S

Nuclear Weapons and
Limited War

GENERAL FREDERIC H. SMITH, JR.

|INCE the delivery of atomic weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki a few days before the termination of World War II, the world has come to recognize the probable use of nuclear weapons in any general war, with a somewhat lesser appreciation of the immediate and long-term effects upon civilization as a whole. It is safe to say that knowledgeable people in every nation rightly construe an all-out nuclear war between the Communist powers and the free world as being destructive beyond real comprehension, a horror to be avoided if at all possible.

There is, however, little widespread knowledge of the application of nuclear firepower in limited war. In limited war relatively small-yield weapons can and should be used selectively in such a manner as to avoid the destruction of the countries or populations involved and still achieve military objectives at nominal cost. As a result of ignorance and in the absence of clear-cut tactical doctrine, the general feeling of horror engendered by the prospect of a world holocaust, which is reasonable, has been applied to any employment of nuclear weapons in limited war, which is unreasonable.

This confused thinking is not confined to the man in the street but is unfortunately shared by many men in scientific, governmental, and military circles. We in the Air Force have been remiss in our failure to explore fully the wide range and flexibility now available to us in the family of weapons and to enunciate clearly our doctrine for tactical application of these weapons in limited war. We cannot afford to lose friendly nations and territories to the U.S.S.R., Red China, or their satellites under any circumstances. It certainly would be inexcusable if we were to lose them simply because we failed to capitalize on our great potential through a basic lack of understanding or lack of imagination as to how to use the weapons we now have.

The purpose of this article is to demonstrate that not only can the intelligent use of nuclear firepower in limited war give us the greatest possible opportunity to win such wars at minimum cost to us and to the country we

may be defending against aggression, but that it is highly probable that without the use of such weapons our chances of winning in many areas are slim indeed.

The Threat and Our National Objectives

Any lengthy treatment of the subjects involved under this heading is certainly unnecessary here. The teachings of the Communist ideology are well known to all readers, as well as the vast disparity between the pure manpower resources available to Soviet Russia, her satellites, and Red China on the one hand and to the organized free nations of the world on the other. In the application of this manpower in limited wars the Communist hegemony has the advantage of operating on interior lines and of being able to expend a great number of lives and a large commitment of currently obsolescent material without any sensible reduction of its over-all capacity to wage global war.

On the other hand the industrialized nations of the free world, in opposing aggression, must operate on exterior lines in most parts of the world and can ill afford heavy loss of life or heavy commitment of modern equipment without a reduction in the capability to wage global war. It follows, therefore, that if we are to prevent further Communist expansion at the expense of friendly or neutral nations we must find an economical method of waging successful limited war.

What Do We Mean by Limited War?

Classically a limited war might be defined as any armed conflict short of direct combat between the great powers. If this article is to avoid generalities and clear up misunderstandings through a frank discussion of specifics, this definition needs further explanation.

In the first place we must realize that both the U.S.S.R. and the United States possess ample force to erase any small country as an effective sociological or industrial unit. It would be possible for their air forces to eliminate opposition within and bordering such a country by indiscriminate bombing with nuclear weapons of the sections held by the enemy. Such a defense of an ally obviously would not only be unattractive to that ally but would negate any political advantage to be gained by waging this kind of a limited war.

By extension, there is a very definite upper limit to the destruction of life and property that is consistent with the successful attainment of our objectives. While we cannot specify a general cutoff point at which the tactical advantages of further destruction would be outweighed by the political disadvantages, it is patent that there will be one. The achieving of tactical objectiveswith a minimum application of force will be a serious factor in selecting targets and in determining tactics. These considerations are the very ones that have been used in the past as arguments against the employment of nuclear weapons in small wars. The considerations are real; the conclusions that have been drawn are invalid.

Whether armed resistance to Communist aggression by the United States and its allies can in effect be limited to local areas and not spread to global conflict depends not only upon the will of the combatants but upon geography and geopolitics. The nations in the European economy are alike enough in culture and interdependent enough economically (and in a sense politically) that it is difficult to visualize a limited war being fought in that area. But in the Far East a limited war has already been fought in Korea, and in Southeast Asia one has been fought in Indochina. In the Middle East actions taken by the United States and Great Britain in Lebanon and Jordan might well have resulted in limited-war situations. In each of these examples neither of the chief antagonists desired global war; and in Korea and Indochina their wish to avoid it was strong enough to have permitted the tactical use of selected nuclear weapons without serious danger of all-out war, with peculiar and distinct advantages accruing to the United States, her allies, and the free world.

It is clear that nuclear weapons cannot be used haphazardly if we are to keep the war limited and avoid undue destruction to the friendly countries we are defending. Certain very clear-cut restrictions must be placed upon their use-restrictions in targets, in yields, and in character of bursts. The objectives of a limited war must be explicitly defined by higher authority and should include a restriction on strikes outside a delimited zone of hostilities. A limited aggression can be effectively countered under such conditions, and we should develop plans and concepts on this basis.

New criteria for the selection of appropriate targets for nuclear weapons in limited war need to be developed. These must admit a new class of targets, categorized as "situation-control" targets. Typical situation control would be the use of nuclear weapons to destroy forest cover and thus to deny the enemy concealment or passage. Another would be the closing of narrow gorges in mountains by causing extensive land slides. The commander on the spot must have the option of expending weapons in the zone of conflict within his allocated stockpile in accordance with his judgment of the situation, at the same time remaining within the explicit policy guidance concerning the acceptable categories of targets and methods of weapon employment placed upon him by

One of the most frustrating aspects of the entire cold-war period for the military commander or planner has been the host of unpredictable factors involved in possible limited wars. The location, the enemy, the size, the political conditions, the weapons, and the tactics of such a war have all seemed fated to be left unspecified until the last moment. General Frederic H. Smith, Jr., Corimander in Chief, United States Air Forces in Europe, feels that much of this uncertainty would be removed if the United States should publicly reserve the right to use nuclear weapons in limited wars, just as it has already done for general war. Further, he details a concept for the effective use of such weapons. Under this concept, difficult terrain features would become the targets for nuclear attack, with the tactical intent of denying to enemy troops the cover and camouflage offered by these features and of blocking the passage of troops through critical areas.

higher authority. Counter-air-force targets would of course be brought under attack within the designated confines of the conflict, but in most instances this would require careful selection of weapons and a high precision in delivery to obviate undue loss of life to the indigenous peoples.

Historical Situations Favoring Nuclear Firepower

World War II situations

During World War II in the Southwest Pacific, conditions prevailed which made attainment of Allied military objectives-and, in fact, containment of aggressive Japanese forces-an extremely difficult proposition. The battlefields in New Guinea, New Britain, the Philippines, Indonesia, and the Solomons were covered to a large extent with dense forests, including rain forest, dense bamboo, mixed bamboo and deciduous forest, and mangrove swamps. Much of the area was hilly or mountainous. Our forces had little experience or capability to cope with this battlefield environment. The Japanese troops were experienced, had been jungle-trained, and could take utmost advantage of all opportunities afforded by the terrain.

To complicate matters, at least at first, air support by Allied air forces was ineffective. The enemy forces were able to assemble, to move, and to fight in such a way that Allied forces were rarely able to see them or accurately estimate their capabilities. Targets in the classical sense of the word, i.e., concentrations of personnel and material that could be pinpointed, were extremely limited. Eventually napalm became a primary weapon in close support in the Southwest Pacific as it became available in quantity late in the war. Used in conjunction with demolition weapons, napalm became one of the most effective means of driving enemy forces into the open for subsequent attacks with fragmentation bombs and strafing. This combination of tactics not only was employed against jungle-concealed objectives but was used very effectively against enemy troops entrenched in caves.

The Ipo Dam. Coincident with the cleanup of Manila, elements of the XIV Corps were penetrating to the edge of Laguna de Bay to divide enemy forces to the southeast and southwest of the city. The 6th Infantry and 1st Cavalry Divisions pushed into the mountains north of Laguna, where the former captured Montalban by the end of February 1945. Both divisions then reached Japanese defensive lines, consisting chiefly of elaborate cave positions. The positions were fairly well stocked with equipment, weapons, and food, and the advance became necessarily slow.

The usual method of attack was to smother the caves with air and ground bombardment so that demolition parties could approach and seal the tunnel entrances. Heavy bombers struck every significant target, especially enemy concentrations in the vicinity of Antipolo and Ipo. On 6 March, 98 B-24's dropped 250 tons of bombs on Antipolo. Some 450 fighter attacks in the area between 8 and 11 March further lightened the task of the 1st Cavalry, which reported that the terrific bombing had literally blown the enemy out of his defenses.