clear that minimum deterrence is associated with the so-called stalemate concept.

In brief, the stalemate-minimum-deterrence thesis holds that since general nuclear war could never be initiated by the United States, even if provoked by every means short of a direct attack on the homeland, general war can only begin with an initial enemy attack (also assumed unlikely). In this case the enemy forces must have inevitably "flown the coop," so that there are no useful strategic military targets left to hit.

Thus, by combining the argument that premeditated general war will never occur with the argument that if a general war does occur the U.S. will be hit first, one arrives at minimum deterrence as being an adequate strategy. The fallacy of the "stalemate" theory has been recognized for some time in professional Air Force circles. There are other considerations that deny the validity of minimum deterrence and the resulting "city busting" strategy even more forcefully.