flexibility of their sea power to achieve their purpose. By landing small forces and stimulating local rebellion in widely scattered areas, they forced the continuous deployment of Napoleon's troops from one end of Europe to the other, thus exhausting him economically and paving the way for Waterloo. The analogous strategy in technological warfare is shown in the present situation with the Soviet Union. For example, the enemy breaks out in the satellite field and forces a complete redeployment of our resources in that direction. Once we have committed ourselves to this course, the next action of the enemy is to make a breakout in the field of nuclear-powered aircraft with the hope that this would force a redeployment of our economic and technical resources. This process could be repeated almost indefinitely as new concepts became available.

This, then, is the primary strategy of technological warfare: to force the enemy to compete at a technological disadvantage while recommitting his resources as frequently as possible to his own economic disadvantage. When a nation is ahead in a given technical field, it is very difficult for an adversary to catch up without the development of a new concept. Thus a victory immediately places the enemy on the strategic defensive, and the trends are all in favor of the victor.

As to our objective in the current technological war, it is obviously essential that we regain the initiative as soon as possible by the effective application of new weapon concepts. Having achieved a favorable position in the technological struggle, we should then concentrate on changing emphasis in technical fields when this can be done to our economic advantage and the enemy's disadvantage.

The tactics of technological warfare as opposed to its strategy are perhaps best illustrated by the timing of Soviet announcements at the time of the launching of the first satellite. It will be remembered that the Soviets, within a few days of the launching of Sputnik I, announced that a very-highaltitude nuclear explosion had been set off over Siberia. It is probable that this explosion was balloon-borne, although it may have been rocket-borne. In any case there was no military relationship between the two events. But to the uninformed public in Europe and Asia the juxtaposition of these two technical events seemed to imply that the Soviets had the ability to place a satellite over any point on earth and to release a hydrogen bomb from it at any time they pleased. This was a completely false conclusion, but nonetheless the psychological effect upon the European people and even upon the European military was quite profound, as those of us who were in Europe at the time can testify. The tactics of technological warfare consist of the manner in which new discoveries are displayed to the enemy and to the neutral populations of the world, either singly or in combination with other technical achievements.

If we are to fight this type of war, then clearly some agency or individual must have the responsibility for fighting it. The tactics and strategy of any war cannot be trusted to chance but must be carefully coordinated and planned with other activities at the national level. In my opinion this is perhaps the greatest deficiency in our national structure at this time. Such

an operating agency would have to have certain characteristics. First of all, it would of necessity contain a combination of technical and military personnel, although it should be strongly emphasized that the technical personnel should not be specialists and the military personnel should not be tactical in their thinking. What is required for this organization is the best strategic thinkers of both professions. Furthermore it should not be an advisory group but an operating agency. For such an organization to operate, the military and scientific thinking must be closely integrated at all times, and the agency should have the authority to influence directly the timing of United States technical-publicity releases. Such an agency should eventually report directly to the President. In the meantime, however, it appears that there would be great value in undertaking a consideration of the problem immediately even at the level of the Department of Defense or, perhaps, of the Air Force.

TECHNOLOGICAL warfare is here to stay. As a matter of fact I would estimate that already more time and money are probably being spent for this form of war than for military warfare. All the great missile and satellite programs now under way must be presumed to be of much more significance in technological warfare than in military war at the present. We may reach the time when general military war may be suicidal for any nation. The substitution of technological warfare, although costly, cannot compare to the cost of fighting an all-out nuclear war whether we win or lose. Furthermore technological warfare has the advantage of offering an arena for important competition in which to release international tensions and provide for the healthy development of societies.

We are engaged in such a war now, and yet our entire organization is designed around the fighting of a potential military war. Should we not seriously consider, as a nation, the necessary reorganization to permit us to compete at an advantage in what is likely to be the most popular and potentially decisive form of warfare during our generation?

Minden, Nevada

that immediately promise limited employment with eventual prospects of revolutionary effect.

For this was the decade of the hydrogen bomb, of jet against jet in combat, of supersonic speeds in level flight, of intermediate-range and intercontinental-range ballistic missiles, of orbiting satellites, of man's first contact with the moon, and of man's first dim view of the reverse side of the moon. In this decade the speeds of manned vehicles rose from about 600 miles per hour to more than 1500 miles per hour. The speed of his fastest weapon system rose to 16,000 miles per hour. The altitudes with which man had practical concern rose from about 20 miles to some 300,000 miles, and he probed out some 120,000,000 miles with vehicles orbiting around the sun.

While manned aircraft made spectacular advances during the decade, and the X-15, nuclear flight propulsion, and impending increases in rocket thrust promise to put manned vehicles back into the forefront by the end of the 1960's, the 1950's were essentially the decade of the ballistic missile. It was the missile that brought the bounding technological revolution of the mid-century into the world limelight and kept it there. For it was with the ballistic missile that prescient technology became recognized as a dominant factor in the power struggle between the free world and the Communist world. From 1952, when the successful hydrogen bomb gave the ballistic missile the warhead potential that made it an ominously significant strategic weapon, the race for operational ballistic missiles was on between the United States and the U.S.S.R. Then when the first Soviet Sputnik flashed into orbit, the ballistic missile began its second career as the booster for satellites and space probes. From that day in October 1957 until the close of the decade in 1959 the dual contest for operational missiles and space triumphs continued in a zigzag of world headlines.

For many reasons the space ventures have attracted and held world attention. There is the sheer spectacle. There is the feeling of participation as man attacks the great frontier that moves out from his own planet toward contact with other worlds. But as technological achievement centered itself firmly in the arena of man against space and of nation against nation, a feeling began to grow, though still nebulous in form, that the whole matter of space exploration had much more meaning to the United States than might reside simply in a new area of scientific exploration. The venture into space had become the showcase for advanced technology, in which the relative strong points and weaknesses of United States and Soviet progress stand out more boldly than elsewhere along the broad technological front.

As a result of this interest and concern, the year 1960 has opened with many-sided debate and examination of American progress in space: its relative success, its relative importance and urgency, its organization, and the scope and kind of exploratory program that is planned for the future.

Hardly with expectation of answering any of these debated points or even of encompassing them all but with hope of offering some modest synthesis of the rather scattered scientific record concerned, the Editors of Air University Quarterly Review have assembled a factual summary of U.S. and Soviet space explorations through December 1959.

Launching power for the U.S. satellites and space probes during the 1950's came mainly from the four boosters and the three-stage Vanguard rocket shown here. With the exception of the Vanguard rocket, which was developed solely for IGY scientific experiments, all launchings used military-developed "first-generation" missiles boosters. For space as use, these missiles were modified to carry additional fuel and to accommodate upper stages.