minimum deterrence evaluated

General war. On the face of it a counter-city strategy is suspect. It violates two basic principles:

• The only rational military objective in war is the enemy forces, or targets that affect the forces;

• Destruction which does not affect the outcome of the war in one's favor is irrational and politically and morally unjustifiable.

The proponents of minimum deterrence, while accepting the above in principle, counter with several interlocking arguments:

• Total atomic war can only result from miscalculation or an irrational act; it cannot be conceived of as serving a valid political aim. The classical principles therefore do not apply. The only purpose of total-war forces is to deter total war, and they can do this as effectively by possessing a "revenge" potential as by possessing a valid war-winning potential.

• In the nuclear-missile age there is no prospect of destroying enemy forces-even with the initiative-since missiles can be easily concealed or fired on warning of any attack en route.

• Even if we could find and destroy the Soviet long-range threat, we cannot afford the quantity of sophisticated strategic systems required and still meet other threats which may prove equally dangerous in the long run.

The net effect of accepting the above premises is to concede that Free World survival will be gambled solely on our ability to deter or prevent war and that, should deterrence fail, defeat or at best mutual destruction is inevitable. In our present military environment, dominated by high-yield nuclear weapons delivered over global ranges by missiles or manned aircraft, one cannot show how the capability associated with a minimum-deterrent force can contribute to a satisfactory military outcome, should deterrence fail. This being true, it is not even the best deterrent strategy, since it does not confront an enemy with a credible threat of defeat.

In addition, destruction of centers of population and industry as a means of defeating an enemy in the atomic era is both anachronistic and inhumane. It is a vestige of an era in which the key to victory lay in mobilization of a nation's potential for delivering destruction-its industry and population. Even in World War II strategic bombing was limited to targets that were presumed to affect the military capability, as evidenced by the U.S. daylight pinpoint-bombing of industry. Where cities were attacked, the cities selected as targets were production centers of war materiel. The attacks were justified on the grounds that they disrupted the workers and, hence, war production. In atomic war it is recognized that post-D-day production and mobilization would contribute little or nothing to the outcome. If true, it is hard to see what benefit is to be derived from wanton attack of cities, people, and real estate. Today, victory lies not in the ability to destroy the enemy industrial and manpower potential but rather in the ability to destroy his existing

capability for delivering destruction. Hence a minimum-deterrent force is not an effective general-war deterrent against a nation which has on hand, prior to the opening of hostilities, a large stock of nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them; which has made some provision for the security of an industrial nucleus for recovery purposes; and which has demonstrated willingness to sacrifice human life on an extravagant scale in the attainment of political objectives.

The possessor of a minimum-deterrent force may not take the initiative in general war under any circumstances, including receipt of unequivocal warning of attack. To do so would only guarantee his complete destruction by the enemy's untouched forces in-being.

It is also true that a minimum-deterrent force could not respond rationally to initiation of general war by the enemy, for response would be no more than an act of revenge. Annihilation of the enemy's major cities could not prevent the enemy from completing destruction of the attacked nation to the extent and on a time scale which suited his need and convenience.

A minimum-deterrent force will restrain an aggressive nation from initiating general war only so long as the aggressor feels that conquest by means short of general war is a more advantageous course of action. Thus a minimum-deterrent force sets a price for victory, but one which the Communist bloc may consider reasonable for the attainment of world domination. This concept should perhaps be labeled "partial deterrence" rather than "minimum deterrence."

Limited war. Next, let us see how effective a minimum-deterrent strategy and force may be in relation to limited war.

If this country were to tailor its strategic forces to a philosophy of minimum deterrence, we could not prevent the Communists from launching limited wars in areas of their choosing. They would be well aware that our minimum-deterrent force would be used only as a last resort, if at all, because attack of enemy cities without an accompanying ability to destroy his offensive forces would be national suicide. A Twilight of the Gods philosophy is not part of our heritage.

What has deterred aggression in Europe and in other vital areas for the past ten years has been primarily the counter-force aspect of the general-war capability, backed up by the expressed willingness to use any and all forces to defend the Free World if it should become necessary. An enemy nation is most effectively deterred from attempting major acts of limited aggression if he is made to realize that we have both the will and the physical capability to retaliate with general-war forces and that, should we do so, our possession of the initiative and a counter-force capability will lead to our destroying his general-war retaliatory capability.

We must therefore answer our question, "Could a minimum-deterrent force deter limited war?" in the negative.

Relative cost. It is perhaps pointless to pursue a discussion of whether a minimum-deterrent force is cheaper than a strategic offensive force with a counter-force capability. A force which cannot deter either general or limited war and which cannot achieve victory is not a wise choice at any price.

We would not attempt to challenge the assertion that a minimum-deterrent force would be cheaper in dollars than a counter-force capability if the purchase cycle ended there. But a minimum-deterrent force creates a requirement for unlimited forces to fight limited wars. If our strategic general-war forces can neither deter limited war nor participate in it, we must then create limited-war forces in quantities adequate to meet the Communist threat at any point along a 15,000-mile periphery or at several points simultaneously.

This drain on Allied manpower and resources would more than offset the apparent saving in general-war deterrent forces realized by conversion to a minimum-deterrent force. Another effect of adopting minimum deterrence in the U.S. force structure would be to raise the cost of Allied security, since U.S. mobile forces-even if augmented-can never meet the demands of a limited-war capability to defeat the Soviets in the NATO area alone.

counter-force targeting

It is often argued that in the missile age we shall be unable to locate enemy force targets even if we had the strategic initiative. What are the prospects of finding lucrative force targets in the 1965-1970 time period? Obviously a counter-force capability has little meaning if we cannot find or hit the forces.

The claim that ICBM's can be so concealed that their location will be unknown to us is exaggerated. Intelligence techniques should provide knowledge of the location of hardened sites during the construction period, and they won't move far thereafter. Concealing a completed site is easy compared to hiding the building process, which requires access to roads or rails, labor, heavy equipment, etc.

While the exact location of mobile missiles may not be known, their great vulnerability to slight overpressures should allow us to target these on an area basis with the help of reconnaissance.

Finally, we shall have constant satellite surveillance in the time frame of concern to us. This should provide intelligence on ICBM movements or site construction. We assume that the Soviets know all about our ICBM sites. I see no excuse for granting them a decisive advantage in this respect.

The Free World's strategic force structure and strategic concepts need not be influenced by an assumed unsymmetrical intelligence, reconnaissance, or surveillance capability. We must base our plans on the assumption that we can both find and reach all major Soviet missile and bomber bases by one means or another. We must then see to it that this assumption is vali dated by giving adequate attention to this problem.

This leaves the question of whether or not any nation's warning, decision, and reaction systems can respond quickly enough to save the force from surprise attack. Here we can only rely on judgment. Theoretically it is possible to build a fully automatic response to a missile attack. In practice I doubt if either side can do so or would accept the liabilities of doing so in the foreseeable future.

The enormity of the damage involved in unleashing a nuclear war precludes decentralization of the decision to fire ICBM's to the extent necessary to eliminate substantive delays. The lack of reliability of warning and identification devices and the possibility of spoofing will require unequivocal knowledge of the attack before responding. And fear of accidents will keep the human control factor in the firing sequence.

We must be ready to respond quickly if an enemy's poor timing or premature firings should clearly motivate our decision to retaliate. But if a real case could be made for survival by quick response, there would be no requirement for hardening, mobility, or concealment of strategic missile sites.

In summary, our strategic forces for the foreseeable future cannot rely solely on survival through automatic reaction. Nor should our strategy be unduly influenced by the doubtful assumption that any attack on enemy forces will be frustrated by the enemy's ability to unload his sites and bases while our attack is en route.

From the above analysis it seems clear that a minimum-deterrence, counter-economy strategy and the related force structure make no sense in the 1965-1970 period.

minimum deterrence weakens NATO

In the years since World War II, the bastion of Free World security has come to be the series of international alliances in which the United States accepted a key role either as a formal partner or as an informal supporter. A series of bitter experiences in the postwar years showed clearly that Communist encroachment, with its bag of tricks ranging from fifth columns through Communist-sponsored guerrillas to open aggression by Communist satellites, could only be stemmed by tying the smaller and more exposed countries into alliances with the stronger powers of the West. The final ace in these alliances has always been the strategic total-war forces of the United States.

One of the most far-reaching implications of the minimum-deterrence concept is the disastrous effect it would have upon these alliances. For the sake of brevity, I will discuss this aspect only in relation to NATO. As the strongest and the most vital to Free World defense posture, this alliance is the bellwether.

In a recent presentation on the Berlin situation Dr. Hans Speir discussed Soviet aggressiveness. The extent to which the Soviets are prepared to push the West towards war in this instance can be attributed in part, he states, to pronouncements by responsible American officials to the effect that we would probably no longer honor our commitments to use, if necessary, our strategic forces in defense of our allies.

Numerous public statements in recent months have questioned the willingness of the U.S. to perform its retaliatory role in the NATO defense strategy, should the Soviets attack Europe. Most of these statements claim that the Soviet long-range nuclear capability will, from now on, deter the U.S. from using its strategic forces, except in a case of last resort-that is, a direct attack

on America. Hence, these statements conclude, our commitments should be reduced to a level commensurate with minimum-deterrence philosophies.

Effective deterrence is composed of two elements. First, a reasonably credible and demonstrated military capability to inflict unacceptable damage upon the enemy should he engage in aggression; and second, the declared will to use this capability. It appears today that many individuals are openly challenging the will to use our principal deterrent force in defense of NATO.

Soviet planners, in considering the extent to which they can conduct limited aggression with impunity in the NATO area, are obviously taking into account these public statements, made by Americans, which discredit the validity of our approved national security strategy with respect to the NATO area. These statements are, at the very least, irresponsible in that they invite limited aggression by increasing Soviet confidence that we will not retaliate against their homeland, notwithstanding our commitments.

Whether the U.S. NATO strategy of "the shield and the sword" is valid at this time seems beside the point. If this strategy needs to be revised, then it should be revised within the councils of NATO and the National Security Council, not in the market place.

Today the European public and European leaders count on the U.S. strategic retaliatory capability and on our promises that we will use it in their defense to offset the larger Soviet forces threatening West Europe. Based on the current shield and sword strategy and on faith in American commitments, the NATO forces have been deployed and organized so as to best complement the strategy of forward defense in Germany and strategic retaliation from the U.S. and U.K. The present efforts would publicly “pull the rug" out from under the retaliatory half of the strategy by advocating minimum deterrence and stalemate. Nor do they attempt to solve the resulting problem of how one is to provide an effective deterrent or a truly credible military capability to defend NATO without the support of the strategic air arm. These efforts can only lead to insecurity throughout Europe and the exploitation of the resulting weakness by the locally superior Soviet forces.

It may be useful to recall that NATO force goals have never been downgraded or reduced because of anticipated returns from the U.S. strategic air undertaking. Since the very inception of NATO our Government has sought to obtain the maximum military contribution that the countries concerned could raise and support, given as much U.S. assistance as could be justified to the Congress and the American people each year.

The first NATO plans established the minimum forces required to defend Europe without support from the strategic forces. Following the North Atlantic Council meeting in Lisbon, it became clear to the Western world that these minimum force requirements for a local defense of Europe could not be generated. The necessary choice, now and at that time, was the adoption of a global strategy which combined strategic retaliation with the maximum NATO capability to provide the strongest possible defensive shield in Europe. The alternative was to admit inability to defend Europe at all.

Had the military leaders of the various NATO countries been compelled to advise their political masters that only the forces that could be generated