to support the air operations. The World War II examples were drawn from experience in fighting an all-out war against the Japanese. The Korean War required a major effort on the part of the United States, and it was a war we did not win.

In any future conflict with the Communist powers we must anticipate that logistics as well as political factors will be considered and that our antagonist will throw the greatest possible load upon the logistics system supporting our activities. It is easy to envision a number of places in the world, perhaps in Southeast Asia, where we would be forced to operate from the equivalent of bare strips. One can readily visualize the tremendous effort simply to supply fuel, oil, bombs, and ammunition if we were to fight such a war as that in Korea or such as any of the major engagements in the war against Japan, utilizing only napalm and high-explosive bombs and ammunition. Competent studies clearly indicate that it would take a period of several days to be able to mount more than a double handful of sorties a day, considering only the provision of fuel. We really compound our logistic requirements if we must provide iron bombs and napalm tanks and jelly.

To be more specific, a single nominal-yield nuclear weapon, airburst, will clear an area of forest about 8000 feet in radius. To achieve a similar effect with napalm would require 8000 sorties of F-100 aircraft, each carrying four 120-gallon drop tanks. Not only would 32,000 tanks have to be transported to the operating base but 25 million pounds of napalm would also have to be provided, over and above 8000 sorties' worth of fuel. In the Ipo Dam campaign the Fifth Fighter Command dropped just under 700 tons of napalm in two days of intensive operations. One atomic bomb of nominal yield with an airburst would have been more effective in destroying cover, would have left no lingering radiation hazard, and, other than animals in the jungle and forest, would have killed only enemy troops.

Nuclear weapons were not available to us in World War II except at the tag end of the war. Nor did our stockpile contain sizable numbers and varieties of them during the Korean conflict. This situation does not obtain now nor will it in the future. Furthermore our assumed superiority over the Communist powers is qualitative, not quantitative. In any future limited conflict we must maximize our effectiveness and minimize the strain upon our economy. This can only be done through the intelligent application of nuclear firepower. That such firepower can be employed with no more-and perhaps with less-inhumanity than there was in wars of the past I hope to demonstrate in the following discussion of targets.

Limited-War Targeting

Geographical, geopolitical, economic, and cultural factors affect the likelihood of a Communist-instigated limited war. The geographical area we have chosen for a treatment of targeting considerations in limited war may be a no more likely one than many another. Because of the writer's familiarity with the terrain and because of its relatively wide variety of land and vegetation

forms, Southeast Asia has been selected as a hypothetical example to illustrate the application of nuclear firepower against a variety of situation-control targets. The basic principles would apply to any geographical area.

Communist forces have shown again and again that in both large-scale invasion operations and limited guerrilla activities they take maximum advantage of the concealment offered by forest cover. This was beautifully demonstrated in the war against French Indochina, where the Communists were able to assemble, to move, and to fight under cover so that the French forces were rarely able to see them or to estimate accurately their capabilities.

In Southeast Asia standard interdiction targets, including roads, bridges, railways, and rivers, will be few in number and low in value. In most cases the Communists will have the advantage of nearby vegetation cover for concealment. They have repeatedly demonstrated the capability to move under cover while minimizing their use of standard transportation routes and facilities. Air targets of the standard communications-center type will play a relatively minor role in Air Force limited-war operations in Southeast Asia.

The basic Air Force operational problem in most limited-war tactical situations will be that of weapons delivery against an enemy who can almost always operate under vegetation cover of such density and extensiveness that detection and precision bombing are almost impossible. In addition to vegetation cover, areas of eroded limestone, karst areas, provide earth cover in the form of caves and extremely rugged terrain. Detection by aerial reconnaissance can generally be avoided by enemy forces. Air Force preplanning, in the sense of standard lists of fixed targets against an enemy in this environment, is next to impossible. Since standard communications-center and interdiction targets -targets that can be preplanned-will play a relatively minor role in limited war in Southeast Asia, this study is addressed to the special problem of “situation-control" targets.

The major targeting consideration will be that of providing for the delivery of nuclear weapons on areas involving enemy assembly, movement, and actual combat, where in almost every situation he will be afforded the advantage of concealment. Very little targeting will be possible in terms of preplanning against fixed or pinpoint locations. Targets will usually be discernible and locatable only in terms of general areas in a fluid situation, even where pinpoint objectives are involved. Area saturation of such situation-control targets will be the rule, pinpoint or precision being required only in terms of safeguarding friendly troops and indigenous personnel.

Such targets will require continuing action on a combat necessity basis, where timeliness in weapons delivery is of overriding importance. Nuclear weapons are a critical requirement against such situation-control targets where political considerations permit their use. Timeliness requirements will usually be of such a nature and urgency that the proper or maximum degree of situa tion control can be effected only if the local commander can use nuclear weapons at his own discretion, as modified and controlled by the ground rules prescribed by competent authority.

Target analysis reveals that Southeast Asia presents generally eight cate gories of situation-control targets. The eight situations have been described as:

• rain forest

• valley route (rain, deciduous, or bamboo forest)

• mangrove forest

• bamboo grove

• karst area

⚫ mountain defile

• close-contact siege or redoubt

• beach or amphibious landing

Within the above categories an almost infinite number of individual target situations can be visualized in terms of specific situation-control targets and opportunities for weapons application. Here we will analyze general terrain and weather combinations so that plans for any specific tactical situation can be developed as necessary under one of the above general categories. Nuclear weapons against such targets will usually produce the double effect of (1) disrupting enemy assembly, movement, or battle activities; and (2) clearing away jungle or forest concealment, thus ensuring increased effectiveness from continued nuclear attacks against enemy positions.

The examples we shall present are not to be construed as actual targets or associated with probable courses of action by an enemy. They were selected purely as examples of the general categories of situation-control targets to be found in Southeast Asia and are used to depict weapon effects in various terrain and forest-cover situations. In applying sample weapons to these targets, zero winds have been assumed in most cases. Fallout must always be considered in connection with the safety of friendly troops, but in relation to the enemy is a bonus effect. For ground-burst weapons the fallout pattern will vary with type of weapon, wind direction, and velocity. Airburst will usually be recommended so as to minimize fallout. Figures reflecting personnel casualties are based on the assumption that troops are under forest cover or in the open. In neither case have they taken passive protection measures.

Examples of Situation-Control Targets

A summarized example, with illustration, of one type of tactical control situation is presented for six of the general categories mentioned earlier. Of course many variations in situation are possible under each general category in such items as weather, terrain, forest cover, tactical situation, and weaponeffects requirements. The six typical examples are offered as a basis for planning in terms of specific combat situations.

Rain Forest

1. Description: Rain forests are dense and the trees generally tall. Crown canopy is thick and storied in varying layers. Unlike jungles, the rain forest often has sparse ground vegetation, involving a carpet of ferns, a tangle of canes, or groves of creeping bamboo and palms where the sun reaches the

forest floor or at the edge of the forest. Such undergrowth replaces the high forest as canebrake along streams and is insufficient to deter jungle-trained troops.

2. Situation: Enemy forces have invaded a friendly country and are regrouping. A vast irregular-shaped rain forest is located between the enemy and his attack objectives, i.e., population centers of the friendly nation. The indigenous air force, using nonnuclear weapons, has destroyed a concentration of small boats and rafts on a major river flowing through the jungle into the friendly nation. Small indigenous naval forces patrol the river. Combat air

patrols over the river have further discouraged logistical support of the invasion by this means. Preliminary nonnuclear strikes by the indigenous air force have caused the enemy to disperse into the periphery of the dense forest. Intelligence reports indicate that the enemy is planning to continue invasion through the forest, without the assistance of vehicles and with each soldier carrying his own ammunition and food.

U.S. Air Force elements have arrived and attempted reconnaissance of the forest. The excellent cover afforded the enemy prevents locating him or collecting information concerning the disposition of any of his forces known to have invaded the country.

The vast forest covers several hundred square miles. Photo interpretation and intelligence studies of the forest for possible choke points eliminate large areas as likely penetration routes because of steep ridges and other natural barriers. Final analysis reveals a corridor 60 nautical miles wide which the enemy must cross to reach his objectives. Intelligence indicates that the invading forces have not had sufficient time to reach this corridor. Action is initiated either to block his progress through this area or to trap him in a concentrated area for purposes of direct nuclear attack on his forces. 3. Nuclear Weapons Application:

a. Blast Effects:

A single nominal-yield weapon, airburst, has significant blast effects over approximately a 3.7-NM diameter. Sixteen of these weapons, airburst with minimum overlap, would create a debris belt in excess of 58 NM in length and effectively block the forest corridor. Since a zero circular error is unlikely and overlap and gap of weapons effects are probable for any delivery method, the requirement for 16 nominal-yield weapons to block this rain-forest corridor represents a conservative estimate.

Six high-yield weapons would cover an area greater than that covered by 16 nominal-yield weapons. Also there is less probability of gapping and overlapping. With a single high-yield weapon burst at optimum altitude, a circular area approximately 11 NM in diameter would be subjected to blast damage, i.e., limb breakage in the center and denuding of stems and leaves at the outer edges. Six such weapons would create a 67-NM-long debris belt. An additional uncalculated bonus effect when applying the larger-yield weapon results from the "K" factor, an intensifying blast effect associated with the longer duration of the positive phase of larger nuclear weapons. Depending on the nature of the target, more damage can be achieved with less or equal overpressure if the overpressure lasts for a longer period of time, as is the case with high-yield weapons. The degree of blast intensification from K-factor effects cannot be predicted for forest stands, since experimental data are not available.

Jungle-trained troops moving on foot would experience great difficulty in crossing the debris-belt barrier. Even if such an attempt were made, they would be exposed and interdiction would be easier. Attempts to clear a path or road through the debris would require such a concentration of manpower and machinery or elephants (used extensively in forestry activities in Southeast Asia) that another lucrative nuclear target would be provided. Creating